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Crises have littered human history with serious consequences for both the country and its
people. The 2008 Great Recession and Asian Financial Crisis are exemplars of such serious
economic and social damage that took many years to recover. Debt default is one of the main
contributors to crises and has long lasting effects on the economy. This thesis illustrates a mac-
roeconomic model for Open Economies that can simulate a range of economic policy settings
and strategies for managing debt in a crisis. The simulations provide insight into the possible
outcomes for small and medium sized economies that may aid policy development to prevent
and mitigate the effects of a crisis. Moreover, this thesis explores the economic and political
ideologies and how they have influenced macroeconomic policy development with potentially
negative outcomes for the least able in society. Rather than use one economic ideology, the
underpinning analysis draws on many different economic schools to interpret what is a neo-
classical Real Business Cycle style model with many extensions and adaptations. This model
and its software system is adaptable to a wide range of country settings that can support the
evaluation of possible economic policy, debt and crisis management strategies. The underlying





A Tale of Two Cities
1.1 Introduction
Now as I conclude this work in July 2020, with one of the most severe human public health
and economic crisis in living memory brings me to recollect a book from my teens, the first
paragraph:
“It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it
was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity,
it was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope,
it was the winter of despair, we had everything before us, we had nothing before
us, we were all going direct to Heaven, we were all going direct the other way
– in short, the period was so far like the present period, that some of its noisiest
authorities insisted on its being received, for good or for evil, in the superlative
degree of comparison only.” - Charles Dickens, Tale of Two Cities.
So why would I start with something political, moral and a commentary on the social condition
for an economics work?
Without context of the political landscape and social conditions we often find ourselves when in
a crisis, one cannot describe, characterise or make morally sound economic policy arguments
or insights into crises. They tend to have a disproportionate effect on society although such
crises tend to be a consequence of mixed capitalist economies. Income and wealth differentials
develop across the socio-economic spectrum depending fiscal and monetary policies responses
to a crisis (Mitchell, Wray and Watts, 2019; Dosi et al., 2013; Blyth, 2013). Therefore it is import-
ant to understand the dynamics and consequences to households, firms, the government and
foreign investors under different policy settings and fiscal response strategies.
Crises are notoriously hard to forecast with any certainty in either timing and impact (Eicher
et al., 2019). The 2008 crisis is an examples where OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development) predictions indicate that there will be volatility in the markets
leading to a subdued economy, however they were more concerned with too much expansion-
ary activity inducing inflation (OECD, 2008). Of course, the Lucas critique has some bearing
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here, if one is able to forecast a crisis and in some-way prevent or mitigate it, by the nature of
preventing or mitigating a crisis might make government less prepared for the next. If gov-
ernment and other actors took a risk management approach, then they would build in levels
of resilience, have crises plans in place and would exercise them regularly. However human
behaviour eventually reduces the effort and resources put into such measures limiting their
effectiveness. One only has to look at many governments being caught out by Covid-19 even
though with the last twenty years they put in place resources and plans as a result of SARS and
MERS epidemics.
Another aspect is fundamental uncertainty and the diverse treatment of uncertainty by the dif-
ferent schools of economic thought (Dow, 2015). The important aspect of uncertainty in terms
of a crisis is that time, the depth of the crisis, the spillover effects and the tail that eventuates
makes it difficult to ‘insure’ against. If governments and NGO’s (Non-government organisa-
tions) are unable to forecast crises then how can governments prepare and respond to them.
We seek to analyse the effects of different policies and strategies on an open economy that may
be in place ex-ante or ex-post particularly in economies where there are restrictions 1 on credit
by either the imposition of conditions by powerful actors or by treaty.
1.2 Question and Objectives
This naturally brings us to this work’s fundamental motivating question:
Is it possible to create a flexible parsimonious macroeconomic computer simulation
model that can illustrate the frequency, types and time-paths of various financial
crises in an open economy with credit restrictions?
Our motivation for the question is that history tends to repeat itself, or doing the same things
and expecting a different outcome depending on one’s interpretation and perspective. Eco-
nomic, as opposed to political, crises have littered history in all parts of the world. Although
many economic crises have their foundation the political landscape, they can have a funda-
mental step change in both the economic and social order. The 2008 crisis, whether it be from
the regulatory framework or corruption or by some external influence, had a significant differ-
ential impact on countries and socio-economic groups that has left both economic and social
scars (Chambers and Kopstein, 2001; Arulampalam, Gregg and Gregory, 2008; Kapuvari, 2011).
Moreover, the 2020 pandemic and response has a much more polarised policy and strategy re-
sponse across several nations (Gräbner, Heimberger and Kapeller, 2020). It may be that the
polarisation became more evident once the crisis impacts both the general populous and gov-
ernment resulting in events become ever more amplified. Therefore if we can in some way
inform on the range of options open to those that set macroeconomic policy.
1By restriction we mean that part or all of the public debt issuance is in a foreign currency or, as in a monetary
union, the government does not have full control over its monetary policy or a situation where an NGO has imposed
conditions that limit the level of public debt and requiring the government to operate within certain fiscal policy
bounds.
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What we are trying to find is a generally accepted foundational neoclassical model that is not
complicated by many of the New Keynesian frictions that can simulate crises with different
fiscal policy settings, strategies and restrictions. Keeping the foundation simple permits the ex-
tensions to induce model behaviours akin to crises such as sudden stops, double dips, rippling
effects though an economy using quite simple rules based decision making that most policy
makers could easily comprehend. Therefore our objective of this work to address the question
is:
To develop, construct and demonstrate a understandable, flexible model and its
supporting computational environment that simulates the unfolding of different
types of crises with a wide range of fiscal policy settings and government strategies
for bailouts and debt management2.
To this end, this work simulates and discusses macroeconomic crises in the context of different
philosophical economic schools, social and political norms to identify a range of challenges
in responding to a crisis. We take a neoclassical style (Real Business Cycle) macroeconomic
model from the seminal works of Eaton, Gersovitz and Stiglitz (1986); Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2016a); Na et al. (2014) and extend it well beyond the original intent. The extensions include
both private and public sector debt, crisis sequencing, fiscal policy rules and, bailout and de-
faulting strategies. Furthermore, although the core model founds in the neoclassical tradition,
we discuss a range of different economic schools, ideologies and their interpretations and pos-
sible alternative conclusions. Therefore, the reader should expect challenges to the neoclassical
theoretical foundations during this discourse.
We interpret the different simulations and policy scenarios using theories from different eco-
nomic schools. This provides us with a range of insights into policy outcomes ensuring that
we account for the assumptions. Important, and often neglected is the discussion on the as-
sumptions. We discuss the assumptions and evidence in these first two chapters and apply
the interpretations to the model in Chapter 3 though to Chapter 8. The model is not an end
in itself and makes no claim as such. No model, or ideology holds the higher ground, or the
answers to problems and to claim so is to almost has a religious undertone to it (Stiglitz, 2018)3.
Rather than make direct policy recommendations, we seek to show some ideas and insights
founded on the assumptions that will require interpretation by policy makers in the particular
economic, social and political context that they find themselves in.
An important aspect of this model is its flexibility to turn on and off policies and strategies, use
different calibrations, regardless of their stability. We create scenarios from a range of policy
and strategy combinations that we run a stochastic simulation against. Fundamental and an
important difference to many macro models is that it includes private sector debt independent
of public sector debt. To fund these debts we use a foreign ‘banker’ that has limitless funds
to invest and can tolerate crises. The ‘banker’ that provides debt in a foreign currency avoids
2Throughout the work, we will refer to the combination of fiscal policy setting and strategies as a scenario that
we run in simulation to identify and classify crises events.
3Some of the Neoclassical papers that we cite almost border on a religious ideology with the theories and as-
sumptions that form part of the belief system
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to the topic of money creation that we will discuss later. Furthermore, treating the country as
‘small’, although small is relative to the world economy, that is it is a price taker. Further, small
can mean a country that does not have control over the currency it issues debt in or its banking
system. Small, in this context, means there are constraints, means that world market prices for
goods and finance rule somewhat simplifying the model.
1.3 Contextualising Economic Ideology in Crises
Turning back to the Dickens quote, there are some important aspects that we need to draw out
in context of crises and the circumstances that people find themselves in. It presents us with
a set of paradoxes and dualities just as applicable now as they were when Dickens wrote the
work. In the 2020 pandemic, already we can see that it is the ‘best of times’ for some and the
‘worst of times’ for others as it unfolds. One only need to look back at the 2007-8 crisis and the
response by governments following certain economic ideologies and the consequences.
If we take the UK4 for example, the 2008 crisis and the response by both fiscal and monetary
authorities lead to a widening wealth gap across deciles (Gagnon et al., 2019). A consequence
was and is the considerable increase in financial asset wealth largely from the portfolio balance
channel (Joyce et al., 2011; Shah et al., 2019). Net wealth remained static for the lowest wealth
deciles whereas growth rates in the upper wealth deciles grew at rates 40% to 140% in 10 years
well in excess of long run capital returns (Gagnon et al., 2019). Moreover, low income groups
saw real wages decrease from 2008 onwards in many developed economies. Bailouts, in these
cases, did not compensate low income groups for the substantial losses in both wealth and
income, whereas the wealthy were compensated for the losses. Therefore, who is targetted
with a bailout and who are the eventual beneficiaries is an important question often ignored
by the neo-liberal and neoclassical ideologies.
This leads to the second point, “...age of wisdom and age of foolishness...”. For parsimony,
homogeneous agents are the core tenor of most macroeconomic models, although there are
some with limited heterogeneity. Such models are both tractable and solvable mathematically.
We can characterise the models in this work being from that tradition. If one was to develop
policy from those models then one falls into the trap that we illustrate before. This is ignoring
the asymmetric distributional factors so evident from the 2008 crisis. Then to repeat it would
be foolishness itself. As in Colander and Freedman (2018) and Fullbrook and Morgan (2020),
this is a criticism not only for classical economic schools, it is for all schools, Therefore any
recommendation needs to be tempered with caution, particularly when making policy insights
for crisis events.
This work will rail against some of the received wisdom5 of current mainstream macroeco-
nomic ideology in favour of other philosophies and ideologies that might give greater insight.
Nevertheless, those that use such ‘received wisdom’ without qualifying it, in some cases to
4Although the UK has a sovereign debt currency issuing ability, the government at the time chose to act as if
public debt was constrained by the government choosing to follow the neoclassical specification, namely the inter-
temporal budget constraint that imposes Ricardian Equivalence resulting in a policy of Austerity post 2010.
5‘noisiest authorities insisted on it being received....’
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further their own political or social ends need to be questioned and held to account. For ex-
ample, the received wisdom of 2010 UK election was that high levels of government debt is
bad, we need to get the deficit down and blaming it on the last government for the government
debt ‘crisis’. The policy response, government austerity, largely supported by the ‘established’
economics community as the ‘appropriate’ policy response.
“It ain’t what you don’t know that gets you into trouble. It’s what you know for
sure that just ain’t so.” - Attributed to Mark Twain
Such ideology permeated many of the southern EU nations enforced by IMF, ECB and the EC
(Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano, 2003; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011a). As Blyth (2013) illustrates,
the whole concept of austerity and austerity politics is founded on ideas from current classical
economics. These have and continue to be carried though into modern variations with signi-
ficant social and economic cost in the long run. The impacts are severe on poorer, less resilient
households and communities. Compounding factor is the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis
that has left many countries and communities compromised and unable to withstand another
crisis (Arestis and Pelagidis, 2010).
This ‘conservative’ neoclassical economic view mixed well with the politics of ‘conservative’
neo-liberalism that denominates much of European and American politics. This continues to
have a significant impact on Southern European countries and the poor in many others within
Europe. Moreover, the social cost of such policies may be incalculable in economic terms as
well as the breeding ground for right leaning authoritarian actors to take advantage (Micocci
and Di Mario, 2017). Be warned, democracy, the underpinning political system that most eco-
nomists subscribe to, can easily be threatened (Snyder, 2017). There are political implications to
any economic policy and there is political environment that macroeconomic policy must exists
in. One can invoke the extremes in the other. As in Dickens, economic despair often leads to
political action that changes the political order though non-democratic means.
It is important to understand where these ideas come from, we will use a couple by way of ex-
ample. Principally, the inter-temporal budget constraint of governments, banks only interme-
diate money, Ricardian equivalence, expansionary fiscal austerity, that fiscal expansion creates
inflation and crowds out private investment, are all theories that are both taught to under-
graduates and postgraduate as received wisdom. Crises bring into sharp focus these theories
and if or when they actually apply. If governments are to act then they need to comprehend
the real constraints on fiscal investment and expenditures. In answering these questions, one
needs to look at the different economic schools. Austrians are of the mind of that markets will
self correct. Keynesians are for fiscal intervention to make up for the deficit in labour utilisa-
tion, thus create demand and hence investment. This contrast leaves much space for modelling
to compare different policies and strategies before and during a crisis.
How does a government fund the response to a crisis? The classical view is by borrowing
from the private and foreign sectors, normally bonds. Alternatively, central bank can credit
the public accounts with funds, it can just spend it, then settle using an ‘overdraft’ with the
central bank (Wray, 2019; Kelton, 2020). However government may be restricted by lenders to
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borrow in foreign terms (regardless of if it is domestic lenders). Both the classical and foreign
terms borrowing impose an inter-temporal budget constraint on the government. Examples
of this are many middle to low income countries and any country in the EUROZONE. This
restriction means that fiscal expansion is constrained by the debt service levels the economy can
entertain. However, borrowing in domestic currency or foreign investors buy debt in domestic
currency then government can adopt both fiscal and monetary expansion either via the central
bank and/or commercial banks. This changes the dynamic of the economy where government
spends to stimulate and taxes to moderate rather than for funding of government6(Kelton,
2020). Countries such as the USA, UK, Australia that issue debt in their own currency that is
widely accepted can adopt that strategy. As Japan demonstrates, high levels of debt are a false
equivalence to signs of policy mismanagement and economic disaster when debt is in ones
own currency.
With regard to banking and the way that they fund lending, including to the government, has
a material impact on the way that the economy behaves. The loanable funds model or quantity
theory then banks would need the deposits before lending, whereas credit theory states de-
posits are as a result of lending (Faure, 2020). They are diametrically opposed which bring into
question under what circumstance do these different theories apply. Faure and Gersbach (2017)
state equivalency between loanable funds and credit money creation under some extreme cir-
cumstances, that is no default and no failure, making the argument rather obtuse. in Con-
trast, the BoE (McLeay, Radia and Thomas, 2014) with other central banks such as Bundesbank,
Norge Bank and even the Federal Reserve state that banks create and destroy bank money dur-
ing the lending and repayment process. This contradiction created a furore from neoclassical
theorists on what is seen by central and commercial banks as normal banking practice. It is
neoclassical economic thinking that is out of step with the real world, what they know for sure is
just ain’t so.
Loanable funds/quantity theory can easily be incorporated into a traditional equilibrium model
as many do including Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015) and Gertler and Karadi (2015) that make pro-
vision for defaulting. These models somewhat unrealistically ‘engineer’ a fraud to create the
default rather than consider the feedback loop between continued profits and the desire for
more. McLeay, Radia and Thomas (2014) illustrates that bankers have two core preferences,
how much revenue or profit they wish to make and how much risk they are willing to take on.
These desires modify with time and how successful they are normally taking on increasing risk
to counteract falling profits. This falls into the Minsky (1992) that we discuss later. The level of
risk perceived by the banker determines that capital requirement of a bank and not the level of
reserves so often put forward in the neoclassical interpretation.
So why is this important in regard to government default? By construction and legislative edict,
government that can issue debt in their own currency have access to domestic commercial
banks and either directly or indirectly, the central bank. Moreover, the central bank can control
6Where there is enforcement of contracts, rule of law and a stable government that honours its debts, then banks
can lend to the government and create a safe revenue stream that is easily convertible to reserves or liquidity. The
reason that government enter into this arrangement is that many jurisdictions do not allow central banks to lend
directly to the government. This imposes an intermediary step, commercial banks.
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the yield on government debt by buying or selling it as a part of open market operations as QE
(Quantitative Easing) has demonstrated over the 10 years from the crisis (Martin and Milas,
2012; Christensen and Rudebusch, 2012; Joyce et al., 2012, 2011). Banks carry government debt
on their balance sheets as assets to ensure that it has sufficiently liquid assets that it can trade for
reserves whilst still receiving a (small) return. Unfortunately, the financial crisis demonstrates
how easy it is to increasingly go for more risky assets to increase profitability believing those
assets were ‘as safe as houses’.
So this brings us to why we needed to cover this first? How is it relevant to a work on Crises and
debt? Context, the epistemological foundations are provide frame that we assess any analysis
and this work because as Santayana (1905) states
“The line between what is known scientifically and what has to be assumed in order
to support knowledge is impossible to draw”
and is particularly so for a social science. As we have already indicated, our work and the
analysis herein draws on mainly Neoclassical RBC and New Keynesian, Keynesian and Post-
Keynesian and Modern Monetary Theory ideas, theories and arguments. Furthermore, we will
touch on some Austrian, principally Hayekian and Schumpeterian thinking, draw a little from
Marx about labour and Minsky on fundamental instability.
One’s frame of reference, ideology and theories are important as they drive the assumptions
that one makes. A pluralist view does not discount any particular view on the basis of school.
We does this on the basis that no particular school has all the answers. Rather, we conduct
our discussion on the basis of comparing different schools and drawing out conclusions. An
example is a fundamental difference between Neoclassical and Post-Keynesian, namely Say’s
Law and the law of Effective Aggregate Demand that raise the questions: do saving drive
investment or are savings a result of investment and of course, loans from deposits or loans
create deposits. in search of possible explanations, we draw from many sources beyond the
traditional viewpoints.
1.4 Debt, Risk and Uncertainty
Until 2008 crises, private debt, the private sector flow credit, leveraging and deleveraging was
not on the ‘radar’ of many neoclassical academic and professional economists, rather the focus
was more on sovereign or public debt. Still some remain in denial, maintaining positions and
theories that now seem untenable as we shall illustrate later. This was particularly evident
in the commentary by media, politicians and academic economists. Most now recognise that
private debt dynamics was one of the major drivers of the 2008, then it might be important to
consider it in any evaluation.
How did this come about? It seems the lessons from the 1929 crash were largely forgotten with
relaxation of regulation and weakening of the protective institutions. This leads to real threat of
inflated asset prices and due the interconnected nature of banks and financial institutions, the
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wholesale underestimation of risk and a complete lack of understand of the difference between
fundamental uncertainty and risk (Strahan, 2013; Skidelsky, 2018; Longstaff et al., 2011; Ang
and Longstaff, 2013). The recent financial crisis triggered largely by a number of failures in
the the financial sector has left many nations with large deficits, elevated levels of debt, low
growth and central bank balance sheets inflated with a range of potentially toxic assets. This
necessitates that consideration of both private and public debt in the assessment of sovereign
credit worthiness, hence the risk premium (Arteta and Hale, 2008).
Continuing the discussion on the fundamental dichotomy between classical, neoclassical schools
and that of Post-Keynesian, Kelechian, MMT in the way that banks operate. We already noted
above this difference with the ability of banks to create money. Furthermore and in the words
of Minsky, the Paradox of Stability, where the perception of stability of the financial system pos-
sibly is an indicator of how actually unstable it is (Minsky, 1992; Mehrling, 1999). The feeling of
stability and the need to profit drive the need to take increasing risks whilst being unaware of
the consequences at both a corporate and system level. The question is does savings drive in-
vestment or investment drive savings? If banks create the money to lend to firms to invest, then
the result of that investment is deposits and savings. If banks can create all of the money that
they need, why do they need to issue bonds and particularly to foreign investors7 considering
this puts them possibly under exchange rate risk?
The main reasons are, firstly, to balance up the maturity mismatch that exists between deposits
and equity when considering most of a bank’s asset portfolio is illiquid loans. Deposits can
be called on without notice whereas a bank foreclosing or liquidating is somewhat more prob-
lematic. Secondly, using short term money market borrowing to fund liquidity exposes the
bank to re-issuance risk as Northern Rock Bank experienced in the 2007/8 crisis. A proportion
of liquidity comes from the Central Bank borrowing, however much comes from the closed
reserves market that trades liquidity on a day to day basis. When the country does not have
sufficient financial resources to fund bank borrowing then it needs to turn to overseas markets
and if the domestic currency is not ‘valued’ by foreign investors then they will need to borrow
in a foreign currency and carry exchange rate risk themselves.
As to speculators. Both the 1929 and 2008 crash, as well as the Bubble Company, Tulip mania,
South Sea bubble) were rooted in so called investment lending using margin accounts and other
similar borrowing to fund financial asset purchases. This creates the perfect storm both both
the investor and the financial institutions providing funds without it being obvious at the time.
Effectively, creating a market wide Ponzi scheme that runs out steam. What is seen as stability
is the foundations of instability (Minsky, 1992).
Here we need to discuss some accounting basics. Debt is a stock that is as result of a contract
between parties that exchanges cash-flows. That contract sets out obligations in the form of
payment schedules and the recourse on default paths. Those cash-flows are in the form of
credit flow being extended by the lender to the borrower and for the borrower to repay the
7Many of the Banks in developed and high income developing countries borrow from outside the country, Ex-
ample, over 60% of New Zealand bank borrowing is from overseas resources both in domestic and foreign currency
(Reserve Bank of New Zealand).
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borrowings with normally some form of usury at some future dates. Therefore, in GAAP8 the
borrower must count all debt as a liability and the lender counts it as an asset that is subject to
revaluation9. Although goods exchange may result from a contract and may provide security
for the honouring of the contract they do not form the contract themselves. The lender can
sell debt and the borrower can swap debt cash-flows. Normally, corporate and sovereign debt
is in the form of term specified bonds and may be part of a portfolio of debt issuance with
different time-frames for terms and settlements. The fundamental issue for banks that hold
nearly all their assets as financial assets is that they are subject to market fluctuations though
mark to market and loan book delinquency. Lehmans is a case in point. This leads us into the
discussion private debt.
1.4.1 Private Debt
Bankers make lending decisions on what they forecast the market to be in the future to de-
termine the level of risk they wish to take on and the profit they wish to make. Three main
categories for private lending; to households, that is mortgages, credit cards for example, to
firms to fund both cash-flow and investment, and to investors (we will call the speculators).
With households and firms, one would expect the flow of credit to be stable, that is the overall
leveraging does not change much. When credit flow is accelerating, whether it be for mort-
gages or for speculation, then that represents a systemic risk to households, business and the
financial infrastructure (Miller and Stiglitz, 2010; Arteta and Hale, 2008). As we explain later,
such a breakdown will lead to difficulties in the public sector (Gennaioli, Martin and Rossi,
2014; Arellano and Kocherlakota, 2014).
Continuing on with the theme that banks create money to lend, therefore they destroy it when
they are repaid, we need to consider what happens to consumption in both cases. if lending
criteria is relaxed, then consumption will increase, such sustained consumption will drive firms
to invest and to invest they borrow. Hence banks have a two fold positive effect on the economy
when lending. This was part of motivation for QE to encourage banks to lend10. Likewise,
if bankers forecast suppression in the economy, thus increasing default rates, then they will
tighten credit flow, possibly eliminating it altogether. Banks will operate a ‘sinking lid’ on
their loan books, forcing consumers and firms to deleverage, that then reduces consumption
and investment (Eggertsson and Krugman, 2012). Banks effectively amplify the cycles rather
than act as a smoothing device in the economy though. This is either lending over-leveraging
or by debt deleveraging that leads to inflation (either sector or nationally) or suppression of
consumption either by deflationary pressures or funds being devoted to debt repayment. The
recessionary sinking lid that banks operate mean that one cannot equivalence debt repayment
to saving, a common mistake made by many economists.
8Generally Accept Accounting Procedures
9Revaluation occurs with fixed assets in the form of depreciation and financial assets in the form of mark to
market pricing
10We note that QE is a credit supply ideology rather than a demand ideology. The lack of appetite for credit from
both firms and households in a recession though uncertainty would limit the effect of QE on the household and
production sector, therefore encouraging the more speculative ‘investment’ though stock markets.
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Hence, bank crises tend to be more prevalent than Sovereign debt crises (see Chapter 2). Fur-
thermore, the fortunes of households, firms and domestic banks are so heavily intertwined that
such events as mass defaulting in the household sector results in banks defaulting on their bor-
rowings. Therefore, bank crises are household and firm crises as well. One only has to look
at the 2008 financial crisis to see those interdependences. If one takes into account small open
economies that undertake bank funding using overseas resources, then the exposure is much
greater, as it affects the terms of trade, than say an economy that borrows in its own currency
(Benigno and Romei, 2014). This leads us to conclude that one can model simply the a homo-
geneous representative household and a foreign lender and largely ignore the role of the bank
in the lending and defaulting mechanism.
1.4.2 Public Debt
We will categorise two groups of countries, ones that issue debt in their own currency where
such issuances are rarely under-subscribed and those that issue currency in another country or
currency union’s currency. Except for the EU, most of the OECD countries forming the back-
bone of the World Bank high income category largely fall into the first group. However, it is
rarely one or the other, many middle income nations have a mixture of domestic and foreign
denominated debt (Bonizzi, Kaltenbrunner and Michell, 2019). As discussed, there is a signi-
ficant ideological difference here over the treatment of sovereign debt between the neoclassical
school and that of Post-Keynesian with an MMT flavour11. The conceptual difference is that
classical thinking is that the level of debt is constrained by the discounted future cashflows
taking to account growth and interest. Therefore, if there is debt, then the discounted future
primary surpluses must less the interest must be equivalent to that debt. Tax revenues must
exceed expenditures, if debt becomes too large, then tax revenues need to increase and/or ex-
penditures decrease that drives the policy of austerity. The mantra, the government needs to
behave as a household or firm would do ignores that MMT view that governments create the
money to spend in the first place with the need for bond issuance is to create a safe asset that
provides liquidity and stability whilst making a small return.
PK/MMT world would generally agree that the neoclassical stance would be applicable to a
country that either issues debt is a foreign currency or pegs their exchange rate (Arellano and
Kocherlakota, 2014; Connors and Mitchell, 2017). We can therefore safely draw that most de-
veloping medium and low income countries would have to conform to this rule as they issue
debt in foreign terms or they currency peg such as Argentina in the late 1990’s or some of the
Asian countries prior to the Asian crisis. As all of the European Eurozone countries are effect-
ively using a foreign currency with the EURO for fiscal borrowing they are all constrained in a
similar way12. This implies that there is a limit to the amount of debt that foreign investors are
willing to entertain (Bi, 2012; Kumar and Baldacci, 2010; Assibey-Yeboah, Mallick and Mohsin,
2016). Moreover, economic NGO’s13 will only entertain funding, support and interventions
11Not something that some Post-Keynesians would subscribe to!
12The ECB has monetary control over the EURO, not the central banks of each nation state. Therefore the central
banks cannot create money that the government spends
13Economic NGO’s include World Bank, IMF, ECB
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with a fiscal responsibility pact that includes controlling the level of public debt.
Another characteristic is that any public debt issued in domestic currency is normally for the
domestic economy’s consumption and not foreign investors (Cantore et al., 2017; D’Erasmo and
Mendoza, 2016a). There is is a case that governments may choose to default on the domestic
debt in deference to the foreign issued debt. As in D’Erasmo and Mendoza (2016b), there may
be a optimal method of sovereign default either by creating inflation or haircutting or both.
The important aspect is debt is constrained sometimes by legislation or by treaty (Commission,
2015).
This leads us to a deep neoclassical form of constraint is tax revenue and controversially, is the
Laffer curve (Laffer, 2004). This is reliant on taxation being on the supply and not on demand14
and that there is no incentive to work when all labour wage is consumed in tax. This implies
there is a peak or optimal level of taxation based on preferences and that a situation can exist
where higher taxation leads to lower tax revenues. This is somewhat problematic in that it
assumes a universal tax rate for all labour, that high-income persons would vary their labour
input according to the tax rate. Even at rates in the 70-90% that we have seen historically high
income individuals do not reduce their labour input. However, low paid workers are more
likely to lower their productivity and increase hours according maintain income.
This brings into question the philosophy behind the Laffer curve (and others of a similar nature)
as fiscal taxation policy (Mirowski, 1982). Yes, high taxation on wealthy individuals may render
avoidance. However, the evidence does not support that view as tax aggressive tax avoidance
can attract unwanted attention of tax authorities exposing them to the risk being charged with
evasion with the complexity of tax law. Therefore the limitation for an economy that requires
tax revenue to fund expenditure and debt service must be somewhere else. Furthermore, end-
lessly increasing taxation might have significant socio-political effects that are undesirable to
a government. If tax revenues prove to be insufficient, then governments may seek to haircut
part of the debt and enter into Paris Club Negotiations (Yue, 2010; Haldane et al., 2003; Das,
Papaioannou and Trebesch, 2012). As we will discuss in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8, it is in the
interests of both borrower or lender to renegotiate rather than face sanctions and or loose the
entire investment.
The classical view is that the economy’s borrowing is constrained by the inter-temporal gov-
ernment budget constraint regardless of how the debt is denominated, however this is no a
view shared with other schools. Those countries that issue debt in their own terms and have
no under-subscription or special terms needed for their debt. We will use QE as the example to
demonstrate the point particularly as it is used in response to a crisis (Joyce et al., 2012). QE, the
central bank buys sovereign bonds from financial institutions in exchange for reserves. Hence
the price of those bonds increases, the FI (financial Institution) transforms an asset into a more
liquid asset and the central bank increases expands the balance sheet equally. The government
sells bonds to financial institutions. The process of buying is that the financial institution cred-
its the governments account (a liability to the bank) and creates the asset of the bonds on their
books, similar to the way that they create a loan, therefore the bank expands its balance sheet
14consumption taxes are on the demand side, same as payroll taxes to the employer
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and so does the government with a liability (the bonds) and an asset (the payment). Then the
central bank can swap those bonds for reserves as before. When the bonds mature, the govern-
ment buys back those bonds by using its treasury account at the central bank. As Kelton (2020)
explains, the government does not even need to issue bonds, it could, if unrestricted by legisla-
tion, just run an overdraft with the central bank. This is the MMT view of a highly integrated,
sovereign currency debt issuer that is not available to all countries. Effectively the central bank
controls the yields on bonds by its open market operations and the fiscal authority, inflation as
we will discuss next.
Following the Post-Keynesian argument, there is however some limitations and they come
from labour, inflation and investment.When effective aggregate demand nears aggregate sup-
ply (either across all sectors or within a sector or sectors) then labour wage may start to increase
as does inflation. When effective demand exceeds current supply capacity of the economy then
inflationary pressures will raise prices, hence inflation. If government expenditures are creat-
ing that demand, then government is driving inflation, hence government needs to ensure that
it does not create excessive demand either across the economy or within a sector or sectors.
An important note here is that banks, though lending policy, can create a similar effect in asset
prices such as housing, commodities and equity markets that we have seen in recent history.
Furthermore, in a open economy, that demand may also be satisfied by importing pushing
demand for the local currency downwards creating import inflation that may affect domestic
production. When aggregate demand is deficient, then there is little effect on prices, as Keynes
states, prices are sticky (largely governed by cost of production) and will only gradually deflate,
if at all, and there will be unemployment.
So how can fiscal control inflation? The MMT view is that taxation and bond issuance, that
takes money out of the economy can regulate inflation. Taxation is not used to fund govern-
ment expenditures or debt service, rather its used for regulating inflation in one or more sectors
and perform a rebalancing inequality and alter behaviour. The purpose of bond is is to provide
a safe asset for the economy and to assist in regulating interest rates (Kelton, 2020; Connors
and Mitchell, 2017). There are many Post-Keynsians that do not agree with the premise in
MMT levelling some criticisms on some areas lack of formalism in such areas as the role of
taxation and bond issuance. Nevertheless, Colacchio and Forges Davanzati (2020) explores a
more formal framework and the establishment of the idea of government as the employer of
last resort, the role of taxation and debt management that combines more favourably monetary
and fiscal policy beyond that of prior authors.
Regardless of some of the specifics of operation, there is a considerable dichotomy between
the neoclassical and MMT/Post-Keynsian schools on the ability of governments to respond
in a crisis and the level of ‘mopping up’ to ‘balance the budget’ that may be necessary. This
important difference leads to how politicians respond to a crisis and then how they seek to
straighten out the economy. At one end, high public debt is a ‘bad’ that needs to be corrected
with reduced government spending. At the other end, it is a necessity of a modern economy
for government to focus should be more on employment and investment to enable recovery.
Vivid realisation of both of these is in the 2010 response by the UK government with austerity
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and that of the 1933 US government of expansionism. That brings us to the role of government,
does it just look after itself, the self interest rational agent government or does it work to ad-
dress the socio-economic conditions of the household? This is fundamental to the philosophical
debate between the neoclassical school and the Post-Keynesian schools. However, one aspect
that neoclassical and many Post-Keynsians can agree on is that when government have little
sovereignty over the currency that their debt is issued in the the choice is between an austere
fiscal policy or default or both.
1.5 Crises and responses
First, some definitions and questions about what is a crisis, classifications, the possible causes,
consequences and the mechanisms. If we start by defining a crisis by its characteristics, the
first is that they are rare, infrequent events there we can distinguish them from normal cyclical
macroeconomic behaviour (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011b) and as such, are largely unforeseen,
unplanned, tend to sudden and that suddenness tends to cause it to be transmitted throughout
the economy’s sectors quickly. They have a surprise element, as we have already discussed
with the OECD and IMF making them almost impossible to forecast with any accuracy. They
are situations where falling incomes and/or collapsing asset values, real or financial, that res-
ult in distress in the household and/or firms (including financial institutions) that distresses
any debt they may hold. This distress flows though to the banking sector in degrading bal-
ance sheet though non-performing loans and asset value write-downs though mark-to-market
accounting principles. Furthermore, they may have substantial calls on liquidity. They will
seek to protect its balance sheets by reducing credit supply putting both firms and households
under further distress (Laeven and Valencia, 2018). Another aspect is that banks will seek to
liquidate assets into a potentially flooded asset markets, particularly if those assets are a result
of foreclosure. Thus they force a revaluation of assets downwards as they attempt to protect
themselves making the situation much worse (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011b). This is how a crisis
can unfold, it rather depends on the causes.
An excellent exposition on financial crises, including Keynes, Minsky and Shiller discussion
on financial fragility, inherent instability and asset bubbles is in Detzer and Herr (2014). The
former is reliant on fundamental uncertainty, the differential rates of return on money and
capital and the difference between those that run business and the ‘casino’ stock market that
leads into both Minsky’s FIH (Minsky, 1992) and possibly Shiller’s asset price bubbles(Shiller,
1999, 2002, 2015). Banks unique ability to create money inherently makes them unstable (Min-
sky, 1992). It goes that stability increases the demand for greater profits although capital re-
turns may not be increasing, hence seeking out other assets then increase asset values (Schiller
Bubble) that increase the motive to buy more and so on until, asset prices stop increasing, then
it collapses. Either way, bank balance sheets end up in the situation we set out before.
When the banking sector forces deleveraging or there is a sudden stop in the economy (supply
of credit dries up), then consumption ebbs. Households forced to deleverage either by de-
faulting or credit restrictions, will reduce consumption. The interaction between firms and and
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households though consumption and the labour channels increases unemployment as firms
feel the distress in funding passing that distress onto the household, that, with income reduc-
tion, reduces consumption. All of these amplifies the crisis and driving a crisis of confidence
across all sectors. Private sector crises, particularly banking crises tend to step change down-
ward in the economy establishing a new lower equilibrium and a lower growth rate (Laeven
and Valencia, 2018). That effectively summarises the transmission though the economy.
One aspect of crises, particularly significant ones, is that they occur infrequently and their
sequences tends to be subtly different. As we have already discussed, forecasting is problematic
and history is forgotten. Taking the US great depression and its response, after some significant
fiscal interventions and regulatory frameworks that were progressively eroded by successive
governments as regulation was seen as more of in encumbrance rather than mechanism to
maintain stability. A generation had past by and the lessons of history gradually faded into
insignificance. Some early warnings where the 1987 Black Monday and the spill overs into the
economy (Bogle, 2008) followed by the 2001 DotCOM bubble leading up to the the 2008 crisis.
However, some crises are ‘exogenously’15 generated, such as the current 2020 pandemic and
the 1973 & 1975 oil crises. Still, these crises generate a economic fallout. The strength of the
regulatory and social protection programmes largely governs how resilient the economy is, in
particular the financial system in the face of declining balance sheets though asset revaluations
and mark to market. Although the causes may be subtly different (or unsubtly so) the crisis
itself either eventuates in the public or private sector taking some form of action to a potential
default situation. This is our area of interest in this work.
A dimension to many of these crises is that the International Monetary Fund or other agencies
step in with government bail out packages requiring reform, austerity and debt restructur-
ing without crippling interest rates. Still, these are ‘foreign lenders’ of last resort do exact a
premium over the international risk free rate albeit not at the rate private foreign investors
may seek. These last resort leaders demand discipline by apply economic and political sanc-
tions to ensure reform occurs16. We will treat the motivation of foreign government, NGO and
private investors as largely with similar motivations when considering a crisis, namely, that is
to be repaid.
The alternative to a government bailout package is default, exclusion, renegotiation and even-
tual return to credit markets. The problem with default is that both country and foreign in-
vestor suffers. Even with haircuts, default tends to deny the foreign investor of the funds to
some considerable time, in many cases, years. Although, under the Paris Club, negotiations
tend to result in some form of recompense, however international accounting and banking
rules normally require defaulted debt to be effectively written off and any recompense accoun-
ted for at a later date. This implies that public or mass private default is seen as a cliff edge
by foreign investors, one that they would rather avoid if at all possible. High debt has a long
term impact on growth Reinhart and Rogoff (2010b). Therefore any recovery is slow as public
15The degree of exogeneity is somewhat questionable in the wider than economics context
16Many of these reforms have proved to be disastrous for both the economy and the population by destroying
social safety nets, healthcare and privatising core government functions lead by political-economic ideologies.
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and private debt deleveraging under the cloud of low growth though a lack of demand, high
unemployment and no incentive to invest.
So what motivates governments to intervene in the private sector at potentially great risk to
themselves? Taking the work Yue (2010), and De Paoli, Hoggarth and Saporta (2009), when
an economy heads to or is in default then it may incur considerable loss through terms of
trade, that is, foreign traders seek to limit their risk by limiting the trade credit and foreign
exchange. Furthermore, limited access to credit that prevents consumption smoothing impact-
ing domestic production. As previously stated, these reductions lead to reducing the tax base
and need to reduce its own expenditures to continue to service debt.17. Such bailout may limit
any mass default in the private sector, hence, limit the effects on tax revenues of a crisis by
increasing public debt. Therefore a government may be motivated to protect tax revenues in
the short term as the cliff edge of private default has material impact on their ability to service
public debt. This brings us to the second question, the degree that a government is motiv-
ated to undertake bailout and its consequences. If the political consequences are dire, then this
vulnerability may make them be compelled18 to undertake one or more bailouts making them
vulnerable public debt default.
Government feels the effects almost immediately with falling tax revenues and incomes from
investments, whilst increasing debt to GDP ratios cause foreign investors to increase interest
rates. The government may step in with funds to prevent mass default in the private sec-
tor, restore confidence and create some normally. These bailout funds come from public sec-
tor borrowing, hence transfer private sector mass default risk effectively to the government
(Barth, Prabha and Yun, 2012; Acharya, Drechsler and Schnabl, 2014; Reinhart and Rogoff,
2010a). Effectively the equity owning part of the private sector privatises the profit and social-
ises the losses with any risk premium being exerted. In some cases, government reaches a debt
limit and default in either or both private and public sectors eventuates. The experience of the
European Countries is that the significant debt overhang results in normative austerity policies
and the private sector seeking to deleverage. In some cases this results in social and political
instability, again affecting foreign investors confidence and undermining the ability to recover.
Crises follow a typical pattern, that is there is normally a private debt crises that stems from
banking practices in the country or the country’s banks are exposed to mass asset write-downs
that leads to both a government debt problem and a balance of payments problem (Kaminsky
and Reinhart, 1999). The banking system, if it has had a long period of stability in the economy,
has an amplifying effect on any recession though the households and banks deleveraging, re-
ducing consumption that leads to a sharp decline in the economy. As we have discussed, the
banking system can quite easily end up in a macro-level ponzi scheme though progressive in-
stitutional weakening that are put in place to minimise instability (Minsky, 1996). Although
17Governments may not be able to reduce expenditures in response to a sudden downturn. The parliament-
ary cycle determines that fiscal budgets are set in advance and deviation mid period is somewhat problematic as
commitments for political and commercial reasons. It would be difficult for governments to quickly reduce the
workforce, cancel spending commitments. Rather, a government will borrow to fund the shortfall with a view to
correcting the short fall in subsequent budgetary periods.
18We use the term compelled in that the political and economic consequences of default in the public sector are
too dire to be tenable. In the UK and USA, governments briefly looked over the cliff edge of mass private sector
default
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many authors identify events leading up to the crisis, we contrast that short term focus with a
more longer term structural and institutional view.
From the 1980’s the neo-liberal progressive weakening of regulation and institutions though
the mantra of the Austrian School ideology of limiting government, ‘free markets’ and the
market will self correct, allowed the banking and financial systems to become progressively
unstable, creating asset bubbles in 1987, 2001 and the period leading up to 2007. The so called
‘great moderation’ set the stage for the ‘Great Recession’ and a major setback in income and
growth in many nations. Some of which was from the policies that were either imposed or
self imposed by government’s political and economic ideology. The Neoclassical and Austrian
schools have much to answer with regard to their policy recommendations without realising
the unintended consequences that history has already taught us.
There are any number of ways that government may address a crisis in the broad spectra from
benevolence to the government though to benevolence to some or all of the private sector; self
protection, protection of investors in the government though to protecting the private sector
or the household. Increasingly, many governments intervene in the private sector in an at-
tempt to limit the effects of a mass default in a private debt crisis (Barth, Prabha and Yun, 2012;
Acharya, Drechsler and Schnabl, 2014). These interventions necessitate government provid-
ing emergency funds (bailouts) to the private sector, in various guises19, necessitating an in-
crease public borrowing. Importantly, this leaves the country vulnerable to future downturns
(Cantore et al., 2017). Many countries in this position resort to severe austerity measures in an
attempt to reduce the government debt, albeit with limited success.
This paper seeks to explain by constructing a theoretical model of a private sector debt crises
spread to the public sector and long term consequences for fiscal policy. Furthermore, this
model seeks to explain how the public sector may be forced into bailing out the private sector
when public debt is high and a default in the private sector may result in the demise of public
sector debt.
1.5.1 Vulnerability to Default
The economy’s vulnerability to default is quite simple, a private or public sector default con-
straints the flow of credit to fund household consumption, firm investment or government
expenditures and investment. US 1929 crash, 1990’s Asian financial and 2007/8 crisis illustrate
the profound effects of default across both public and private sector. The options available to
a sovereign debt country and those that rely on debt in foreign terms is striking, depending
on the macroeconomic philosophy. We will take the economies that depend on debt in foreign
terms.
We take two cases, high public and low public debt before a crisis emerges. High public debt
would attract high servicing costs and represent a significant components of the total fiscal
budget. Government would be aware that if mass default occurs in the private sector then
19Examples include equity injections into banks and insurance companies, loans, cash injections, grants, nation-
alisation to name a few.
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government revenues will decline markedly. If they are unable to reduce expenditures then
public debt default is an inevitable outcome. A government may be motivated to prevent
private sector default by bailing out, increasing public debt and preventing its own default.
The government would be reliant on being able to ‘outrun’ the crisis using public borrowing.
We contend that a government with high debt will attempt to outrun the crisis by borrowing
if it is able to do so rather than allow the private sector to default leading to public sector
default. The political consequences of not bailing out the private sector, even when debt is at
high levels, are likely to be detrimental to those that adopt such policies, for example Hoover
Administration 1932 Presidential elections.
However, low public debt may give a different motivation if government debt levels, hence
servicing costs, then it may be able to sustain a default in the private sector. Alternatively, if
government expenditures (transfers and/or expenses) do not have sufficient flexibility the it
must be a critical point where any expenditure reduction is insufficient to offset lost tax reven-
ues. The motivation to bail out the private sector increases with the level of public debt. This
seems counter intuitive to the benevolent government where one would expect that govern-
ments would use the buffer of low public debt to respond to decline in the private sector and
that benevolence may decrease in increasing public debt. Effectively, if a government acknow-
ledges that public sector default has undesirable economic and political implications then it
can become trapped into funding the private sector until it can borrow no more.
Another aspect to consider is that changes to fiscal policy to re-stabilise the economy after a
crisis may take some time, that is adjustments government expenditures, tax rates and social
transfers, other than the emergency measures may take some time (Alesina and Drazen, 1989).
Governments are unlikely to entertain austerity measures to create sufficient fiscal surpluses
during a crisis, as that is likely to exacerbate rather than resolve the crisis20. Therefore, we
assume that any re-stabilisation or interim adjustment policy by the government is ex-post the
crises.
So, enter the foreign investor, that bring us to the next question why would risk neutral foreign
investors continue to fund both public and private sectors under such circumstances? We need
to look at the alternatives. If the foreign investor considers the option of not continuing to
lend to the government at high debt levels then the government is almost certain to default
and the foreign investor takes either looses everything or a significant haircut Likewise, with
the private sector. A risk neutral foreign investor would exert a premium on the both private
and public debt commiserate on the risk of either government or private sector default. An
assumption of crises is that until one gets to the crisis, no one knows if the government will
bail out the private sector and for how long. However, there is a limit for government, above
which future primary surpluses will be insufficient to service the debt, the fiscal limit (Leeper
and Walker, 2011; Polito and Wickens, 2012). There are many approaches to determining the
fiscal limit including Laffer curve (Laffer, 2004; Trabandt and Uhlig, 2011; Fève, Matheron and
Sahuc, 2017) or some derivative thereof as in Bi and Traum (2014, 2012).
Many papers explore public sector debt crisis including Bi and Traum (2014); Aguiar and Gop-
20Although recent 2020 pandemic responses in the US are stalled with little prospect counters this argument
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inath (2006); Yue (2010); Fuchs-Schündeln and Hassan (2016, etc.), some consider the drivers
of private sector on the public sector Reinhart and Rogoff (2011b,a, etc). There are a number
of different ‘traditions’ in DSGE modelling public debt and the private sector. These include
the tradition of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) with followings from Arellano (2008) and Na et al.
(2014) to name a few. These, at their core, a decision by an agent that weights the value of
defaulting or continuing to participate with foreign investors. Alternatives come in the form a
New Keynesian approach by Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015) and Gertler and Karadi (2015) where
banker choose whether to renege on commitments leading to a recession, however, these mod-
els fall short of our goal in that they do not include public debt.
Next is to consider the DSGE models in the style exhibited in Bi and Traum (2012); Bi (2012);
Bi, Shen and Yang (2016). These models use public debt, determining the interest rate from
a cumulative distribution function where the probability of default is a function of either the
level of public debt or public debt to GDP ratio. As to bank defaults with the including the
sudden intervention what we observe is that neither government or private sector plan for a
circumstance such as the last financial crisis. That is the private sector experiences a situation
where mass default between private sector debt default decisions, the government’s attempts
to prevent private sector default by one or more transfers (bailouts) and, in some cases, a rapid
expansion in public debt to levels where default is imminent. However, why does government
enter into attempting to prevent private sector default? Starting with Yue (2010), De Paoli,
Hoggarth and Saporta (2009) and where default incurs a loss to the economy through terms of
trade and inability to smooth consumption implies that tax revenues will also be affected. Any
sustained loss of tax revenue will eventually have implications for public debt if the default
is in the private sector. The implication is that government may be motivated to bailout the
private sector to maintain tax revenues if there are high levels of public debt and assuming that
governments do not want to default.
One aspect to consider in bailout or interventionist policy is that lower socio-economic deciles
are much more sensitive to income fluctuations and will act conservatively if uncertain (Dalziel
and Lavoie, 2003). Hence they will curtail consumption or be forced to curtail consumption
approaching the Keynesian ‘subsistence’ level. Although there may be sufficient capital sup-
ply capacity, the self reinforcing cycle of deficient effective aggregate demand that determines
firms income and profits, hence their investment, will lead to decreasing labour demand and
unemployment (Bertocco and Kalajzić, 2020).
Not only is the household vulnerable to default either on its own account or the bank, the
government is also vulnerable to default from the decisions made in the private sector. This
may lead to a Keynesian low equilibrium state that without outside assistance, a small open
economy cannot recover. This puts whoever funds the bailout of the country in the policy
making driving seat.
1.5.2 Post Crisis Policy
Is it more important to focus on government debt or private sector credit flows and debt? In
many cases a private debt crises ends up as a public debt crisis though the bank transmission
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mechanism that we discuss above Barth, Prabha and Yun (2012). Therefore does the public
sector become the insurer of last resort for an unstable banking system (Acharya, Drechsler
and Schnabl, 2014; Gennaioli, Martin and Rossi, 2014). A question for future investigation is
do we want the government to be the insurer of last resort for the banking system or should it
be the employer of last resort for the people? Are they mutually exclusive?
There is also some dispute on the policy approach post crisis, does it implement austerity pro-
gramme or expansionary stimulus to the economy (Guajardo, Leigh and Pescatori, 2014). As
we have discussed, the economic NGO’s tend to adopt the neo-liberal, neoclassical theories in
that post crisis, government need to address public debt and implement reform and auster-
ity. Recent events in Greece, UK and others indicate a political backlash to long term austerity
programmes resulting in inconsistent (and in some cases self harming) policies and instability
(Krastev, 2012; Johnston, 2016). It is questionable if the accepted norm of most governments
is to implement some form of austerity programme in an attempt to create sufficient primary
surplus to reduce debt is a sustainable policy. Likewise, expansionism, especially with a small
economy, is likely to run out of funds quite quickly without further external interventions.
Then that leads back to the role of NGO’s and their policies. With the 2020 crisis, there does
seem to be some hope that the normally draconian measures are being somewhat moderated.
When a government does not have monetary control or control over the denomination of debt
then its role of insurer is limited. If they do have monetary control then this provides a way
that governments can respond to a crisis potentially addressing both the financial system and
employment. If there is a choice to be made in the response hat factors does a government need
to consider. If a government is constrained, then resolving the financial system or protecting
the people is a choice it will potentially need to make. In developed nations and many of the
higher income developing nations, a freeze in the financial system would cause the population
to liquidate assets held in such institutions (the models of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) come
to mind here) following Keynes (1936) view that in a crisis, liquidity matters and liquidity is in
short supply. Therefore boosting confidence and creating liquidity would be the first order, as
the economy would freeze quite quickly. That was the actions of the US and UK governments
in 2008 and more belatedly, the ECB. This is where those countries with monetary control have
the greatest advantage, the can respond quickly and stop a banking balance sheet recession
turning into a national depression. This is why many of the countries that are constrained seek
outside assistance.
This brings into question how effective will be the long term support to households across
Europe with the 2020 pandemic? Although demand may slacken, households may be able to
meet their obligations and consume. This might at least limit the lay-offs and at least limit
the negative effects of unemployment (Bertocco and Kalajzić, 2020; Pavoni, 2009). One ques-
tions the logic of QE post the initial addressing of liquidity issues when both households and
firms were still under stress and unlikely to borrow in such circumstances (Martin and Milas,
2012). Furthermore, the swift implementation of a range of macro-prudential policies lead the
banks to be much more ‘conservative’ in their lending practices. QE may have lubricated some
wheels in the economy, however it was and remains so, unable to restart the economy. the post
2008 evidence suggests that monetary policy is not necessarily the tool that many neoclassical
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monetarist believe that it is. Maybe its time for fiscal policy to play a more active long term role
that the neutered role assigned to it by the neo-liberal wing of economics. One could say, one
bitten twice shy.
1.6 The Way Forward
In Chapter 2 we will explore the History of crises though the lens of ‘two cities’, namely de-
veloped and developing nations from a theoretical, historical narrative and empirical perspect-
ives across many crises. Chapter 3 develops the foundation model that forms the basis for this
work. We use a foundation scenario to simulate a number of different type of crises. Chapter
4 describes the underlying computational system that supports the foundation model, its ex-
tensions and the range of possible scenarios. Chapter 5 starts the process of exploration of
the possibilities that derive from the foundation model by looking at the effects, particularly
in crises, of different fiscal policies in response to debt and national income changes account-
ing for (in)consistency of policy. Chapter 6 discusses less passive interventions that normal
fiscal policy in response to cycles by extending the model to allow governments to take an
active role in crises. This somewhat resembles the 2008 crisis and its fallout as well as oth-
ers. In this context we introduce the socio-political economic dichotomy that we observe in
response to crises. Chapter 7 extends the model with the government adopting different de-
faulting strategies. Chapter 8 rounds out the model with wage rigidity and fixed exchange
rates (akin to Greece) and considers way that fiscal policy influences taxation, social transfers
and government expenditures. This discusses a range of possible fiscal policy implementations
to achieve governmental objectives. Finally, Chapter 9 concludes by summarising the found-
ation model and all is extensions with the realisation of different policy and strategy settings
though different scenarios and the potential for further development.
With the current policy options and strategy settings, we have set up over 11,500 scenarios
and, though Chapter 3 to Chapter 8, explore the simulation of 47 different scenarios comparing




“When the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the activ-
ities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done” - John Maynard Keynes,(1936)
2.1 Introduction
Understanding the historical context of crises provides us with the opportunity to identify po-
tential causes, paths and the consequences with a view to improving the modelling, simulation
and interpretation. Building on Chapter 1 initially discussing the how country development
status affects dynamics of crises and the possible responses options. We then illustrate with
some examples using the historical narrative from the Asian crisis. This we follow with an
empirical analysis of different types of crises plotting their paths in key variables. We continue
to use both a neoclassical and heterodox, particularly Keynesian, Post-Keynesian and MMT,
framing to broaden our model development and interpretation.
Much of the history that differentiates developed from developing nations and their income
classification by such organisations as the World Bank and IMF is as a result of colonial occu-
pation during the nineteenth century and the post colonial era policies after WW2. As Western
European countries retreated from previous colonies, they left a number of legacies including
artificial borders between countries that did not reflect the indigenous make up of the popula-
tion. Many of these ex-colonies were reliant on primary production including agriculture and
mineral extraction that were largely owned by firms from the coloniser. Although many have
significant resource wealth, the combination of political instability and outside influences, in-
cluding the coloniser’s own interests, has lead to those countries remaining in a economically
poor state. Aspects include corruption, lack of law and civil enforcement, and ethic differences
cause civil unrest. This is in stark contrast to the developed world where countries have in-
stitutions that limit the effects of criminal activity and enforce private property contracts. This
extends to governance where strong institutions ensure a stable environment ensures economic
and social policy are consistently applied (Kleiman, 1976; Angeles, 2007).
One particular aspect that results from this differentiation is that many developed nations have
internationally recognised stable sovereign currencies. This facilitates trade with confidence
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of investors and traders alike. That means that market participants are willing to trust the
currency and buy public or private investments. One of the main criticisms levelled at MMT
is that not all countries are like the USA. The perception of weakness makes them reliant on
investment and debt denominated in foreign currency (Bonizzi, Kaltenbrunner and Michell,
2019; Mankiw, 2020). This has a significant bearing on the way that a country may be forced
into a crisis and how they may respond. What seems to be possible in many developed nations
in that bailing out the private sector with government funds may not be a course of action
available to developing nations. One only has to look to developed nation responses to support
business and in some cases, the population, with many trillions of dollars (or local currency)
in the 2008 and the more recent 2020 crises and contrast them with the options available to
developing nations.
2.2 Development Status and Crisis Response
2.2.1 Developing Nations
Most developing nations are more likely to experience debt problems that may impinge on
productivity, capital growth and foreign investment, thus consigning them to the lower end of
the income spectrum and limiting their market access (Turnovsky and Chattopadhyay, 2003;
Mendoza and Oviedo, 2006; Gelos, Sahay and Sandleris, 2011). As we have discussed, one core
aspect is the degree of monetary sovereignty is a limiting or improving factor for flow of credit
(Bonizzi, Kaltenbrunner and Michell, 2019). Moreover, as pointed out in Na et al. (2014) debt,
regardless of whether is it private or public, denominated in a foreign currency exposes the
country to foreign exchange risk and particularly so for currency unions such as the EURO-
ZONE (Farhi and Werning, 2016; Proaño and Lojak, 2015). Therefore, only when a country
denominates or pegs its currency does it risk default by necessity (Kelton, 2020; Connors and
Mitchell, 2017). As all debt is denominated in nominal currency terms, the value of that cur-
rency matters to both lender and borrower. We can say the ability to manufacture money or
destroy it as it relates to sovereign debt is instrumental in the way that lender, borrower and
the country strategises and performs any recovery. Furthermore, the resultant strategies in the
developed world have reinforced the concentration of power in a limited set of ‘too big to fail’
institutions has concentrated power making smaller developed and developing nations ‘price
takers’ (Longstaff et al., 2011; Strahan, 2013; Ioannou, Wojcik and Dymski, 2019).
Largely, international sovereign credit contracts is government by local regulation and jurisdic-
tions. There may be measures in place to gain access to assets in the event of default, however
such measures may not apply internationally nor can they apply them to sovereign debt. The
foreign investor ability to recover may depend on the threat of sanctions. This may be limited
to their own government’s policies and willingness to enforce contracts1 (Bocola, 2016). The
only recourse open to foreign investors alone is that they collectively exclude defaulting coun-
tries from international credit markets for a period of time (Mendoza, 2013). This forces both
1Seizure may include, freezing assets, bank accounts, not permitting clearing of funds, whereas imposing sanc-
tions on firms from the defaulting country limits their ability to access international borrowing.
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parties to negotiate and the outcomes are dependent on the relative power each party has in
the international markets and political systems.
The countries may experience differing degrees of impact of exclusion from credit markets.
The lack of foreign investment funds, particularly counties with subsistence incomes, poverty,
limited natural resources2 and low savings rates. In addition, the lack of domestic financial
infrastructure, has a significant impact on output and normally confines them long periods of
poverty (Gelos, Sahay and Sandleris, 2011). A country where they are able to exploit resources
or have substantial well developed economy, the effects of such sanctions could be less. The
cost of default for lower income counties, may be significantly larger than the default itself in
the long run. As such, enforcement of exclusion sanction (requiring market coordination) and
seizure are at the crux of the willingness (or motivation) for a country, both private and public
sectors, to repay its debts outside a mere commitment to repay.
Normally, modelling exclusion takes the form of a permanent removal from credit markets,
particularly for developing nations. However, this is not borne out by the data (Yue, 2010).
With historically low interest rates and the search for returns, some lenders may restart lend-
ing to a defaulting country with higher interest rates after short period. Furthermore, full
default on all debt rarely occurs. Frequently, sovereign default is partial and ordinarily in-
volves renegotiation normally though the Paris Accord. Hence it may be in the interests of
the lender to continue to lend on the basis that ‘something is better than nothing’. The threat
of sanctions or the imposition of limited sanctions is normally sufficient to keep the country
repaying whilst negotiating a settlement. Fine tuning the sanctions is important to ensure that
the lender doesn’t make the situation worse whilst maintaining pressure. Conversely a default
in the private sector is more likely to result in a reduction in wealth with the seizure of assets
and either high interest rates or a period of exclusion.
Resilience of the economy, however measured is an important differentiator between develop-
ing and developed countries. Debt to GDP ratio is seen by many as one of those core measures
of resilience. Many NGO base decision making on public debt to GDP ratio to the extent that
the EU (Commission, 2015), IMF and World Bank until recently, imposed severe fiscal policy
constraints on both developing and smaller developed nations. However, this debt service af-
fordability proxy does neglect the interest rate and the currency they debt is issued in. If a
country was able to manipulate the interest rates on its debt then it can manipulate the level of
debt that it can afford (Kelton, 2020; Joyce et al., 2011; Shah et al., 2019). This is not normally
open to a developing nation thus making them vulnerable to NGO constraints and sanctions
that reduce their resilience.
Next to consider is the stability of fiscal revenues and expenditures. If we assume that the MMT
conditions do not apply, then debt service must accord with the primary surplus. Therefore,
resilience of that primary surplus to shocks, regardless of source. A resilient economy has
the ability to collect revenues efficiently whilst expenditures are used productively to enhance
productivity without corruption (Bi, Shen and Yang, 2016). A case in point is Greece, although
2Limited may mean under developed natural resource such as minerals, hydrocarbons and includes agricultural
resources
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is in the upper end of income brackets prior to 2008, its revenue collection was problematic
with its substantial grey market (Bi and Traum, 2014, 2012). In the post 2010 era for Greece had
one of the most severe externally imposed austerity programmes that further weakened the
economy’s resilience (Blyth and Ban, 2015).
One of the core changes to the Paris club’s focus from the initial resolving debt to the benefit of
the lender was to move to a more developmental approach noting that it is in the interests of
both lender and borrower in promoting resilience (Cheng, Díaz-Cassou and Erce, 2018). This
contrasting view can be likened to difference in approach by the victors between the crisis post
of WW1 and WW2. WW1 the victors imposed harsh economic penalties that lead to political
instability. Whereas in WW2 the Marshall Plan promoted economic and political stability to
rebuild resilient economies (Quinn and Woolley, 2001).
To summarise, the importance of what debt is denominated in, the level of independence of
currency and the power differential between lender and borrower has significant bearing on de-
veloping nation’s resilience to shocks. Moreover, the economic NGO’s ideologies and policies
throughout the last 50 years has possibly made developing countries’ resilience worse. Fortu-
nately, the Paris Club takes a wider pragmatic view in that it is in a shared interest to make
developing countries more resilient by developing their infrastructure and institutions. Still,
we see many macro-economists, political leaders and the media use simplistic measures such
as debt to GDP to measure the distress and set policy as a consequence.
2.2.2 Developed Nations
Before continuing with the discussion on developed nations, it is important to differentiate
between developing and developed nations. Nielsen (2013) describes the the different classific-
ation taxonomies for the world NGO’s such as IMF. These largely focus on economic measures
such as income and market structure. For example, IMF designates advanced (or developed)
nations as “‘relatively high income levels (comfortably within the range of those in the [existing
advanced] country group), well developed financial markets and high degrees of financial in-
termediation, and diversified economic structures with rapidly growing service sectors.” (IMF,
2001). One cannot discuss classification without drawing on Fernandez et al. (1997) which in-
clude a much broader sense of a country’s value structures. However, both of these neglect a
core factor, namely, rule of law, that is integrity of the legal system to secure property rights,
enforce contracts and apply criminal matters evenly though its institutions and the legislative
processes (Haggard, MacIntyre and Tiede, 2008). Moreover, the break down of the rule of law
and possibly the legislative process acting in the interests of a few is likely to create inequalities
in any nation state. For any classification system to separate developed and developing nations
needs more dimensions that the classical economic factors. It goes hand in hand that rule of
law, country value structures and economic factors need the infrastructural fabric3 to support
economic development (Haggard and Tiede, 2011).
3By infrastructural fabric we mean both physical infrastructure, social and political institutions, rule of law and
social safety nets
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The infrastructural fabric of a nation provides it with the resilience to withstand shocks to the
economy and the people. A very clear and recent example is that of the Covid-19 pandemic
that has put the institutions and socio-political infrastructure under pressure. This has brought
into visibility the weaknesses in the social fabric of even developed nations. Moreover, the 2008
crisis and its fallout brought about some to question the ability of some nations to survive in
the European Union. The breakdown of the socio-political infrastructure, where people beleive
the economy does not work for them, permits political extremist ideologies to gain a foot hold
with disastrous consequences. It is a short road to the breakdown of socio-political order, the
shortness of that road is how resilient the infrastructural fabric is and the willingness of the
people to defend it (Snyder, 2017).
On the economic front, some aspects to consider regarding crises and developed nations. As
we have already indicated, the financial infrastructure and interconnectedness is an import-
ant part of a developed nation’s sustaining its wealth and standing. However, the institutions
that compose the financial infrastructure themselves are, by their own design, unstable (Min-
sky, 1992, 1964; Kregel, 2008). In part, this instability drives the developed capitalist economy
with somewhat infrequent clearing away of ‘old’ industry with the replacement of new devel-
opments, the creative destruction (Schumpeter and Redvers, 1934). However, if that results
in people believing the economy does not work for them then this gives opportunity for self-
interested political actors to undermine the infrastructural fabric of the nation4. However, in
the last major episode, the economic cost is not bourne equally nor was the benefits of inter-
ventions by government or government agencies tended to benefit those with wealth. What
starts as an economic crisis can develop into a socio-political crisis providing the opportunity
for either those that seek to authoritarian rule or, now less frequently, overthrowing of the very
institutions and governments. With economic strength of a developed economy, must come
the institutional strength to ensure that crises do not destabilise the very foundations of the
strength.
2.3 Historical Analysis
Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it - Santayana (1905)
2.3.1 Sovereign Debt, Surpluses and recessions
Leading up to the 2008 crisis, Chan and Duggar (2007) undertook an analysis of a number
of sovereign defaults almost exclusively in developing countries in all regions. Of particular
interest is their analysis of the circumstances around defaults, a number of defaults and re-
covery rates. Note that in 2007, there were no sovereign default, a circumstance that would
change over the next three years. One aspect is that many of the developing countries, partic-
ularly those with larger economies such as India and Brazil use a combination of foreign and
4Case in point is Russia since 2000, a near miss with the USA in 2016-2020, Poland, Hungary, Burma are all
examples of institutional undermining
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domestic currency bonds. This mix had a significant bearing on the ability of the country to
service its debt in times of stress. This is quite unlike the US and UK where debt is almost
exclusively denominated in its own currency and the currency has sufficient resilience to with-
stand sovereign distress. We will discuss later in this chapter the views expressed by the MMT
(Wray, 2019).
However, before proceeding into a historical narrative on the pathways though crises to re-
covery, it is important to understand an often forgotten aspect that affect young nations, even
if they issue sovereign debt in their own currency. In the United States, successive federal
governments have attempted to repay sovereign debt since the beginning of the 1800’s. Table
2.1 sets out the years that the federal government ran a surplus, how much federal debt was
discharged and year that the next recession or depression began. Wray (2019); Kelton (2020)
hypotheses that surpluses turn into recession. To explain, starting with the federal government
running a primary surplus that exceeds that if the debt service cost and sufficient to repay prin-
ciple. This means that the private sector has to run a gross surplus sufficient to pay the taxes
and levies and carry out investment activities with a lower effective aggregate demand. The
Federal government retiring debt that is partly held domestically, provides an inflow of funds
proportionate to the debt held. However, a significant proportion of that debt is foreign held (as
in the case in the US), therefore this would generate a capital account deficit. Tax revenues are
compulsory on the private sector and investment is not. One could envisage a situation where
tax revenues were substantial enough to effectively take the majority of the private sector gross
surplus without the compensation of revenues from federal debt retirement. This, crowding
out new investment and potentially impinging on depreciation reinvestment.








Table 2.1: US Past attempts of paying off Public debt (Fed-
eral) and Depressions Source: Minneapolis Fed
Taking this to bank lending for investment then banks will observe less net revenue for firms
and reduce their investment lending accordingly. Collectively, the suppression of investment
is likely to progressively weaken the private sector, particularly if there is a capital account
deficit driven largely by government debt retirement. In Table 2.1 one observes the correlation
between a recession starting and the end of debt repayment. As the recession starts, tax rev-
enues fall curtaining debt repayment and possibly making the recession worse. Instrumental
was the role of the banking sector and pension funds In the last two periods (1920-30 and 1998-
2001), both of which are reliant on the sovereign bond market to provide a safe asset that can be
easily liquidated. If there is a shortage of such instruments, then the price will rise, yields fall
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and the same effect as the later QE programme is likely to occur. The difference is this is driven
by fiscal policy not monetary policy (Joyce et al., 2012). As such, in the search for returns in-
vestment houses will seek ever increasingly risky assets that constantly rise in the market until
2001 (or 1929!) that is well explained in Galbraith (1994) following a Minskyian path.5
2.3.2 Historical Narrative Regional Analysis
Here, we draw on the Asian financial crisis where many governments and the private sector
borrow from foreign investors in a mixture of their own domestic currency and foreign cur-
rencies. As a foundation, we use the texts of Radelet et al. (1998); Johnson et al. (2000) to form
the basis of this historical analysis. In addition we will include the Argentine collapse so often
reported in academia to draw out any particular aspects common to all the crises. we will cover
Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea and Malaysia as representative of the Asian crisis.
Prior to the crisis (1997), Thailand had reasonably rapid growth (~9%) and moderate inflation
(~4.2%) with rapid expansion in its manufacturing base. At the time there was a currency peg
at 25 pesos/USD, that came under a speculative attack. Unable to maintain the peg (lack of
foreign reserves), the currency was floated and it immediately devalued by 50%. Much of the
country’s borrowing and many of the imports were priced in USD that brought a sudden stop
to the economy with many of the financial institutions becoming insolvent. In this case, the
government required outside assistance (the IMF) with the proviso of strengthening its regu-
latory frameworks. The rapid increase in unemployment and the release of foreign workers
(600,000) as a result of the contraction increased the level of poverty in Thailand and transmit-
ted the crisis to other countries. The crisis occurred over a three to four period with sustainable
recovery occurring by 2001. To summarise, a currency crisis, that transmitted to financial sec-
tor by foreign borrowing and the sudden economic stop. External intervention (IMF) granting
and lending created sufficient capital inflows for the government to bailout the private sec-
tor. A short, painful crisis, where the pegging acted against the country rather than a gradual
depreciation that would allow industry to adjust.
By contrast, Indonesia had a stable with a significant trade surplus with a growing banking sec-
tor, foreign reserves and industry. It had a soft pegging band with the US with many business
borrowing in USD. After the Thailand’s float, the Ru came under pressure in a similar way to
the the Baht. Widening the soft peg was insufficient and floating had the same effect as Thai-
land, immediate depreciation, however not to the same extent. The issue was Corporate debt
priced in USD was expanding as the Ru depreciated and the possibility of mass default. Con-
traction in firm’s activity and unemployment plus those returning from Thailand unemployed
made the situation much worse. Again IMF bailout package to the government progressively
stabilised the economy that took some five years to recover to pre crisis levels. Again foreign
5Some aspects to note, is that until 1863, there were also multiple state currencies and money notes issued by
banks with local exchange rates and the institutional restructuring under the Federal Reserve in 1913. This evolution
of institutional management of money has some bearing on the way that Federal government issue and manage
debt. There are many ways that the Treasury can fund expenditure using the Federal reserve that includes bond
issuance, reserves, money issuance by way of example. Effectively, the Federal Reserve is the Treasury’s banker and
the Treasury can run an overdraft with the Federal Reserve. This is the dicotmy between the MMT school and most
academic work.
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currency borrowing in the private sector lead to a sovereign crisis that needed external inter-
vention. We can treat the IMF as a benevolent foreign investor that acts as a ‘lender of last
resort’.
A major difference between Indonesia and South Korea is that South Korea adopted an ag-
gressive expansion strategy that borrowed from domestic banks that in turn borrowed heavily
from overseas. The expansion was unsustainable in that insufficient profits with unproduct-
ive absorption of capital investment. The instability in the region lead to a small downturn in
revenues 6 that caused many large corporations to enter bankruptcy, thus creating a banking
crisis. Again the IMF stepped in forcing many reforms and significant bailout package reversed
the free-fall of the economy. However, the government ended up with a much higher debt to
GDP ratio (13 to 30%) as GDP declined and government revenues fell. Again, the private sector
with poor lending practices and corruption needed bailout. The problem was banking and the
private sector rather than currency that nearly lead to a South Korean public debt crisis.
Malaysia was much more of currency crisis, again pegged, in part driven by the Baht revalu-
ation and a loss of confidence. Foreign investors started to deleverage leading to capital and
currency controls. Unable to fund the expansion and influx of labour from other countries
lead to a recession. Unable to service debt, and with rising defaults, banks became at risk of
failure requiring government recapitalisation, thus increasing their sovereign debt. Malaysia’s
recovery was much slower than any of the others.
In summary, attacks on fixed exchange rates that caused contraction in the domestic economy
that then lead to the banking system being under stress. Every one of the countries bailed out
corporations and banks from either their own government resources or grants/loans from the
IMF. In all cases the crisis were sudden and resulting in deep recessions with all of the knock
on effects.
Argentina was different to the Asian countries. Although they shared a currency peg, the 2002
crisis was the culmination of a series of crises in the 1990’s. This case was a combined public and
private debt crisis with most private debt in USD. This constrained the Central Bank as interest
rates had little influence on inflation. As the USD was appreciating, the peg forced the peso to
appreciate resulting in declining export revenues. High unemployment and high public sector
borrowing lead to domestic cash shortages. As soon as the peso floated, immediate devaluation
that caused a trading stop in banks and firms. Worsening trade and unemployment compoun-
ded government’s debt position resulting in default and a 75% haircut on all government debt.
Inflexibility in the labour market inflexibility, poor government fiscal management, with a lack
of appropriate macro-prudential oversight on the financial sector compounded with a currency
peg lead to a crash. This is quite different to the Asian crashes, in that the government effect-
ively created the circumstances of the crash. Eventually, foreign investors (including the World
Bank, IMF and the US Treasury) provided the funds to reflate the economy. However, only on
the condition that government implemented significant austerity measures and reforms. Part
of the response was a significant pay and pension cut across the board. Unemployment took
many years to recover that imposed a severe drain on Government resources.
6Complicated with a significant level of corporate and public sector corruption
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The above illustrates three types of crisis, that is a currency crisis, a banking crisis and a sov-
ereign debt crisis. These particular examples stem from some form of currency control and
structural/institutional problems in the economy. In all cases, labour was impacted, as was
government debt (when it was the private sector). All the economies required some form of in-
tervention from foreign sources to reflate the economy. We will incorporate all of these factors
into our modelling.
2.4 Empirical Analysis
We conduct time path analysis across multiple crises using the dataset in Laeven and Valencia
(2018) that are classified into banking, currency, sovereign and recovery for the period 1971 to
2017. This represents the modern era of financial development and the maturing of many of
the NGO’s policies7. Each event date in Laeven and Valencia (2018) defines the coordinating
point for the consolidation of data across all the datasets8. We select 12 annual periods to cover
the period before and after the crisis. We then select and normalise nominal GDP, government
and private debt, (y, dG, dH respectively) by dividing each level by the average over the 12 peri-
ods for each event. With unemployment is expressed as a percentage unemployed and GINI
is scored from 100 where 100 represents maximum wealth inequality are already normalised
therefore we just select the data accordingly. A question is why can we use banking crises in
lieu of private debt crises? Most private debt is funded by banks as we have discussed there-
fore, we will use banks as a proxy for private debt and default9.
The debt (private and public) as well as GDP derives from the IMF’s Global Debt Database as
set out in Mbaye, Badia and Chae (2018), unemployment and GINI are from the World Bank
WBI database (2020). Country income category are from World Bank (2018) with High (A,B)
Middle (C,D) and Low (E,F). Each crisis is classified by Laeven and Valencia (2018) that enables
us to filter the data down to specific crises classification and/or income category.
We report the results with graphs Figure 2.1,Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3 that show the mean time-
path for each event and income classification. Note that the frequency of some of the more
subset charts rely on a small sample of and then applied to the data by filtering on country,
crisis and income classifications, and event timing. We use Banking crises classifications as a
proxy for private debt crises and sovereign debt crises as a proxy for public debt crises. As
currency crises can affect either we do not explicitly associate these crises with either public or
private. One can observe from the historical analysis above that currency crises can associate
themselves with ether public or private crises. We include currency crises for completeness. We
report the breakdown of the frequency of default by income category in Table 2.2 . As expected
7NGO means World Bank, IMF, OECD and other similar organisations
8A useful source for sovereign default data is the Bank of Canada in conjunction with the Bank of England’s
Sovereign Default Database Beers, Jones and Walsh (2020)
9The alternative is corporate bonds and secondary lenders. Neither represent the bulk of lending to households
or firms. Banks rely on household and firm private debt stability to maintain their balance sheets. This implies
that if sufficient households (or firms) default, then the bank will itself default by becoming insolvent. In the 2008
crisis, banks defaulted on their debt (bonds and deposits) when the delinquency rate on household loans markedly
increased. Therefore, banks are a proxy for the behaviour of households when modelling default in a crisis situation.
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default events tend to be more frequent in low and middle with low middle income categories
being twice as frequent as high income. Note that Sovereign defaults represent only 14% of the
total number of default which brings into question why is much of the neoclassical literature
focused on sovereign defaults rather than the more frequent currency and banking crises. Just
from this frequency data, banking represent the greatest threat to high income countries and
that currency has an equivalent threat to middle and low income countries.
Income Group
High Middle Low total
Number of Countries 78 53 82 213
Banking crises 56 61 100 217
Currency crises 41 61 98 200
Sovereign crises 14 22 32 68
total 111 144 230 485
Table 2.2: The number of crises during the period 1971 to 2017.
The first line is the number of countries by the World Bank income
category. The lines, Banking, Currency and Sovereign represent the
classification of default as defined in Laeven and Valencia (2018)
2.4.1 Banking Crises
Banking crises represent the most frequent crisis event in all income categories. In Figure 2.1 at
the point of the bank crisis, private debt deleveraging occurs reducing the level of private debt
that is then followed by a period of growth. A driving factor for these banking crises seems to
be a recession in the years before. Note that public debt climbs sharply post crisis, something
that we observed in the 2008 crisis. Although GDP grows, we also observe unemployment
growth as well post crisis. A possible explanation could be found in Post-Keynsian (Dalziel
and Lavoie, 2003) and Keynes (1936) where deleveraging by the banking sector in crisis re-
stricting the flow of credit, thus slowing investment (or in some cases forcing firms to divest)
and the easiest cost to remove is labour, hence unemployment. However, contradictory is the
increase in output. This seems to follow the increase in public debt that is either related to
unemployment and or intervention in the private sector. Further investigation is necessary to
establish the interactions between these variables. One not unexpected aspect is the growth in
wealth and income inequality illustrated by GINI.
if we now compare low income, middle with high income then we would expect an observable
difference due largely to the structure and maturity of the financial infrastructure that affects
level of private debt.. A point to note is that banking crises where there is some form of gov-
ernment intervention are much more prevalent in the mid to high income countries whereas,
low income countries have a less mature banking system and less of the population relies on
it. First, compare middle income with high income as they will have both a reasonably well
developed banking system, significant private sector lending and a large proportion of the pop-
ulation using it, therefore exposing the country to banking risk. As we have already discussed,
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public debt increases in response to the crisis. Whether that is bailing out or revenues, the out-
come is the same. Note that public debt continues to climb in high income economies, whereas
there is a tailing off in the middle income.
















































































































all high mid low
Figure 2.1: Banking Crisis - Columns from left to right are All crises, then by income classification:
high income, middle income. low income. The variables are y is GDP, dH is private debt, dGis
public debt, unemp is unemployment and gini is the income GINI index. This includes multiple
banking crises across all countries. The data is normalised to mean (except for GINI) by calculating
the deviation from the mean for that sequence, all sequences are then aligned on the crisis date and
the chart reflects the mean path across all of the sequences.
A interesting observation is that middle income economies have high level of public debt before
the crisis and that seems to collapse, implying that government may also be defaulting at the
same time. Regarding private debt, high income seems to have a small correction whereas that
correction after the crisis is much more pronounced in middle income countries. Note that the
decline in income, y is much more sudden in middle income countries, whereas high income
countries seem to have a period of recession leading up to the crisis. One could hypothesis
that high income the recession might be the factor that puts the banking system under stress
whereas middle income suffer an externality or some from of institutional failure prior to the
crisis. This would be the case with the Asian crisis (Johnson et al., 2000). In high income, the
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progressive rise in private debt (approximately 10%pa) immediately prior to the crisis seems to
support the latter stages set out in Minsky (1992) leading to the liquidity crunch as in Mendoza
(2013).
We can see that unemployment increases rapidly in high income countries as a result of the
crisis whereas we only observe a peak sometime after the crisis for the middle income countries.
Labour costs in high income countries tend to be higher, however companies may ‘hang on’
to labour in a recession and it is only the crisis that releases the labour. Following the theories
of debt deleveraging, one would expect that the deleveraging that occurs in middle income
would have a much more pronounced effect on unemployment. This would be an interesting
point for further analysis beyond the scope of this work.
Lastly, inequality, Note that the mean level of inequality is much greater in middle income
countries and there is a sudden drop in inequality at the point of crisis. This is possibly driven
by financial asset wealth taking a significant downgrade then recovering as we have seen in
the early stages of the 2020 pandemic. However, this is temporary and the economy returns to
the same levels of inequality. This in stark contrast to that of high income where we observe a
progressively worsening inequality throughout the crisis period. Although high income eco-
nomies start at a lower level there is a significant change that flattens off after 6 years post
crisis. Note that middle income inequality averages 42/100 whereas high income remains be-
low 34/100. Middle income countries tend to have a significant proportion of the population
near poverty levels and a wealthy minority that would cause the GINI to reflect high levels of
inequality.
We include low income countries for completeness. One aspect is that private debt does not
deviate much in response to the crisis (the range is small), nevertheless, government debt does
increase markedly much more inline with high and middle income. Interestingly, inequality is
initially less in low income countries than that of middle income possibly implying that the bur-
geoning wealth class has not developed possibly aligning itself to the industrialisation status
of the country.
In summary, banking crises inevitably end up with some form of wealth transference from the
government to the private sector whether that be via a bailout or tax revenue losses though
corporate losses. High income countries suffer a consistent and progressive climb in unem-
ployment possibly though companies attempting to save labour costs and moving more to
automation.
2.4.2 Currency Crisis
According to Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) and Benigno and Romei (2014), a currency crisis
is when the confidence in the domestic currency causes a significant depreciation in its value
making foreign funded debt servicing unsustainable. Thus leads to a mass private debt de-
leveraging10 and a rapidly increasing level of public debt as service costs compound. As such,
a currency crisis may provoke a banking crisis that follows soon after. The important aspect is
10possibly though default
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the effect of deleveraging on the domestic economy is the affect on effective aggregate demand.
This may, in part be compensated for by the increase in exports, therefore GDP, however, in-
dustries that only provide domestically may be hard hit. So what we might have is a domestic
recession and an export boom. We observe this dynamic in the general case of all countries
currency crisis Figure 2.2.
A currency crisis tends to have significantly different private debt dynamics if one accounts
for income category . Both show climbing public debt and increasing unemployment at the
periods around the crisis. However, in high income countries, there is a significant period of
deleveraging ex-post crisis. Moreover, there is a significant period of private debt accumula-
tion ex-ante. Again, unemployment increases dramatically though the main crisis period and
then stabilise at a high level. Possibly we can explain this with deleveraging affecting both
consumption and investment.
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Figure 2.2: Currency Crisis - Columns from left to right are All crises, then by income classification:
high income, middle income. low income. The variables y is GDP, dH is private debt, dGis public
debt, unemp is unemployment and gini is the income GINI index. This includes multiple banking
crises across all countries. The data is normalised to mean (except for GINI) by calculating the
deviation from the mean for that sequence, all sequences are then aligned on the crisis date and the
chart reflects the mean path across all of the sequences.
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Most high income countries that experience a currency crisis tend to be impacted in the private
sector with a rapid depreciation of the local currency ramping up funding costs for the finan-
cial sector thus reducing the interest rate spread, therefore the desire to lend and creating a
liquidity trap that suppresses aggregate demand (Eggertsson and Krugman, 2012). In contrast,
the range of deviation for private debt in low income is small in comparison. A possible ex-
planation is that the level of private debt is likely to be substantially lower in developing, low
income countries. An interesting factor that comes out of high income is that the GINI index
decreases11. However, in the low income case, it remains flat until sometime post crisis.
2.4.3 Sovereign Debt Crisis
Much more focus it put on sovereign debt crises than either of the other two classifications and
we have fewer events to use as the basis for analysis. Another aspect is that we do not know
if the sovereign default is as a result of the government propping up the private sector, that
is it could be associated with a banking crisis or external factors to the economy. Sovereign
debt crises may also be linked to a currency crises making public debt unaffordable to service,
particularly if the majority of the debt is in foreign terms.
Starting with the general case, that includes all income categories Figure 2.3, then there is a
marked decline in both private and public debt starting approximately one year after the crisis.
If government and private sector are deleveraging then both are creating surpluses to achieve
that, otherwise either or both government and private sector are in the process of defaulting
and writing down debt. Although income increases, classical debt deleveraging or defaulting
creates a depreciation in the exchange rate (although exchange rate depreciation may be the
source of defaulting) (Benigno and Romei, 2014). In concert with the private sector delever-
aging, there is a rapid increase in unemployment and inequality. Then inequality falls for some
reason. Likely, is that asset wealth is negatively impacted by the deleveraging in the initial peri-
ods and depending on monetary and fiscal responses such as a QE programme, targetting may
create greater inequality. Generally, unemployment and inequality become worse as a result.
The high income category for sovereign defaults shows a similar pattern to that of the general
with the similar decline in debt . An important difference is that unemployment peaks at the
crisis at a very high level between 12 and 14% and only slowly declines over the subsequent
years. In regard to inequality, prior to the crisis a progressive increase as wealth is accumu-
lated in the upper deciles, with a sharp drop in the GINI possibly as we have described above,
asset revaluations being realised, however, this soon returns to higher levels and once private
debt stops deleveraging, then inequality increases to a new, much higher level. Until recently,
economic NGO’s exerted power to force governments to implement austerity programmes as a
condition of receiving funding from them. Many of the southern European countries that can-
not use inflation or exchange rate depreciation effectively were forced to implement quite serve
austerity programmes (Blyth and Ban, 2015; Bi and Traum, 2014). Note that although income
increases past the crisis, it stops two years after the crisis, this matches Greece’s experience,
11that is inequality is deceasing
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where post crisis bailout Greece defaulted on part of its debt and bailout conditions forced a
marked decline in income with unemployment climbing to record high levels.
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Figure 2.3: Sovereign Debt Crisis - Columns from left to right are All crises, then by income
classification: high income, middle income. low income. The variables y is GDP, dH is private
debt, dGis public debt, unemp is unemployment and gini is the income GINI index. This includes
multiple banking crises across all countries. The data is normalised to mean (except for GINI) by
calculating the deviation from the mean for that sequence, all sequences are then aligned on the
crisis date and the chart reflects the mean path across all of the sequences.
If we now consider the lower income category then we observe some similarities to that of
high income in the increasing in unemployment and a pre-crisis change upwards in inequality.
However, government debt climbs markedly though the crisis period and then falls afterwards
possibly implying that the is some limit on government debt and that some form of defaulting
strategy attempt to repay as much as possible. This is somewhat in contrast to that of middle
income countries, where there is an extreme spike in debt that then is defaulted on repeatedly.
This is a significant difference in the behaviour of private debt where there is a steady growth
in debt. Note the level of inequality is much higher during a crisis analysis period averaging
51/100 whereas low income is in the range of 38/100 and high income Figure 2.20/100. These
middle income countries are progressively industrialising and the labour market still reliant on
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low wage occupations. One characteristic that correlates during the post crisis is that private
debt deleveraging seems to start unemployment and flatten output. Although there is increas-
ing indebtedness in the private sector after the post crisis deleveraging it seems to not make the
difference. There maybe an interaction with currency as most middle income countries borrow
in a mix of foreign and domestic currency. Again the deleveraging and exchange rate explana-
tion in Johnson et al. (2000) tempered with a short term recovery in the short run (Bonam and
Lukkezen, 2013).
2.5 Conclusion
From both the historical narrative and the empirical analysis we can see that the role of private
debt has significance in most medium to high income countries. This is contrary to the norm-
ative that public debt is the principle cause of many crises, it is the consequence of crises.
There is some significant differences between developed and developing nations in the ability
to withstand crises without the need for external intervention from NGO’s. Such interventions
come with the baggage of austerity and reform that in some cases works against recovery and
resilience. As we noted in Chapter 1 and further elaborated here, the consequences of erod-
ing the infrastructural fabric of a nation makes them less resilient to crises and more likely to
experience civil unrest and turbulence. Although the institutions of a developed nation may
be strong, recent events indicate that the road for extremism is made easy by ideologies that
economically disenfranchise the majority of the population.
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Chapter 3
Foundation Model and Scenario
3.1 Introduction
Our foundation model derives from the work of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) with both Arellano
(2008) and Na et al. (2014) extensions. We extend the model considerably by including private
debt separately from public debt; the cost of servicing that debt deriving from the willingness
to repay and the ability to repay, a public debt repayment curve following Reinhart and Rogoff
(2011b) and a fiscal policy rule similar to that of Cantore et al. (2017). Fiscal policy determines
social transfers, government expenditures and taxation rates. The monetary policy follows that
of Na et al. (2014) with an exchange rate determination by the marginal utility between tradable
and domestic goods.
The core characteristic of this model is that all debt, public or private, is denominated in foreign
currency. In our prior discussion, we show the difference between public debt in domestic
currency and that, where public debt is in foreign currency or some form of pegging, fixed
exchange range or banding. This imposes a significant restriction on the government’s ability
to respond to a crisis with borrowing in a foreign currency where risk neutral lenders will exact
a risk premium on excessive debt. Effectively, the government carries both the risk of the crisis
and the risk of a depreciation in exchange rates that markedly increase the cost of servicing
public debt. This establishes that the government has a lifetime budget constraint following
the traditional RBC style models.
The separation of private debt from public debt , both denominated in foreign currency, means
interest rates follow their own track. Common for smaller developed and developing countries’
banking systems to use foreign resources for their liquidity. Normally, the domestic economy
does not have sufficient resources to cover all of the liquidity requirements. For the purposes of
this model, we assume that banks do not create money or that creation is limited by some legal
or macro-prudential requirement that we can treat banks as purely transformational, passing
though the risk of default from the household to the foreign investor, thus becoming invisible.
Although this is contrary to our prior discussion that banks create and destroy money in the
lending process, it maintains that an equilibrium can form which determines the willingness
and ability to repay without the complication of taking into account banker’s preferences for
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risk and profit. Therefore, the constraint on the private sector is a lifetime budget constraint of
the traditional RBC form.
If we are going to consider default, then we need to have some exogenous process that gener-
ates foreign exchange income to service the debt. Following both Eaton and Gersovitz (1981)
and Na et al. (2014) we construct a AR(1) stochastic process that may force the household to
consider the choice between defaulting and continuing to service the debt. The decision mak-
ing by the household includes the cost of default, that is suppressed foreign exchange income
whilst being excluded by lenders. There is trade off between reducing consumption to service
debt and that of maintaining consumption today, then experiencing the cost of default in the
hope that fortunes will reverse sooner rather than later.
One of the extensions which we take up from Na et al. (2014), of the foundation Eaton and
Gersovitz (1981) model, is that of non-internationally tradable goods and non-tradable or do-
mestic goods and that of the tradable goods income stream above. This creates an exchange rate
between tradable and non-tradable goods, determining the price of domestic goods in foreign
goods terms. Again following Na et al. (2014), and the Marxian principle that all capital derives
from labour, we adopt that firms produce goods using labour only. Funding for this is by the
household, and the household supplies labour for an labour wage income. One could liken this
to a developing economy model where capital (both private and public) are somewhat limited
and it is the fruits of labour that generate the goods.
Need to consider if the household compensate for the lack of foreign income in downturns,
with increasing production in the domestic sector. This would, of course, result in more labour;
something that the household will balance with that of the utility of consumption of domestic
goods. However, this is not certain; increasing production using labour only, may result in a
decreasing marginal productivity though decreasing economies of scale. How could this be
realistic? Firstly, there is a finite limit on the labour hours and secondly, there is plenty of
evidence that increasing labour input does not necessarily result in a similar factor increasing
in output.
In a downturn, if the demand for labour is in decline then would labour reduce its wage rate
to ensure full employment? This assumes fully flexible wage rate setting, something that we
do not necessarily observe in developed economies; however, in developing economies, wages
may be somewhat more flexible. In this foundation model, we will start with flexible wages,
and in a later extension we impose downward wage rigidity with fixed exchange rates similar
to that of a currency union or peg. Therefore, the domestic sector interacts with the foreign sec-
tor through the household’s consumption and labour preferences under the constraints of the
price of domestic goods in foreign terms. A household therefore may experience inflationary
or deflationary pressures in their decision making. This we explore later in the theoretical and
simulation sections below.
Turning now to the government and the somewhat unrealistic propositions in both Na et al.
(2014) and Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) about the role of government. Many models consider
government being benign, static and almost being portrayed as parasitic on the private sec-
tor. We have already devoted much discussion to the role of government that we will not cover
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here. Suffice to say, that we model government that is dynamic with a policy rule, variable taxes
and social transfers. This more fairly reflects government activities does in the real economies.
Our foundation is a fiscal policy rule deriving from Cantore et al. (2017) with adaptations to
suit our particular needs. Cantore et al. (2017) is a New Keynesian rather than a RBC style,
however it suits our needs and is simple to understand and calibrate. To create the realism,
we make policy making look forward and take into account the current policy settings, the
level of tradable output and the current level of government debt. This then sets the tax rates
on consumption (supply side tax) and labour (demand side tax) as well as the government ex-
penditures on social transfers and general government expenditure. This mimics the budgetary
process that we observe around the world using the legislature to approve budgets in advance.
Consumption tax applies to both tradable and domestic goods whereas labour taxes only ap-
ply to the domestic market for labour. Social transfers and government expenditures apply
to both tradable and domestic sectors. This then ties the executive part of government to set
taxation rates, hence forecast income and largely pre-determine the expenditures necessary for
its functions. Furthermore, households know the tax rates they will need to fund and social
transfers they will receive in advance. Hence the more replicates the normal budgetary cycle
and feedback loops that we observe in many countries.
The government seeks to borrow from foreign investors to fund any shortfall in primary sur-
plus.This borrowing it also needs to fund any debt repayments and the interest therefore is
inter-temporally budget constrained. Government needs to run primary surpluses to fund
debt servicing. Juxtaposed is the real world, most developed economies run a primary deficit
and have done so since WW2, and likewise with many developing economies.
Normatively, the expression of government debt is in the form of Debt to GDP ratio. In the
EU fiscal responsibility area, part of the Eurozone, a debt to GDP ratio of 60-65% would be the
target. Many countries seek to reduce their Debt to GDP ratio to as low as 28%1. Many see that
reducing debt as ‘good’ for the economy, particularly those promoting fiscal responsibility. For
example: UK 2010 budget2. However, government could choose to increase GDP rather than
reduce debt stock. As we have already discussed, if a government can seek to invest (that is
government expenditure), improving productivity, it can reduce the debt to GDP ratio.
In our setting, where governments cannot create the money, it needs to borrow from foreign
investors and then deploy those funds as transfers, either directly or indirectly, into the private
sector to boost productivity. This could be problematic for the foreign investor, in that if the
government is unsuccessful or there is a depreciation of its domestic currency then it is more
likely to default. This implies that with increasing risk of default, the effective interest rate
that foreign investors require will increase, making debt servicing costs increase. As such this
creates a situation where the public debt hits a tipping point and the only outcome is default.
Any country that denominates its debt in foreign terms has a natural debt curve which, at
the peak, has a debt limit. Reinhart and Rogoff (2011b) explores this is some detail; however
we turn to Cantore et al. 2017; Bi and Traum 2012, 2014 for a style of logistic functional form
for determining the interest rate, hence the debt limit in foreign terms. Therefore, a condition
1The NZ Government set a target in the 2017 election of 28% debt to GDP ratio
2https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/budget-june-2010
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can develop where declining foreign exchange income can be a prelude to a default situation
for a government that operates public debt responsibly, if that debt is denominated in foreign
currency.
This leads us to the question, why would a government issue public debt in a foreign currency
when it has its own domestic currency? Firstly, a legal imposition is that of a currency union,
an example of which is the Eurozone. In these cases, countries have made a trade-off between
monetary flexibility in managing their fiscal debt, and the benefits of common rule trade. This
may be a reasonable deduction in the good times; however, in downturns, the fiscal flexibility
that a sovereign currency government has is not available to the country. Our discussion on
the historical aspects indicates that some form of transfer between nation states to limit the
damage that a public debt default would impose.
Secondly, the economy is so small that it does not have the ‘carrying’ capacity to hold a level
of public debt sufficient for the government’s needs. What is a liability to the government is
an asset to the private sector. However, if that country’s private sector does not have sufficient
wealth to buy up the debt, then the government needs to turn to foreign investors. With a small,
less stable exchange rate, foreign investors will need to account for exchange rate movements
(the classical UIP condition) in the interest rate that they charge. Effectively, a country that is
reliant on foreign investors to provide public debt funding, may be forced to denominate its
debt in foreign terms and carry the exchange rate risk itself.
Thirdly, although a country may have a sovereign currency, much of its domestic trade and
commerce including banking may be undertaken in a foreign currency. A case in point is Ar-
gentina prior to the 2000’s debt crises, as Na et al. (2014) eloquently illustrates. Although there
will be a demand for domestic currency (largely to pay government taxes), private income and
wealth will be denominated and held in foreign terms. This is common in many countries
where the ubiquitous acceptance of the US dollar for settlement of private transactions leaves
the domestic currency to play very much a secondary role. Hence, a country in this situation is
not going to be able to ‘sell’ or service its debt in its domestic currency, necessitating the coun-
try to offer debt in foreign terms. Likewise, a country that receives foreign income in foreign
currency and needs foreign funds, particularly the private sector, thus diminishing the neces-
sity to use domestic currency, further weakening the domestic currency as of value in foreign
exchange.
For the foreign lender to both private and public sectors, they must account for possibility
or risk that the household or government may default, customary is to cover the possibility
of principle loss by additional interest as an insurance mechanism (Lizarazo, 2013). Such in-
creases result in debt servicing costs which are potentially unsustainable, as already discussed,
a tipping point. For the household, this trade-off between defaulting and living with income re-
duction and that of consumption reduction to service debt brings us to the willingness to repay.
If we assume no malfeasances, then this comes down to a simple calculation of maximising the
utility. They trade the gain though not having to repay the debt, effectively it being written
off and a period of exclusion that impacts the foreign income, the imposition of sanction for a
period, for that of a self imposed austerity measure reducing tradable consumption.
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Most researcher model public debt in a default situation as a total write-off. As we have already
shown, total write-off is rare with recent examples of partial write-off being Greece, Argentina,
Brazil and many of the Asian crash countries. In nearly all cases government defaulted on
what was due at the time with foreign investors continuing to lend. The first three aforemen-
tioned countries did exactly that in 2010, 2002 and 1990 respectively (Chan and Duggar, 2007).
In all these cases, they suspended payment of either interest or principle, or both on the bonds
that were due at the time. Bar Greece, they entered into Paris Club negotiations to settle the
debt with significant haircuts. This model can default to different levels of debt3 emulating
the defaulting process that many countries go though. Any model that does not reflect this
reality is questionable as it cannot replicate the repeated sequence of defaulting events that a
government in trouble experience. A country may ‘limp’ from default to default until some ac-
commodation with foreign investors occurs. As Cantore et al. (2017) observes, foreign investors
rarely exclude countries that default.
From the investor side, failure to renew debt contracts may result in a much larger default in
that, if the country does not receive the funds, then it cannot repay (even partially) other debt.
Although USG indicates this is a possibility, they do tend to exclude this from their models.
Likewise with the Bi and Traum (2014), default is a one-time event with exclusion. Cantore
et al. (2017) is one of the papers to consider the possibility that investors will continue to lend.
However, this is in a domestic context and less relevant to foreign investor lending. We observe
such behaviour in commercial lending, where investors (banks) will renegotiate the parameters
of any such loan contracts rather than forcing default and potentially bankruptcy. Bankruptcy
normally resulting in creditors receiving cents on the dollar. By allowing repeating partial
defaulting and only returning to good standing when debt becomes sustainable do we model
accurately both the foreign investor and government’s behaviour. We have a setting that allows
for near total default and that demonstrates it is in neither party’s interest to go down the road
of exclusion as both are likely to loose more wealth and in the case of the country, political
stability (Chan and Duggar, 2007).
The overall model derives from foundation model that covers many of the aspects we discuss
above. The overall model is highly configurable with different policy and strategy settings that
runs in the software suite we set out in Chapter 4. The overall model cover private sector bail-
outs by the government under certain conditions and a range of defaulting strategies including
shallow (defaulting to debt limit), defaulting to affordable and near full default. One aspect to
consider is the fiscal policy rule and the application of fiscal policy ideology (or realisation) by
the government. With regard to the policy rule, we test scenarios with different weightings for
consistency of policy, the effect of national income and stock of public debt to likely extremes
where governments may ignore or largely ignore one or more of the inputs to the rule. As
to the fiscal policy realisation (that is expansionary or contractionary), taxation, social trans-
fers and government expenditures are set to either be pro-cyclical or countercyclical with the
fiscal policy rule. That is, we can simulate extreme austerity or extreme expansionary policies
by the government and most cases in between. Furthermore, we provide a partially optim-
ised solution to downward wage rigidity that provide similar results to Na et al. (2014). These
3Variable write-offs
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mechanisms and factors, when intermixed, provide us with over 11,500 possible scenarios to
test form. We select a representative 37 to illustrate the effects of different policy choices on the
outcomes for households.
To summarise the foundation model that all the models in this work derive from. The founda-
tion has private and public sectors, with separate default-able debt, trading with both tradable
and domestic goods at an exchange rate between them. The private sector has a representative
household and firm, the public sector has a government that borrows and a monetary policy
agency. All borrowing is with a representative foreign agent that has unlimited resources to
lend. Default in the household is on all private debt whereas default in the public sector is
limited to what has to be repaid and cannot be funded. The private sector operates a fiscal
policy rule that sets the tax rates on consumption and labour income with the expenditures on
social transfers and government. Tax rates are pro-cyclical with the fiscal policy rule whereas
expenditures are countercyclical representing an mild fiscal expansionary policy on a recession
or low levels of public debt. The private sector income streams are from an tradable goods
exogenous AR(1) process representing some exportable resource whereas the domestic (non-
tradable) good derives from household labour. Labour wage is flexible and unconstrained.
The parameter calibration is stock from the various sources as set out in the calibration. The
simulation is the foundation simulation we use to benchmark many of the other simulations
against.
3.2 The Model
This model has five agents: households and firms in the private sector; Central bank and fiscal
government in the public sector and foreign investment agents. Common with the founda-
tions, households receive is an exogenous income stream, labour wages and one period foreign
debt to fund consumption and repayment of debt. There are tradable and domestic goods mar-
kets with nominal prices and a nominal exchange rate. As with USG, a monetary authority
that regulates private sector foreign borrowing. Our extensions include the introduction of
a fiscal government that collects proportional tax revenues to fund government consumption
and social transfers to households. Government adjust its revenues and expenses by borrowing
and repaying from foreign investors with one period bonds. With USG, there is decentralised
private borrowing and one centralised default decision. In contrast, this model has decentral-
ised private borrowing and default decision on private debt independent of government with
government making its own decision about public debt default. A characteristic of this model
is that public and private debt may be priced differently depending on the risk of default.
This model introduces a unobserved fiscal policy rule as a proxy for government policy. This
rule takes into account prior policy, current levels of public debt and national income in the
determination of government expenditure, social transfers and taxation rates. This introduces
a level of stability into the model during normal and recovery periods. In periods when there is
a private debt crisis looming, then government makes unanticipated emergency funds through
social transfers to households whilst holding . It would fund this by increasing public borrow-
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ing from foreign investors. During a crisis it is unlikely that governments are able to substan-
tially increase tax rates or reduce its own expenditures, either of which may exacerbate rather
than alleviate the crisis in the private sector. Hence, any measures to return public debt to
target levels are ex-post the crisis. This establishes dour distinct periods that maps closely to
many economies’ behaviour; these being, normality, lead up, crisis, and recovery. Normality
where normal economic fluctuations induce changes in consumption and debt. The lead up
to a crisis where persistent recessions eventually drive the private sector to default. The crisis
where government attempts to prevent private sector default. This may result in the govern-
ment defaulting and/or private sector default. Finally, recovery, where government attempts
to progressively reduce public debt burden and return to normality.
3.2.1 Private Sector
3.2.1.1 Households
There is a continuum of identical households that derive utility from consuming both trad-
able and domestic (or non-tradable) goods and incur a dis-utility from the labour they sup-
ply to firms. Household nominal income sources are from an exogenous stream of tradable
goods, a labour wage, social transfers from government, and any profits (or losses) from firms.
Households has access to borrowing in foreign currency from foreign agents one period debt
at a price that foreign investors will buy dependent on the risk of default. Households pay
a proportional taxes on consumption, income and debt to the public sector. The representat-






βt {U (ct)− H (ht)} (3.1)









and the dis-utility of household labour is some negative function of labour input H (ht).
The nominal household nominal budget constraint in domestic currency terms:


































Households receive income, net of tax at rate τy, from an exogenous stream of tradable income
ỹTt at tradable goods price P
T
t , income from labour Wtht, Πt on domestic production is the time
worked, htat nominal wage Wt and any nominal profits (losses) Πt. Households also receive a






t and a subsidy (or lump sum taxation) Ft from
the monetary authority to fund (or levy) household foreign debt. To fund this the monetary
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the household also receives any profits from firms. The household uses the proceeds from







t+1 at price q
H





εt is the exchange rate.
Household debt is in one of two states, that is continuing to service the debt IHt = 1 or in default




dHt+1 = 0 (3.4)
where IHt ∈ {0, 1}. A household makes the choice between repaying debt in foreign currency
εtdHt and continuing access to foreign investors or defaulting and not repaying εtd
H
t and forfeits






t+1 = 0. When in good standing and steady state,
their exists a trade surplus equivalent to the interest on all foreign debt. Finally, we assume
that the transversality condition applies to all debt.
Normalising the Price of Goods The model has two prices PT, PN and one exchange εt,
which we simplify by pricing all goods by the relative price between domestic and tradable
goods. Beginning at foreign tradable price, we apply the Law of One Price that implies that the
domestic economy is a price taker for tradable goods. Let PT∗t foreign currency price of tradable
goods. The domestic price for tradable goods is a conversion from the international price via
the exchange rate thus:
PTt
PT∗t
= εt → PTt = PT∗t εt
where εt the exchange rate in quality of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency. Again,
without loss of generality, normalising the foreign price PT∗t = 1 implies nominal tradable







→ ptεt = PNt Therefore, we apply this to wages, social transfers, rebates and
profits:






















































wt = Wt/εt, ft = Ft/εt, πt = Πt/εt.
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The household budget (3.3) constraint for tradable and domestics restated with normalisation
to one price in foreign and local terms:








































Therefore if εt increases (that is, requires more domestic currency to buy one unit of foreign
currency, hence the domestic currency depreciates), then PTt increases and the ratio of relative
price pt = PNt /PTt decreases. This implies that domestic domestic goods and wages are worth
less in foreign currency terms. The domestic currency depreciation results in inflation, εt.
3.2.1.2 Income, Firms and Production
Continuing with the theme where output derives from an exogenous tradable good, endogen-
ous domestic output from household labour. There are a continuum of identical competitive
homogeneous domestic production firms that utilise flexible household labour ht and remu-
nerate at a nominal rate of Wt wages per unit. They utilise a production technology F (ht) to
produce output domestic domestic output yNt .
yNt = F (ht) (3.7)
As a result, firms make nominal profits derive from the revenue from production less the labour
wage cost thus:
Πt = PNt y
N
t −Wtht
Firm profits are subject to the wage wage deflation constraint, divide both sides by PT and
wt = Wt/εt, πt = Πt/εt. as above to obtain firms profit in foreign terms:
πt = ptF (ht)− wtht (3.8)
In addition to domestic output, there is a stochastic exogenous endowment stream of tradable
goods, yTt that can be traded overseas or domestically consumed. The output from this resource
is typically persistent, and is subject to exogenous shocks εyt ∼ iid (0, 1) with a standard de-
viation of σy. These shocks can be liken to terms of trade stocks imposed exogenously or as
fluctuations in tradable goods output from domestic resources.When the economy is is good
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standing then household obtain the full income from the output, however, when the economy
(households or government) is in default, there is an attenuation of output and the household





This loss comes about though the terms of trade and other trading constraints as a result of
default, hence:
ỹTt =







When the economy is in good standing with its debt (both private and public sector) then
It = 1. If either government or household is in default then It = 0. The assumption is that when
either the government or private sector is in default, foreign agents apply more stringent terms
of trade that imposes additional costs on the domestic economy, hence a loss during autarky.
We refer the reader to Uribe and Schmitt-Grohé (2016, sec. 13.2) for an empirical analysis and









and the total output for the economy in foreign terms:






3.2.2.1 Public Sector Policy and Strategy
The public sector has two functioning organisations, one is an independent monetary authority
(referred to as Central Bank, CB) 4 that controls private foreign borrowing through taxation and
the other is a fiscal government that attempts to maintain stability through taxation, borrowing
and social transfers. We closely model the monetary authority on USG with the same intent,
namely, a debt tax that limits household borrowing by creating an pecuniary externality from
foreign sources. There is no interaction between monetary authority and public debt.
The fiscal government (government) uses proportional taxation on income and consumption
to redistribute as social transfers to households and fund its own expenses, including servicing
public debt. Juxtapose to the monetary authority, in normal times the government uses public
debt to smooth out tax revenues ensuring that households receive a minimum level of income.
This allows a short recession will eventually rebalance itself when followed by an up-cycle. In
4Following the doctrine of independent central banks that has become the norm in developed nations and for
many developing nations.
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contrast, a long and deepening recession can strain public debt with negative secondary deficits
that becomes unsustainable in the long run. Likewise, the resilience of the household to long
term recession may also make servicing its debt challenging. The government is cognoscente of
the current state of the economy and household’s income and public debt and sets the tax and
expenditures accordingly. As debt is in foreign currency, the government is inter-temporally
budget constrained.
3.2.2.2 Monetary Authority
Following the same principles set out in USG, to ensure that households internalise the debt,
this model applies the same mechanism; however, it separates the role from the fiscal govern-
ment. The monetary authority, as part of the public sector, seeks to mange household debt
through a debt taxation levying and rebate system. Nevertheless, this model separates house-
hold debt and decision making from public sector debt. Nevertheless, its inclusion applies
the same logic to maintain consistency with the the foundation models. Restating USG, the
monetary authority either taxes external debt sale qHt d
H
t+1 at rate τ
d
t or if:



















dHt and returning it to the household as a subsidy.
3.2.2.3 Fiscal Government
The government operates a budget funded by taxing household income τyt
(








with the proceeds from issuing debt (bonds) dGt+1at price q
G
t
maturing in the next period. This income then funds government consumption gt, social trans-
fers stand repayment of debt(bonds). The government budget constraint stated in international
terms:










ỹTt + wtht + πt
)
+ qdGt+1 − dGt (3.14)
where dGt is a full or partial repayment of current public debt d
G





and IGt = 1 , when in default, then partial repayment d
G
t = (1− ∆t) dGt , IGt = 0 and repays a
fraction of the debt ∆t. Foreign investors continue to lend, however exacting a high price for
















































ỹTt + wtht + πt
)
− (gt + st) (3.16)
As we have briefly discussed, households and proportionally taxed on income and consump-
tion to fund government expenditures, social transfers and public debt management. This
introduces a problem for the government: if it maintains constant tax rates then (3.15) implies
that ceteris paribus an increase in debt above the steady state, requires the present value of future
secondary surpluses sufficient to cover public debt. We introduce an unobserved government
policy instrument that represents the government’s one period ahead budget forecast. Most
countries operate a budgeting cycle one period ahead to ensure that households, business and
foreign investors can adequately plan for any necessary adjustments to tax rates, government
expenditures and social transfers proportionately. Furthermore, governments tend to operate
at some level of consistency of policy overtime that moderates rapid changes to tax rates and
public expenditures. Following Cantore et al. (2017) we adjust taxes on consumption and in-





























Where ψt is the government’s policy instrument that it uses to determine the adjustments to
tax revenues, and government expenditures5. ψ,dG and y are the steady state values for the
policy instrument, government debt and national income.The parameters ρψ, ρdψ, ρ
y
ψ determ-
ine the weight that government to debt and income whilst recognising the desire to maintain
consistency6 . A Part of the rebalancing is that when tax rates increase we need to induce a
counter cyclical government expenditures to decline. We achieve Cantore et al. (2017) a little
more simply by following the same rule (3.18) with government expenditure and the inverse











where g is the steady state level derived from the underlying tradable and domestic goods
consumed by government, as hence ptgN + gT = g, gN , gT > 0. Therefore the proportion
of government consumption of either tradable or domestic goods is dependent on the tradable
price of domestic goods whereas the policy instrument increases or reduces the overall level of
government consumption proportionally for tradable and domestic goods.
5We deviate from Cantore et al. (2017) slightly in that we later specify that government expenditures adjustment
is by the same mechanism.
6Inspection of table 1 in Cantore et al. (2017) the coefficients of debt and output are 0.0777, 0.1478 for tax and
0.1197, 0.1624 for government with 0.6252 for the persistence of tax rates and a 0.7662 persistence of government
expenditures. We therefore estimate the model using the same techniques in Cantore et al. (2017) for one equation
and three dependent variables, namely consumption and income tax rates, and government expenditure level. Of
course, the policy instrument is unobserved however the tax rates, public debt and national income are all observed.
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Social transfers (funding) covers activities that government undertakes to improve households
such as healthcare, welfare and security. Naturally, if household choose to use transfers for
consumption then the government receives tax revenue. This is not the case if households
choose to use transfer for debt. Social transfers st are a combination of tradable and domestic
goods funded by tax revenues and debt. We assume that during periods leading up to a crisis,
transfers are always positive, that is not a lump sum tax. A countercyclical policy would com-
pensate a decline in national income with greater social transfers. We achieve this from 3.17, in















observe social transfers (though welfare) increase particularly at the beginning of a recession
and potentially taper off as government’s (households, and foreign investors) become increas-
ingly concerned about the level of public debt (Mukherjee and Bhattacharya, 2010). Formally,








t ≥ 0 ∀t (3.20)
3.2.3 The Foreign Sector’s Pricing of Public and Private Debt
An important difference in this research is that we treat private and public sector debt as separ-
ate and only linked only by the mechanism of tax revenues and terms of trade loss in default.
The foreign sector investors are risk neutral and buy household dHt+1and government d
G
t+1 debt
at prices qHt and q
G
t . Naturally, price setting accounts for the risk of default and the interna-
tional rate of interest r∗. For the household,the foreign investors assess the willingness to repay
the debt or default. However, for government, foreign investors assess the political will and
ability to repay the debt. By treating the criteria for assessing probability of default differently,
then the effective interest rate for private and public sectors may be different depending on the
level of their respective indebtedness and the risk they pose to defaulting. In many countries,
private and public sector debt interest rates are significantly different. We observe in some
cases private debt may be at a lower interest rate that public debt depending on the indebted-
ness. We cater for such circumstances by independently determining the price of public and
private sector debt. Therefore the foreign investors offer to buy debt from private and public
sectors at a price that makes them indifferent between the investments accounting for the risk
of default.
There are a number of instances where the government has defaulted and the private sector
has continued to borrow from foreign investors, albeit at significantly detrimental terms. We
cope with this by setting the attenuation of production if either sector is in default.An import-
ant mechanism in either private or public debt default is that the economy experiences a loss
(3.11) in terms of trade represented by a loss function. This loss continues whilst foreign in-
vestors exclude either or both households and government from access to financial markets
depending on who has defaulted. A private sector default may cause the government to loose
tax revenue, consequentially affect the ability of the government to service its debt. Likewise,
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when government defaults, the private sector looses tradable income and may affect its ability
to service debt or its willingness to repay debt. We assume that government will continue to
service debt whilst it can continue to finance servicing through tax revenue and borrowing and
only limited by its ability to impose austerity at a later date.
3.2.3.1 Private Sector
For the private sector, foreign lenders charge qHt when in both private are in good standing




t . When in
default, then domestic borrowers and lenders clear and set qHDt accordingly. The price of private
debt is therefore a function of the probability default in the next period, given that private sector
is in good standing7, that isPr
(
IHt+1 = 1 | IHt = 1
)
. When divided by the gross international









Representing a interest rate rHt =
1+r∗
Pr(IHt+1=1|IHt =1)

























This implies that Pr
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when in good standing. As foreign in-




dHt+1 = 0 (3.24)
3.2.3.2 Government Sector
We adopt a different approach to government following Davig (2004); Bi and Traum (2014); Bi,
Leeper and Leith (2014) with the default dependent on the effective government debt limit dG∗t .
Government repays its debt in full, if the current level of debt is below the effective government
debt limit. In any other circumstance, it defaults, formally:
IGt =
1 dGt < dG∗t0 dGt ≥ dG∗t (3.25)
7Later, we define private sector default probability as the value of continuing to service debt and the value of






≥ vd (yt+1, ht+1) |yt, IHt = 1
}
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Where the stochastic debt limit ,dG∗t is drawn from a exogenous distribution, d
G∗
t ∼ DG∗ that is
non-linear in that it rapidly rises once the probability of default starts to rise. Further discussion
on these points can be found in Bi and Traum (2014); Cantore et al. (2017). We express the
debt limit cumulative density using a logistic function with two parameters with calibrations
from the data. The probability of default, φt that is the probability of IGt → 0 given that the
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later to ensure that
dG∗t is consistent with the public debt limit d
G
nldand the politically tolerable maximum of fiscal
instrument ψgs. For any given level of government debt dGt , the default probability is φt that
represents the risk premium over the gross international interest rate 1 + r∗. Hence, the de-















The government’s demand for debt dGt+1 at the price the foreign investors are willing to offer










 = dGt − Γt (3.30)
and solving for dGt+1provides the next period public debt level. If government defaults on public












Where ∆Gis of the debt being defaulted on. Partial repayment reflects the nature of public
debt, namely it has a maturity structure and default is normally on only some part of the debt.
Although exclusion does occur and there is imposition of sanctions, that reduces immediately
tradable income for the economy.
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3.2.4 Market Clearing and Competitive Equilibrium
In this section, we cover the market clearing conditions for tradables and domestics followed
by the competitive equilibrium. This then allows the specification of the rest of the model that
includes the motivation by government to to make bailout payments, the decision making of
households and. consequentially the debt dynamics.
3.2.4.1 Market Clearing
The economy wide budget constraint derives from (3.5), (3.15), (3.13) and (3.12) where the
proceeds from tradable and domestic output, the change in private and public sector debt funds
























1− IGt (1− ∆)
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dGt









= F (ht) (3.34)



















1− IGt (1− ∆)
]
dGt (3.35)
Therefore a combination of tradable output and foreign debt is fully funds all tradable con-
sumptions (private and government) and any debt service costs.
3.2.4.2 Competitive Equilibrium
Households Households seek to maximise utility by choosing consumptions (tradable and
domestic), labour supply, and level of household, given that government sets the the tax rates
for consumption and income and the social transfers, the monetary authority sets the tax rate
for foreign debt and any subsidy. Therefore state that the problem as:
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t+1 + st + ft
]
Where the Lagrange multiplier:








t ))Ψ2(cTt ,cNt )/pt(1+τct )



















































































































Firms and Production As stated previously, the firms problem is to maximise profit πt:
max
{wt ,ht}
πt = ptF (ht)− wtht
that leads to using FOC wage setting:
ptFh (ht) = wt (3.42)
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This represents normal the trade-off between labour dis-utility, the marginal production of
labour and the marginal utility of domestic consumption, taking into account the government’s
fiscal policy.


























1− IGt (1− ∆t)
]
dGt
With (3.33), (3.46) implies that primary surplus from domestics is zero. However, tradables,





















1− IGt (1− ∆t)
]
dGt − qGt dGt+1
Next, consider the default and bailout decisions of both households and public sector regarding
their debt.
3.2.4.3 Households Decision on Debt
Households consider the option of continuing to service the household debt with foreign in-
vestors, that is being in good standing and continuing or defaulting, that is in bad financial
standing. When households default they experience two immediate effects, the loss of trad-
able income and exclusion from financial markets. We consider the household’s decision as a
recursive maximisation (dynamic programming) problem using three core Bellman equations
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representing the value of being; good standing and remaining so, in default, and finally, the
choice between the two.
Under market clearing conditions(3.34) and (3.35) in equilibrium, then the household considers
the options of continuing to service debt and repay debt or defaulting. We analyse the decision
of the household by turning the infinite horizon problem (3.36) into a dynamic programming
problem where the household makes decisions on consumptions, labour input and the level of
debt. We restate the problem in three parts, value of being in good standing and remaining so,
the value of default and then the decisions between defaulting and remaining in good standing.





t , ĥt, ψt
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However, households may default and need to consider the value of default noting that they
may return to good standing with probability θH, hence the value of defaulting:
vd
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When the household defaults, then tradable consumption is reliant on the revenue from the
attenuated tradable output, social transfers less tax on output and consumption. . This im-






− gT The value of being in good standing is a choice between value of

















yTt , ĥt, ψt
)}
(3.51)

















A competitive equilibrium for the set of stochastic processes{
cTt , c
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3.3 Functional Form, Calibration and Computation
These calibrations, the strategies for public sector default and bailout of the private sector with
the fiscal policy realisation setting and the flexible/rigidity wage/exchange rate form the found-
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ation scenario. We then run the scenario against the mathematical model that is encoded in soft-
ware that we describe in Chapter 4. We refer to the mathematical model with the basic settings
that we have described here as the foundation model. We separate the scenario from the model
so that we can create multiple different scenarios against the same model without having to
change the underlying software. This allows us to extensively test the model implementation
and then be able to calibrate it against a country or groups of countries.
3.3.1 Calibration
The calibrations for the foundation scenario are from Na et al. (2014) using the Argentine eco-
nomy over the period of the 2002 default. These are generally accepted as a reasonable calibra-
tions for this type of model. The fiscal policy rule derives from Cantore et al. (2017) their initial
experiments. A list of the calibrations and sources is in tables Table 3.1 and Table 3.2.
Param Value Description Source
β 0.85 Household discount factor Na et al. (2014)
α 0.75 Labour share in non-traded Na et al. (2014)
γc 0.26 Tradables share of consumption Na et al. (2014)
σ 2 Inter-temporal elasticity of consumption Na et al. (2014)
χ 0.5 The dis-utility of labour factor Na et al. (2014)
ϕ 0.25 elasticity of marginal dis-utility of labour supply Uribe and
Schmitt-Grohé (2016)
ξ 0.5 elasticity of substitution between goods Na et al. (2014)
γw 0.99 Downward wage rigidity Na et al. (2014)
r∗ 0.01 International interest rate Na et al. (2014)
θH 0.0385 Probability of returning to good standing Na et al. (2014)
yT 1 Steady state tradable output Na et al. (2014)
ρy 0.9317 Persistence of exogenous log tradable output Na et al. (2014)
σy 0.037 SD. of shocks to tradable output Na et al. (2014)
δ0 0 Output lost function intercept Na et al. (2014)
δ1 -0.35 Output lost function linear parameter Na et al. (2014)
δ2 0.4403 Output lost function quadratic parameter Na et al. (2014)
Table 3.1: Initial Calibrations - Private sector
These calibrations form the basis for all of the parameters in the foundation scenario. In ad-
dition, there is a no bailout strategy by the government on private sector defaults8 and if the
government defaults then it will default to the maximum level of debt that it can purchase9. In
addition, the private sector wages are and exchange rates are fully flexible with no constraint10,
and the fiscal realisation11 is moderately expansionary generating pro-cyclical taxation and
counter-cyclical social transfers and government expenditures.
8Further discussion on bailouts is in Chapter 6
9We discuss alternative strategies in Chapter 7
10We discuss in Chapter 8
11This is the way that the fiscal policy rule is translated into the tax rates, social transfers and government ex-
penditures. We discuss this further in Chapter 8
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Param Value Description Source
ρψ 0.6252 Fiscal policy persistence Cantore et al. (2017)
ρdψ 0.0777 fiscal policy sensitivity to public debt deviations Cantore et al. (2017)
ρ
y
ψ 0.1478 fiscal policy sensitivity to output deviations Cantore et al. (2017)
gT + gN 0.2 Steady state total government expenditure Uribe and
Schmitt-Grohé (2016)
τc 0.05 Steady state consumption tax rates Cantore et al. (2017)
τy 0.24 Steady state labour tax rates Cantore et al. (2017)
sT + sN 0.2 Steady state social transfers Uribe and
Schmitt-Grohé (2016)
η1 see text Govt debt Logistic function parameter calculated
η2 see text Govt debt Logistic function parameter calculated
∆ calculated Government debt haircut rate Cantore et al. (2017)
dL 1.6 Logistic- low end public debt level Bi and Traum (2014)
φL 0.3 Logistic- low end public debt default probability Bi and Traum (2014)
dH 1.8 Logistic- high end public debt level Bi and Traum (2014)
φH 0.99 Logistic- high end public debt default probability Bi and Traum (2014)
Table 3.2: Initial Calibrations - Government
3.3.2 Functional forms
The functional forms follow those in Uribe and Schmitt-Grohé (2016) permitting us to use the
calibrations from that source. We set a CRRA period utility function for consumption with an
CES aggregator function to combine tradable and domestic consumption. Similarly, for labour




























































Production is for the domestics sector and follows the form:
F (ht) = Ahαt (3.71)













Following on from the competitive equilibrium in equations (3.53) to (3.65) incorporating the
functional forms leads to:

























































































































































The following summarises the computational process to construct the various tables and policy
rules that we use to simulate a sequence. A detailed explanation of the software environment
is in Chapter 4 showing in detail the building of all of the state transition matrices, the dynamic
programming and heuristic learning tools to identify patterns particularly in crisis events. This
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includes a classification tool that analyses the path of the data to find crisis events either in
public or private sector to identify the sequence of states that the crisis goes though to build a
hierarchical map of the events with classifications and sub-classes.
The heuristic event classification system looks for events that are is very close proximity and
ties them together to construct an event sequence. This is then classified by its common se-
quence features to provide an event sequence classification. These are then summarised and
presented as time path sequences. Items in brackets are data stores eg. (PR) is the policy rule
data store12. We summarise the computational process as follows:
1. Compile all the Model (MP) and Program (PP) parameters to construct a set of static
structured data (SD) that forms the basis of the state transitions (PR) for each variable
path.
2. Compute the AR(1) process for log of tradable output using equation (3.10) with nor-
mally distributed innovations in output. Out initial calibrations for the parameters derive
from USG and are specified in Table 3.1 . This generates a time-series which then forms
the basis of computing a discrete state transition with equally spaced points for log yTt




0.5 = 0.10213. The process for creating a Markov state model is to count the
transitions from yTt (rows) to y
T
t+1in a matrix (countable state space) ∀t starting at t = 0.
After counting the all the transitions, calculate the probabilities by totalling the rows and
dividing each element in the row by the total of that row. This forms the foundation for
running the simulations.
3. Construct the equilibrium dynamics for the government policy rule (PR). This creates
discrete three dimensional array that represents the state transitions for the government
fiscal policy rule. This then determines the tax, social transfers and government expendit-
ures, which later feeds into the equilibrium dynamics for the household.
4. Complete the government budget constraint and debt borrowing requirements. This also
includes calculating the state transition for current levels of debt, the primary surplus
(deficit) and the new level of debt. The calculation of the logistic function to calculate the
price of debt is included in this state transition. This finalises in a decision array that takes
into account, tax income, expenditure, hence primary surplus with the current levels of
debt to determine new level of debt, or the decision by the government to not fully repay
the debt. In this foundation model the government will repay as much debt as it can fund
from its own primary surplus and new debt to cover interest payments and principle.
5. Construct the state space for the domestic component. This again feeds into the equilib-
rium dynamics for the household.
6. Using value-function iteration in a dynamic programming algorithm to capture equilib-
rium dynamics in a discrete state space for every level of private debt, household income




and fiscal policy rule setting (PR). This provides the basis to calculate the households will-
ingness to repay or default decision array. This provides the transition probability matrix
that forms the basis calculating private sector default probabilities and the equilibrium
policy rules.
7. After some tidying up and cross checking, we run a the stochastic process to generate
sequences for yTt and the return to good standing for the household and government.
This allows us to run different policy settings on the same sequence to observe the effects
of the policy settings. These sequences have a burn in period to ensure that some form of
stability within the simulation occurs before recording the run. This forms the basis for
running the stimulations and further analysis.
8. A simulation run (SR) produces a sequence path for each variable as a set of indices to
the matrix. Furthermore, we capture discrete events such as default, reason for default
(or bailout in one of the extensions), the returning to good standing. We refer to this as
a scenario dependent on the policy settings that is the foundation for the analysis that
follows
9. Next is to run the analysis tools that identify the discrete events and determine if there is
a sequence to them (QR). It applies pre-determined rules to identify the integrity of a se-
quence. Once it identifies a sequence, it then classifies it by the discrete events that make
it up and matches that classification with other classifications either identified in this sim-
ulation or others. If there is no near classification then it creates a new one. These event
sequences are then standardised and held in a indexed sequential hierarchical structure
that allows quick referencing of similar event sequences by their classification.
10. The reporting (RR) includes distributions of the characteristics of classified events, the
statistical analysis of classifications of time sequences to produce representative graphs
of each variable during that event sequence. Furthermore, a range of statistical analysis
reports completes the analysis of one simulation sequence.
11. Future analysis and reporting between different scenarios allows us to observe the effects
of changing different parameters or rules on government, household, foreign investors
and the economy in general.
3.4 Simulation Results for the Foundation Scenario
This foundation scenario combines the basic parameters from both Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
2016b and Cantore et al. 2017 in table 3.4. The fiscal policy parameters are directly from Cantore
et al. (2017) that drives the hidden fiscal policy rule variable ψ for the next period. This determ-
ines the tax rates, government expenditures and social transfers in both tradable and domestic
sectors. Therefore the fiscal policy rule modifies household behaviour in the next period. . The
tax rates and Households, if they default, default on all of their debt whereas government will
61
State space parameter specification
State space points yT 200
Simulation yT 30mn
Burn in 0.1mn
State Transition matrix size 200x200
Public debt range 0-2
Private debt range 0-2
Grid points for all discrete variables 200
Fiscal instrument range 0.36-1.44
general tolerance on dynamic programming 10−9





ρψ = 0.6252,ρdψ = 0.0777, ρ
y
ψ = 0.1478 (MMM)
Government debt haircut
rule
Haircut to debt limit to limit (HCDL)
Bailout rule No Bailouts (NOB)
Wage setting rule Flexible Wages and floating exchange rates (FW)
Fiscal policy Pro-cyclical tax rates generating pro-cyclical tax
revenues, counter-cyclical social transfers and
government expenditures. That is an expansionary
policies in lower tax rates and increase government
expenditures and social transfers when the fiscal
policy rule is in the lower range. (EXP)
Table 3.4: Foundation Scenario parameter settings that govern the simulation.
haircut their debt to the maximum level they can bare within their budget constraint and the
revenue from sale of new debt. We report in the possible ranges for core government sector
variables in table 3.5. Summary statistics are in the appendix for all the main variables of con-
cern in both the normal state, where there is no sanctions, and the sanctions state where either
the government or household have triggered a default and sanctions are in place for the period.
Inspection of figure Figure 3.1 illustrates the loss function. The quadratic function clearly shows
that once tradable income exceeds 0.8, then the loss function increasingly attenuates the income
(red line). Therefore if sanctions are in place and the economy is recovering, the loss function
has the effect of increasingly holding back the economy until there is relief from them.
Next is to consider the government debt supply given the current level of debt and the interest
rate. We calculate the interest rate with the logistic function set out in section 3.2.3.2. We
illustrate the exponential effect of increasing level of debt in interest rate in Figure 3.2a. This is
similar to that found in Bi and Traum (2012). At peak, the interest rate is >10%. If one refers to
Figure 3.2bthen one can observe that this is approaching the natural peak that approximates to
0.94 D/long run GDP. This forms the Natural debt limit for the government dGndl . This comes
about as the revenue from issuing new debt is priced at less than par to account for the interest.
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Variable min mean max
ψ 0.3928 0.900 1.3659
τC 0.0197 0.045 0.0681
τY 0.0946 0.216 0.3269
gT 0.2284 0.100 0.0661
gN 0.2284 0.100 0.0661
sT 0.2537 0.111 0.0734
Table 3.5: From the above scenario parameter settings and the
overall parameters, the fiscal policy variables have the above
ranges. By changing the fiscal policy rule parameters, these
variables change their range and median point.












Figure 3.1: Tradeable Output Blue line without sanctions, red line
(lower), sanctions. Therefore of any given level of yT(x axis) there is
an equivalent ỹTand depending on the state (normal or sanctions),
the loss attenuates the possible tradeable income when in sanctions.
At the peak, the revenue from selling 1.06 of debt is 0.94 in revenue. Clearly, this becomes
unsustainable unless the government runs significant primary surpluses. We observe a tipping
point some way before the peak, that without intervention or substantial increases in revenue,
the government is almost certain to default and require a haircut on the debt. Although in
this model, the total debt is cycled every period, we simulate partial default by hair-cutting
the difference between what debt sold and the natural debt limit. The demand is less than
supply, driving a haircut in debt being bought back. This scenario creates the more normal
circumstance where government default only on what is due for excise at that time and is
likely to continue to default until debt falls well below the natural debt limit..
One aspect that we show later is that governments in that we simulate a sequence of govern-
ment default on debt over varying time-periods. In studying default sequences, particularly
of developing nations, then clear observation of repeated defaulting by the government until
some accommodation is achieved with foreign investors. This is somewhat more realistic that
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the normal government debt modelling where all debt is defaulted on and the government
starts ‘afresh’.








(a) Interest rates on next period public
debt












(b) Public debt supplied and next period
debt level
Figure 3.2: Public debt supply and government interest rates on tradeable public debt
Following this interpretation, then we represent a three dimensional form of Figure 3.2b that
includes the primary surplus ΓG in Figure 3.3a. Therefore, for any given current debt level and
primary surplus then reading from the vertical line that intersects the plane provides the new
level of debt is in the vertical axis. However, exceeding the debt limit necessitates haircutting
which we illustrate in Figure 3.3b. The fold line in this chart corresponds to the peak of the next
period debt, effectively flattening the new level though haircutting at that peak. This in turn
affects the fiscal policy rule though the debt term in the equation in the next period. Therefore,
haircutting ripples though, first the debt in the next period, and then the fiscal policy in the
period following. As the debt is at the limit, the fiscal policy rule variable will increase; that
in turn increases taxation and decreases government expenses. This follows the pattern where
governments default, then attempt to address the situation by progressively apply emergency
measures in the subsequent budgets, sometimes at the direction of foreign investors or inter-
national non-government organizations.
To illustrate the effects of being in default on the the economy, if we study Figure 3.4 it shows
graphically the difference between the good or normal state (GD) and the bad or sanctions
state (SA) for the key variables for all event sequences. We observe that ỹTdecline representing
the implementation of sanctions, however, has little effect on domestic GDP, yNeither to com-
pensate for that decline. Therefore, total GDP y declines when sanctions occur. The effects on
consumption cTand cNmirror that of GDP in the tradable and domestic sectors. However, we
observe a decline in wages w with a commensurate decline in price p. One of the impacts of
a recession is deflationary pressure on domestic goods. With debt, the expectation is that with
the imposition of sanctions, household debt would decrease; in part the government policy rule



















(a) Debt In next period. The current level of
debt dGless the primary surplus ΓGis the level








qGt < 1. This imposes a maximum level of





















(b) Haircut occur when government has insuf-
ficient revenue from the primary surplus ΓG
and new debt sales qGt d
G
t+1 to repay the cur-
rent debt dGt . Haircuts can never be greater
than the current level of debt as long as they
can continue to borrow.
Figure 3.3: The Policy strategy for debt management, Haircut to debt limit (HCDL) means that the
government will only default on the part of the debt where it cannot obtain sufficient funds from
the primary surplus and the sale of new debt.
own debt increase. Furthermore, the household’s tradable income stream is markedly lower,
therefore debt becomes less affordable and the response to these pressures by the household is
to generally lower its debt. We observed a debt unwinding in the private sector and an increase
in public debt as the economies were in turmoil post the 2008 financial crash. The increasing
risk that government represents in these sanction period passes though the the interest rate
rGwith a marked increase in debt servicing costs. Likewise, the opposite occurs for the house-
hold as it deleverages. Although there is no central bank controlling domestic interest rates,
it customary for the Central bank to rapidly drop interest rates in response to a crisis. Hence,
we would observe the sanction periods where interest rates would be substantially less. Fi-
nally, the total stock of debt d is substantially higher during sanction periods largely driven by
government borrowing requirements.
3.4.1 Event classifications and analysis
The simulation run produces a series of discrete events according to the event classifications
in Chapter 4. The event classifications are pre-determined at the discrete level single event;
however, sequences of events are heuristically analysed to determine sequence classifications.
A complete list of discrete events and sequence classifications for all scenarios is in Chapter
4. However, for this foundation scenario, there are two discrete one period events; namely
government defaults (GDEFx) and Household default (HDNBx) without a bailout14. Table 3.6
shows both the summary level and discrete events. The summarisation is that the first event
classification followed by the second different event classification can be summarised to a

















































































































































































Figure 3.4: Summary statistics for Foundation when in Good, Bad and Sanctions states
group classification. For example, all event sequences that start with Government (GDEFx)
are grouped into GDEFA.
identity Description
ALLxx All events
GDEFA All events starting with a
government default
GDEFx Government defaults
HDNBA All events starting with a No
bailout, the household defaults
HDNBx Government does not bailout the
household and it defaults
Table 3.6: List of all of the one period events with their de-
scriptions
Referring to Table 3.7 government initiated default (GDEFA) counts both government only
(GDEFx) and government followed by household (GDEFx.HDNBx) event sequences. The
searching and classification process identifies 27,734 event sequences of which 6,638 are gov-
ernment initiated default and 21,096 are private sector initiated a near 3 to 1 ratio. In Chapter
2, private sector defaults are much more prevalent that government defaults in the developed
world and, in many cases, the developing world reinforcing that the foundation model and
scenario follows closely the real world. Note that the sequence classification household fol-
lowed by government (HDNBx.GDEFx) indicates that the private sector defaults that leads to












Table 3.7: Under different scenarios, a summary of
the combinations of one period events (taking into
account only the first two unique events) and num-
ber of occurrences
The sudden decline in government taxation revenue though the imposition of sanctions on
the private sector, and the inability of the government to raise taxes fast enough drives the
public debt up to unsustainable levels.The government continues to service part of the debt,
haircutting the result and therefore partially able to function with time to implement austerity
measures in the form of increasing taxation with reducing social transfers and government ex-
penditures. Unfortunately, these measures, or just the current economic conditions, may even-
tuate in the private sector defaulting subsequent to the government default. In this foundation
simulation, this is a rare event sequence. Another aspect is that government default leading
to household default (GDEFx.HDNBx) occur 50% less that private sector default leads to gov-
ernment default (HDNBx.GDEFx). The model follows the illustrative historical and empirical
analysis where, contrary to the economic literature, it is the private sector that drives most of
the crises.
3.4.2 Length and cost of default
Although the raw counts in association with the classifications may give some insight into crisis
sequences, they do not portray how long they last. Focusing on the distribution of defaults,
Figure 3.5a government default sequences tend to be ten periods plus. This closely follows the
data where countries will be in default and continue to default on their debt until some ne-
gotiation with foreign investors though the Paris Club or some fundamental shift in economic
circumstances occurs. Note that private sector default only occurs following a public sector
default when there are long sequences of default.
The next is to consider the cost of defaulting to the foreign investor for both household and
government defaults. We note that from Figure 3.5a, most default sequences are small and
there is a long tail where some rare default sequences involve multiple default events with
a long accumulative cost to the foreign investor. This aligns with the data, in that default




























Govt followed by other default
(a) Distribution number Government ini-
tiated defaults by the length of the de-
fault.




















(b) Distribution Non Government initi-
ated defaults by the length of the default
Figure 3.5: Comparison of the length of default.
The data indicates some countries remain in default for some time and will continue to haircut
debt until a successful negotiation between county and investors. The set up of this foundation
scenario implies that household default would occur once only and then experience a period
of sanctions, whereas government may experience some sanctions but will continue to default
until it reaches a point of debt stability. In Figure 3.5b, we observe that household default short
lived rather than the much longer lived government defaults in Figure 3.5a. This is somewhat
akin to the 2008 financial crisis where the banking system collapse was short lived, however
their was a long tail to the consequences.
Greece and Iceland are a case in point; in the case of Iceland, the banking system was nation-
alised at a nominal value, the toxic assets were written off and the government took on the
burden of reinflating the banking system. An aspect of Iceland is that they have their own
sovereign currency, although small in comparison, and they issue domestic currency debt that
they are able to service without default. The counter example without a sovereign currency is
Greece; once they resolved the private sector banking problem, much to the relief of the Ger-
man banks, their debt ballooned and they defaulted multiple times. In the case of Greece, the
loss in taxation revenue would have made their debt unsustainable. This reasonably fits with
the data on default sequences with other countries, particularly for those in the Asian crisis
and the south American default episodes, where private sector tended to be short lived and
public sector defaults have a propensity to continue until a resolution is found. The longer the
sequence, the more costly it is for foreign investors. However, we are consistent with the data
in that majority of defaults are small in comparison to the level of debt, even though public
debt default tends to be long lived.
The next to consider is the distribution of costs of defaulting events. Figure 3.6 indicates on the
left hand chart that the costs are skewed to the lower end for all default events. However, there
is a long tail (indicated by 4+ zone on the distribution) of very costly long events, however rare.
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(a) Distribution costs of all defaults
























(b) Distribution costs of Government and
Household defaults to foreign sector
Figure 3.6: Costs of default, haircuts to foreign sector
The right hand chart provides a breakdown of which type of default is causing the costs. This
indicates that household defaults tend to be low cost but very frequent whereas government
defaults are more costly, but less frequent. One aspect of this scenario is that the household debt
tends to be small, much like the middle and low income countries rather than high income
countries. This means the threshold for default is also quite low making the cost of default
small, but more frequent. When the household defaults, it writes off all the debt, therefore it
is unlikely to repeat a default within sequence. In this scenario, governments can accumulate
substantial debt and as they haircut to the debt limit, this tends to cause multiple defaults very
close together in the sequences. This also tends to accumulate significant costs for the foreign
investor motivating them to enter into negotiations quickly.
3.4.3 Crises Event Sequence Analysis
Although the characteristics of the frequency and cost are of some importance, the time se-
quence of key variables for a crisis may give some insight into how to forecast such an event.
After running the simulation with the classification tool-sets which categorize the crisis se-
quences, we standardise the the timeline, centring on either the start of the event sequence
or the point which a default, private or public, occurs. We can then find the mean path and
the confidence interval around that path. We do this for all applicable event sequence clas-
sifications: in this case ALL, GDEFA (public sector initiated default sequences) and HDNBA
(private sector initiated default sequences). GDEFA and HDNBA are subsets of ALL15. As the
stochastic process yTdrives the process we would expect that ỹTto be in decline prior to any
crisis as we illustrate in Figure 3.7. This chart covers all events (both public and private) over
the course of the simulation. It is centred on the time of default and covers all crises event
sequences. The crisis point is zero and we include 10 periods prior and 10 periods post.
First, looking at the default event itself, and its affects, on private debt dHand public debt dGin
conjunction with the private haircutting hcHand public haircutting. hcGAs expected, private
15Chapter 4 and the classification appendix illustrate the different sequence classifications with an explanation of
their meaning
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debt declines slowly before the crises in response to lowering income. and then there is a
default event generating a haircut in the private sector. The haircut tends to be for one period,
and household debt tends to recover afterwards with the recovery of tradable income ỹT. Note
that there is a step change in tradable income at the default point representing the imposition
of sanctions. Although in this model that step change may recover, the 2008 financial crisis
shows that sometimes that step change is much more persistent, and may never revert16.
As to public debt, prior to the crisis, the decline in tax revenues whilst maintaining high levels
of expenditure g put the country into a primary deficit ΓG. This primary deficit generates
additional government debt dG up until the crisis point. Although we will discuss separately
public default vs that of private sector default later. Some interesting aspects of the default
sequence we can deduce here that resembles the paths that many countries take in a public debt
default. Note that the haircutting hcG is persistent whilst declining immediately after default.
Furthermore, the interest rates rG are at near their peak as public debt remains troublesome to
both the country and foreign investors, whereas private debt interest rate collapses to near zero
lower bound, something we observe in developed economies in the central bank’s response to
the crisis. Although there is a substantial climb in public debt interest rates, peaking sometime
after the default event, these start to decline slowly inline with the haircutting. An example of
this behaviour is Greece for the period immediately after the 2010 default event, where bond
yields made much of Greece’s debt unaffordable.
In the domestic sector with domestic goods we observe a slow recession yN ,however not to
the same extent as tradables. As this simulation is a flexible wage model, wages take the hit
from the recession with a marked decline driven largely by price. Still, there is an impact on
employment with a decrease in labour demand h following any crisis event. One could con-
sider the domestic sector as fundamentally essential to sustain living conditions, in Keynesian
terms, C0providing a baseline level of consumption with little change cN . We will show later
the effects of a downward wage rigidity on employment where effectively the roles of labour
demand and wages are reversed to some extent.
The focus on the domestic sector fits with the narrative that many governments offer after a
crisis, that is they focus inwardly. In this economy, the government response is to cut gov-
ernment expenditures g whilst increasing social transfers. The scenario dictates that as ψ, the
fiscal policy rule variable, is increasing in response to the level of government debt, that social
transfers would decline much the same way as government expenditure would g. The fiscal
policy rule only affects tradable social transfers sT,not domestic social transfers sN . They are
the residual from tax revenues less the government expenditure17. The apparent uplift in social
transfers is the government switching from tradable goods funding to domestic goods fund-
ing of social programmes; likening this to governments, during crises, need to fund benefits to
households to sustain them though the crisis. This compensates for the loss of income to the
household from labour wage so that they can maintain a base level of consumption.
One aspect of this scenario is the clear lagging of government fiscal policy responses to the
16Unfortunately, an aspect of this model is that it has a long run equilibrium, thus will eventually return to that
equilibrium
17in the domestic sector government expenditure derives from the fiscal policy rule
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crises. Although governments need to direct additional funds to social transfers, they do that
in an environment where sudden jumps in tax rates and immediate austerity in government
programmes would not necessarily be tolerated in the middle of a crisis by the population.
The need for consistent policy with a more deliberate rather than knee-jerk reaction though the
budgeting process reflects the path of our hidden fiscal rule policy variable ψ. Furthermore,
the imposition of increasing taxes and declining government sector expenditure is normally
driven by foreign investors and international NGO’s driving fiscal responsibility in line with
the doctrine of neoclassical doctrine.
Although inspecting the the conglomerate of event sequences has some use, isolating down to
the two sequence classes may give a better understanding of how the economy behaves in the
face of a private sector or public sector default sequence. Important questions here are: What
are the effects on tradable and domestic sectors during a default of ether the private or public
debt? What drives the differences between the two?

















































































































Figure 3.7: All events sequences aligned on default
Already we know that there are three times as many private sector initiated crisis sequences
compared with those initiated by public sector. An important aspect of these models is the
separation of public and private debt and, although they indirectly affect each other, they do so
though the mechanisms in the economy. This is somewhat more realistic than the assumptions
normally portrayed in the literature, where many crises in both developing and developed
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countries stem from a failure in the private sector and not the government. This model aligns
with Chapter 2 empirical evidence that private sector creates more instability than the public
sector in an economy .
Starting with the public sector, inspection of Figure 3.8 (for GDEFA classifications) confirms
much of the analysis above; that is a general decline in tradable income induces a decline in
tax revenues and, through the budgeting process, the government is unable to respond fast
enough to prevent a crisis. Although the government does start to respond (fiscal policy vari-
able ψ climbs) it is insufficiently quick enough to address the primary deficit, ΓGuntil it is
too late. The rapid increase in government debt forces up interest rates, hence debt service
costs, making the shortfall even worse. Hence government debt hits a tipping point where
hair-cutting hcGis the only possible outcome. There is a small step change in tradable income
yTreflective of the one period sanctions. This ripples though the household with a sharper de-
cline in tradable consumption. However, the government, through social transfers, maintains
domestic consumption in the face of declining wages. Private debt declines in line with that of
tradable income, with a gradual return post crisis.

















































































































Figure 3.8: Government default sequences aligned on the default
The government is trapped in haircutting, as are the foreign investors. If, for any reason, for-
eign investors do not coordinate (as they do though the Paris Club), then the government will
be forced to default on all its debt as it comes due. Foreign investors, particularly Banks and
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other financial institutions, need to maintain the asset value, otherwise accounting rules (mark
to market) dictate writing off substantial assets putting them in jeopardy. This scenario demon-
strates this behaviour and has close alignment to that of Greece and Argentina public debt and
the financial institutions that fund them.
Prior to the crisis, private sector interest rates rHare high in comparison to that post crisis and
do not follow the same path as the level of private debt. At the crisis point, tradable income
starts to increase and with the fall in debt level prior to the crisis, the risk of household default
is minimal. In this simulation, the likelihood of a public sector default triggering a private
sector default is minimal (a probability less than 0.07). In the case of a public sector default,
households are minimally disrupted by the default even if government conduct sufficient social
transfers post crisis. Government in this case is preventing a crisis in the public sector spilling
over into the private sector. Without those social transfers, domestic consumption would col-
lapse and, if one follows the Post-Keynesian doctrine that effective demand drive employment,
then their would be a collapse in the labour market either though wages or though unemploy-
ment. Hence, the domestic social transfers act as a stabilizer to the domestic sector. Gov-
ernment consumption of domestic goods reduces as a result of the fiscal policy rule ensuring
that government does not crowd out private consumption. By transferring those funds to the
household, it stabilises the household’s base level of consumption whilst domestic output is in
decline.


















































































































Figure 3.9: Household default sequences aligned on the default
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Now to consider the more prevalent private sector initiated crises in Figure 3.9; here the house-
hold defaults on its debt. The level of household debt prior to the crisis is some 20 to 25% higher
than the government default sequence. Although the private sector attempts to unwind debt,
it is unable to do so quick enough to forestall the default. Immediately before default, private
sector interest rates spike, rHand then collapse when all the debt is written off hcH. Although
there is a period of exclusion, the model dictates that it is stochastic in duration. Therefore we
observe a path where households start borrowing again expanding the economy’s consump-
tion. The ability for households to borrow includes tradable consumption that spikes inducing
a spike in prices and wages in the domestic sector. As tradable income has not necessarily re-
turned to pre-crisis norms, this recovery is weak and we observe a second consumption dip;
effectively, a double dip recession due largely to a weak recovery.
Note that tradable income yThas a step change as sanctions bite. In the public sector, the drop
in tradable income to households and impact on consumption leads to a sharp increase in the
government primary deficit ΓG,This ripples though to public debt as government is unable to
respond fast enough to the crisis pushing it closer to the tipping point. With that, there is a
sharp increase in the interest required by foreign investors rG,; however, this does not always
result in government needing to default. The government haircutting chart in Figure 3.8 il-
lustrate the cases where government debt climbs too sharply (that is the upper bound in dG
resulting in the need to haircut). The effect on the domestic economy is instability in wages;
however, government social transfer, although moderate, does act as a stabiliser in the domestic
market. Note that, post-crisis, wages are approximately 10-15% lower than pre-crisis levels and
largely flat. Although this model is founds on a long run equilibrium, it does demonstrate that
a private sector crisis does bring about short to medium term changes in the economy. This
would lead us to remark that, without government intervention, households suffer consider-
able damage as a result of a private sector crisis and much more so that that of a public sector
initiated crisis.
To illustrate both the difference in paths and outcomes further we put key variable side by side
in 3.10 and moved the reference point t = 0 left. The left column represents all event sequences;
the middle column, all of the public sector initiated crises; and to the right, the private sector
initiated crises. We combine wages and labour to produce labour income wh, government
expenditures with social transfers gs,total income (GDP) for both tradable and domestic y and
total consumption for both tradable and domestic sectors c. Clearly, the summary on the left
hides the effects of private sector default. The difference in consumption between a public
and private sector initiated crisis is stark with disruption to consumption, labour wage income
being the most obvious. Although a public sector crisis drives up public debt to unsustainable
levels, it has little effect on the private sector; whereas a private sector default causes sanctions
and a rapid increase in public sector deficits, leading to potentially unsustainable levels of debt.
74




















































































































Figure 3.10: Time-paths from left to right for: ALL event classifica-
tions (ALLxx), Government defaults (GDEFA), and household defaults
(HDNBA)
3.4.4 Foundation Model and the Empirical time-paths
Finally we compare the time-paths of the model against those of the empirical analysis at the
end of Chapter 2. Figure 3.11 illustrates the comparison between the empirical average time-
paths (left hand four columns) and that of the model (right hand). Of particular interest if
medium income economies private debt dips dHand government debt dGrises. Although the
entry into the crisis is different, the time-path for income y show some similarities. The sum-
mary (ALL, left hand column) shows reasonable alignment across income and public debt and
a little less so with private debt. As the we cannot distinguish in the empirical analysis which
crises resulted in a bailout by the public sector, this might confuse some of the paths. This we
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will leave for later research.



















































































all high mid low HDNBA
Figure 3.11: This summarises the empirical time-path results for Bank (effectively household)
defaults (right hand four columns) with the foundation model’s household default (HDNBA) on
the right hand side. Left Column is all bank defaults, second left is high income countries bank
defaults, third is middle income bank defaults and forth is low income economies. Note that the
scaling for the empirical analysis is different to that of the model. The time frame: the empirical
is +/-5 period either side whereas the foundation model is +/-10 periods. For a more detailed
comparison, please refer to the original charts above and Chapter 2.
Next we need to consider the time-paths for sovereign default, or in the foundation model
government default on public debt (GDEFA) as illustrated in Figure 3.12. Again, the same
concerns over bailouts exist with this empirical data. The closest fit for government debt is low
and middle income where the empirical analysis shows a steady rise in government debt to the
crisis point and then a flattening off. This is similar to the foundation model dG. It also shows
a significant dip in private sector debt immediately after the crisis indicating deleveraging.
With the model, this seems to happen before the crisis. A point to note is that in high income
countries, the empirical analysis indicates a fall in government debt, indicating that defaulting
tends to have greater haircuts that the settings for the foundation scenario and model. Likewise
there is significant deleveraging in the private sector post crisis as many developed nations
experienced post 2008.
There are some similarities between the empirical analysis and the foundation model, however,
these are clouded with some classification issues in the empirical sources that inhibit drawing
solid conclusions. Furthermore, such items as bailouts and government defaulting strategies
are not recorded in the source data that supports the empirical analysis. We will see in a later
scenario, a comparison between bailout of the private sector and the same empirical analysis
to see if a better fit can be obtained. Certainly, middle and low income countries do have some
similarities to the model in both event classifications.
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all high mid low GDEFA
Figure 3.12: This summarises the empirical time-path results for Sovereign debt (effectively
household) defaults (right hand four columns) with the foundation model’s government default
(GDEFA) on the right hand side. Left Column is all bank defaults, second left is high income
countries sovereign defaults, third is middle income sovereign defaults and forth is low income
economies. Note that the scaling for the empirical analysis is different to that of the model. The
time frame: the empirical is +/-5 period either side whereas the foundation model is +/-10 peri-
ods. For a more detailed comparison, please refer to the original charts above and Chapter 2.
3.5 Conclusion
This foundation scenario is the least complicated of all of the scenarios; however, it clearly
demonstrates the value of modelling private debt separate from public debt in the different
path behaviour in crises with a fiscal policy rule. Similar to the data, private sector crises
are much more prevalent than public sector. We can conclude that the concentration of gov-
ernments and their economic advisors on public debt misses the underlying issue that is the
private sector is more unstable, as we have already discussed in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2.
Furthermore, even with the the inter-temporal budget constraint for the government deemed
necessary be the assumption that all debt is in foreign currency, the government has a role to
ensure the stability of the domestic economy though social transfers. This does bring into ques-
tion the almost obsessive analysis of public debt by economists while ignoring the real cause
of many crises, that being private debt.
Although this model is founded on Say’s Law principles, one could easily draw that a failure
in domestic consumption due to labour wage decline would itself lead to deficient effective de-
mand for domestic goods; therefore reducing labour demand ending up in a Keynesian down-
ward spiral. Implementing austerity measures to social transfer at a point subsequent to a crisis
would only amplify the effects of the crises. We show that a weak recovery in a private sector
default almost certainly induces a double dip recession that has long term implications for the
domestic economy. Fundamentally, a crash in the private sector leaves significant damage in
both public and private sectors with high levels of public debt, a depressed domestic sector
and a low wage economy with declining labour requirements. As such parallels to the real
world can be drawn with such countries as Greece in the 2008-2015 period, Argentina in the
early 2000’s, Brazil on multiple occasions, and many of the south east Asian countries during
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the 1997 Asian Crash.
Several aspects in this foundation scenario are not covered, which leads us to move to the next
level. First is that, as recent experience has told us, government do bail out the private sector.
Although many would let us believe that this is a recent invention, this is not the case. Even
before the Great Depression, many government have stepped in to bailout the private sector
to prevent a complete economic collapse. Normally this involves a significant wealth trans-
ference from the public sector to firms and institutions in the private sector to prevent mass
bankruptcy. However, in the case of Iceland, they nationalized the institutions to protect them
from bankruptcy at minimal cost, then re-inflated them with their own sovereign currency
though debt issuance in concert with their central bank. If, as in these models, Iceland was not
able to ‘create’ the funds in its own currency then it would have exposed itself to exchange rate
risk between its own domestic economic capacity to generate income sufficient to fund debt
servicing. Sometimes governments do not bail out as they are already in a dire situation. As
such, we need to consider adapting the scenario to include defaulting to lower levels of debt
including a minimal level.
Second, although countries may default on part of their debt, the assumption that they are
forced to the debt limit needs to be relaxed. Many countries that default foreshadow future
default on up coming settlements effectively magnifying the current default event. There are
many commercial and political reasons for this, partly to create leverage with foreign investors,
partly to get all of the ‘pain’ over with in a short period politically.
Consider the arguments for expansionary vs austerity policies using the combination of taxa-
tion, social transfer and government expenditures. Even within this foundation model, govern-
ment plays a significant role as a stabiliser in the domestic sector, therefore consider situations
where tax, social transfer and expenditures are pro or counter cyclical with income and public
debt. With this, we can change the balance between how much concentration governments
give to the level of public debt, income and the level of consistency they operate by changing
the fiscal policy rule parameters.
Finally, consider options on the effects of recessions on the labour market. The current flexible
wage scheme means that wage rate carries all of the changes. However, a downward wage
rigidity as set out in USG might create higher levels of unemployment in a recession. This
concept runs counter to the Law of Effective Demand, however, may demonstrate the effect on
employment, unemployment and under-employment that we so often see in many developed





Underpinning the foundation model and all of the extensions is a comprehensive software
suite that constructs and runs the model in a simulation using the particular scenario. The
implementation of foundation model and its extensions uses the MATLAB IDE1 to instantiate
the the algorithms that realise the different scenarios in visual form. This approach provides
flexibility in building a database of different scenarios over time and including them into the
analysis. As we discussed in Chapter 3, the scenarios are the configuration of the calibrated
parameters, strategies policy and private sector behaviour settings that the software uses to
drive the mathematical model. There are four stages to creating the final output, these are:
1. The initialisation and set up. These use the input model parameters and the programme
control parameters to set up all of the scenarios and the foundations for optimisation.
Guidance on scenario construction is in Section 4.2.
2. Optimisation, dynamic programming state transitions, decision rules. These direct the
simulation decision making that we further explain in 4.3.
3. Simulation and heuristic event analysis driven by the decision rules and state transitions
is further elaborated in Table 4.2.
4. Analysis and report output. The output from these is in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5 to
Chapter 8.
An overview of the software suite structure, data structures and flow charts are in 4.4. The
design of the system is that all of the configuration, construction of scenarios, state transitions
and decision rules are all data driven. Therefore, programmatic changes are not normally re-
quired to extend the range of possible scenarios. Any combination of the 11,500 scenarios can
be run though the system without any modification. Stages 1 and 2 are only required to be
run once for any set of model calibrations. Each scenario is run though the simulation and
1Integrated Development Environment
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heuristic event (stage 3) analyser ready for the final analysis and reporting (stage 4). It is quite
easy to generate new scenarios beyond the 11,500 as long as the core model model structure re-
mains largely unchanged. Additional fiscal policy rules and realisations require only a partial
rerunning of the state transitions and optimisation to facilitate a new simulation. These new
scenarios can then be run through the simulation, analysis and reporting. What drives this
suite is the scenarios. All of the current scenarios have their roots in the foundation scenario
using it as the basis for adapting the calibration to suit the particular circumstance that the we
wish to simulate and report on.
One fundamental aspect of the design philosophy is that all of the state transitions and trans-
lation tables are discrete points along the variable’s continuum. The simulation uses indices
rather than values and it follows coded dynamic rules as pointers rather than values. This
opens up the possibility to encode any state transitions2 having levels, discontinuity, mixed
functions or similar. This gives the researcher a wide range of possibilities without fundament-
ally restructuring the software suite to explore different policy and strategy settings.
4.2 Scenario Construction
Fundamental to the way this software suite works is the scenario. The scenario contains a
number of policy and switch settings that determine the behaviour of the decision rules and
state transitions that make up the policy rules. These fit into five policy choice areas, namely:
• Fiscal Rule parameters that drives the core fiscal rule variable from the inputs of current
fiscal rule variable value (persistence), the current income scaled by long term income,
the current public debt scaled by target public debt (see Chapter 3 and Chapter 5).
• Government’s response to a public debt crisis including the level of haircutting they will
operate (see Chapter 3 and Chapter 7).
• Government policy on bailouts including the conditions that they use to determine a bail-
out (see Chapter 3 and Chapter 6).
• If the domestic labour market is flexible or rigid wages with the associated flexible or fixed
exchange rates (see Chapter 3 and Chapter 8).
• The fiscal policy realisation that translates the fiscal policy rule into taxation, social transfers
and expenditure. This can be any combination of pro or counter cyclical to the fiscal rule
(see Chapter 8).
In most cases, the master list of scenarios will provide the user with the configuration that is
close enough to a country or countries they wish to consider. Currently, there are over 11,500
scenarios that could be run without reconfiguration. The master list is a Cartesian product of
2The consumption and labour coding needs to be monotonic and increasing. Furthermore, it need to be able to
be optimised. However, there are such elements as the fiscal policy rule and fiscal realisations that do not need to
behave in this way.
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the fiscal rule, bailout strategies, haircutting strategies, wage rigidities and fiscal policy realisa-
tion. Any scenario in the list can be run without reconfiguration of the optimization. Running
a scenario involves completing a simulation followed by the analysis and reporting.
Each scenario has a unique mnemonic in the form that represents the policy and switch settings,
an example is in 4.1 with the table descriptions in the following sections. We use the foundation
scenario from Chapter 3 to illustrate the mnemonic encoding.
MMM HCDL NOB FW EXP
Fiscal Policy realisation on tax and expenditures
Labour market flexibility on Wages
Government Bailout Policy
Public Debt defaulting and Haircut Policy
Fiscal Rule settings
Table 4.1: Structure of Scenario Mnemonic by way of an example using the foundation scenario.
Each scenario has a unique mnemonic code that we commonly refer to throughout this work.
This ensures that the the main policies and strategies are evident in the common reference
across the whole system.
4.2.1 Public Debt Defaulting and Haircut Policy
We specify and illustrate the foundation scenario in Chapter 3 with the development from the
theoretical foundation of the interest rate curve, debt transformation from period to period and
the default by haircutting to the debt limit (HCDL) strategy. The foundation scenario’s pub-
lic debt strategy is one of many strategies countries in trouble employ; therefore, we need to
develop new strategies that replicate typical circumstances and strategies that countries un-
dertakes. The strategies we develop here are drawn from the publically available Paris Club
agreements, IMF, World Bank and ECB literature. We have already discussed that the rather
unrealistic full default where the lender receives nothing that is the foundation of many neo-
classical models. The four strategies that are in the software are:
1. Haircut to the Debt Limit3 (HCDL) - this is in the foundation scenario, however it em-
ployed in many other scenarios as a baseline strategy as it tends to extend the period of
default. Although within the period, the lender gets most of their principle, continued
defaulting will erode any benefit, thus a lender might be willing to negotiate a better long
term outcome.
3With the current calibrations for the logistic function the dGNDL = 0.93679
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2. Haircut to the Lowest Level4 of debt (HCLL) - this replicates much of the neoclassical lit-
erature. The government does not repay anything, effectively forcing the foreign investor
to write off all of the debt. This creates the shortest period of default.
3. Haircut to the primary surplus (HCPS) -This is somewhere in between HCDL and HCLL
strategies. This is dynamic in that the default target level of debt derives from primary
surplus affordability. This is somewhat similar to an negotiated agreement between the
lender and the government and largely mitigates the risk of continuing the default that
HCDL strategy and loosing much more principle.
4. Haircut to a Target Level (HC23) - This allows us to model haircutting to a specific target
level5 of debt somewhere between the debt limit and the lowest level of debt. This means
we can run simulations of government defaulting and set different levels of partial de-
fault. As it follows the same logic structure that HCDL and HCLL, where there is a fixed
debt level, we only test to make sure it works. It is present for completeness however,
we do not use it in any of our current scenarios and would be calibrated according to the
country or countries that we wish to model.
Chapter 7 extends the discussion on the theoretical basis for these strategies and employs a
range of scenarios to demonstrate their effect. The implementation in the software suite is by
state transition tables with decision rules that determine that path though the simulation. The
diagrams in Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5 provide a visual description of those paths.
4.2.2 Bailing Out Rules
There are four bailout decision rules that drive four bailout private debt state transition tables.
If bailouts are enabled, then when the household is going to default then it refers it to the bailout
tables. If the government has sufficient latitude in debt and meets other conditions of bailout
, then the bailout tables determine the minimum level of bailout to prevent the household
from defaulting. A full description of the process is in 4.3with diagrams to explain the paths.
Therefore four bailout strategies:
1. Always bailout the household (ALB) - Government always bailouts out the household
using primary surplus and public debt to provide the funds.
2. Never bailout the household (NOB) - Government never considers bailing out the house-
hold. This is the foundation scenario’s bailout strategy.
3. Only permit bailout when public debt is below a set level (ASB) - if the public debt is
below a level6 the government will bailout the household. This is somewhat akin the
the EU fiscal responsibility rule and its intention is as a protective mechanism for the
government.
4Lowest level as the fiscal policy rule uses logs, therefore we use a very small public debt level 0.05 d/GDP to
replicate full write off.
5Currently set to 2/3 between mid-point and natural debt limit
6Currently 60%
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4. Only permit bailout when public debt is above a set level (BSB) - if the public debt is above
a level the government will bailout the household. This is a ‘Gamblers ruin’ strategy
for the government where if household defaults then government is likely to end up
in default. It therefore attempts to ‘out run’ the debt buy bailing out the household and
preventing loss of revenue in the hope that the household will not default in subsequence
periods before the government recovers.
The details of these bailout rules and an analysis of their effect is in Chapter 6.
4.2.3 Wage Rigidity and Exchange Rates
We follow Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2016a) formulation of downward wage rigidity, where
wages can inflate, however, workers will not accept significantly lower wages for the same
hours. Therefore labour hours deceases rather than wages falling. We have two settings, flex-
ible wages that we demonstrate though the foundation model and downward wage rigidity.
As our model focuses mainly government policy responses rather than the household, we only
partially optimise the downward wage rigidity. Our partial optimisation gives a reasonable
representation of that in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2016a). Noting the time that Schmitt-Grohé
and Uribe (2016a) took to over a week to optimise one solution and we have 800 solutions
to optimise, then a partial solution that approximates suits our policy and simulation needs.
Further discussion of wage rigidities and on the exchange rate are in Chapter 8.
As to the implementation, in the original work by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2016a) they did
a two way contraction mapping optimisation that took over 140 hours to run. This would
have given a precise optimisation map for the state transitions. As our model includes a vari-
able rate tax, social transfers and government expenditures regime then we would take 28,000
hours without full parallel processing, clearly not achievable. Therefore, some initial testing
suggested that one could come very close to their results by conducting a two pass optimisa-
tion technique. This only jointly partially optimises, however, the domestic and tradable goods
markets optimise fully. The process is to first to set up tradable consumptions as a grid, then
use this to form the price aspect of the optimisation in the domestic goods economy. At each
point apply the down wage rigidity in a state transition model (this creates a four dimensional
array) for each one of the fiscal policy realisations at each one of the fiscal policy rule states.
This then sets the domestic goods consumption grid. Both of these can then be fed into the
main tradable goods optimisation. where we can map every tradeable income, fiscal policy
rule, wage constraint and fiscal rule realisation into the final set of state transitions. Although
this process gives a partial optimisation, This process does reasonably reflect the full optimisa-
tion results of Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2016a) although it is a partial optimisation and suits
our particular needs.
As to exchange rates, these parallel the wage rigidity. The downward wage rigidity is comple-
mented by a fixed exchange rate as in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2016a). A flexible wage has
a floating exchange rate. We leave the other combinations for future model development and
research.
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4.2.4 Fiscal Policy Rule and Realisations
This fiscal policy that we specified in Chapter 3 has three terms to determine the one period
forward setting level for the fiscal rule variable ψt+1. This would mean a 3 dimensional ar-
ray to complete the state transition, one for the persistence of ψ and the two for public debt
and tradeable income. This would be satisfactory if we had only one set of fiscal rule para-
meters. However, we have 48 sets of fiscal rule parameters which poses a significant issue
for performance. The fiscal policy rule state transition arrays are but in a hierarchical index-
ing structure with the associated information needed for the simulations to function. As the
state of the fiscal policy rule is known at the beginning of the period, we can determine the
tax rates, social transfers and government expenditures by applying the fiscal rule realisations
translation tables. This poses a problem for optimisation in that tax rates and social transfers
pre-requisites to calculating the consumptions and labour utilities. To solve this, we create one
set of optimisations state transitions per set of fiscal rule realisations. Again, this is held in a
hierarchical indexing structure. Likewise, we need to consider the government budget equa-
tion with the different fiscal policy rules and realisations. We adopt a stage approach in both
the data structure and simulation with feedback loop if the government defaults. The stages
are:
1. Household calculates the consumptions, labour and borrowings determining if it is going
to default (we treat that separately and defer discussion to Section 4.3).
2. The consumptions and labour with income come across as indices that index the govern-
ment budget calculation that determines the primary surplus.
3. The primary surplus/deficit and the current public debt stock determine the demand for
debt.
4. The demand for debt then translates either into the new level of debt and indicators for
default and the level of haircut according to the rules.
5. if the government defaults, then sanctions are applied and the return to stage 1 (this is
the feedback loop)
6. Then calculate the fiscal policy rule for the next period.
If government defaults, then sanctions will constrain the household. The household then might
also default. This results in new levels of consumption and income, hence tax revenues will
decline and change the government budget reduce the primary surplus (or increase the deficit).
There is no circumstance where the government default would cause a rise in tax revenues as
the household will suffer the same loss income.
In the above cases they do not need to be smooth functions for either the translation of the
fiscal policy rule nor the fiscal rule realisations. They are all of a grid form (that is discrete
points) and the simulation is reliant on indices, not values then is opens up the possibility of
a wide range of policy settings and responses to events. We discuss the theory of the fiscal
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policy rule in Chapter 3, its application in a wide range of scenarios that explore the limits in
and application in Chapter 5, and the fiscal realisation in Chapter 8 as a set of experiments for
later development.
4.3 States, Events and Event Sequences
A simulation will pass though a number of one period events effecting ether the household,
government or both. Driving these events are the transitions in states for private and public
debt in response to the stochastic process yT and the stochastic elements for returning to good
standing for both private and public sectors. There are two other stochastic elements that de-
termine if either government or the private sector return to good standing after a default. In
this section we describe the processes for states and events, the government decision making
process, the heuristic sequence classification process, structure and construction of the software
and finally an overview of the flows in the simulation process.
4.3.1 States and Events
At the end of each period the economy can be in four different states that determine the applic-
ation of sanctions and exclusion in the next period. Table 4.2 specifies how public and private
default affect sanctions and exclusion. If either the household or government defaults, then the
imposition of sanctions on tradable income implies a loss as we have described. If one defaults,
then the other could also default in the same period as sanctions are imposed immediately. If
the household intends to default, then, if the policy rules on bailout permit, then bailing out
the household prevents sanctions; therefore it can be in the interests of the government to bail-
out the household and prevent the default and change of state. The foundation model does
not have a bailout condition; therefore, the household would immediately move to default and
economy wide sanctions apply. The government may also default as a result of these sanctions
as the reduction in tax revenue may be insufficient to generate the primary surplus to service
the debt and cannot borrow to cover the shortfall.
The state transition arrays encode these consequences of state of debt and prior default into
the current sanctions and exclusion status. At the beginning of each period, if the stochastic
process determines either or both return to good standing. This process uses the mean sanc-
tions periods for public and private debt and applies the function that we describe in Chapter 3
with the stochastic element to determine if either household or government can return to good
standing7. This gives the researcher the ability to calibrate the model to the current behaviours
of lenders, borrowers and the Paris Club negotiations.
The state transitions derive from single events that come about though the decision making
of both the household and government. The single events are in Table 4.3 and have particular
7Currently Government is set to return to good standing at the beginning of every period, whereas the household
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Default Default Yes Both Both have to return to good
standing, if one returns then
they revert to the other’s
default state.
Table 4.2: Economy States
application to only some bailing out rules set out in 4.2.2. Not every scenario will result in
every single event occurring. The policy settings that are interpreted into the state transition
arrays determine the decisions by both the household and government. At the beginning of a
period, both households and government may return to good standing if they are in default.
Our initial setting determine that government returns to good standing at the beginning of the
period8.
Next to consider is the events that drive state. Table 4.3 defines the single period events that
occur when either government or the household are contemplating or undertaking a default
and the actions that result from those decisions. There are four bailout strategies as specified
in 4.2.2. Some event types are only applicable to a particular bailout strategy. For example,
the strategy No-bailout (NOB) will never have the event types, BAILx (government success-
fully bails out the household) and BFHDx (government attempts bailout but it is unsuccessful).
This is important to the interpretation of the results and the event sequence classifications that
derive from these event types. These event types are put into the log during the run by the sim-
ulation. Details of the logic that the simulation uses is in Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5. These single
events types allow us to use the heuristic analyser to first learn the event sequence classifica-
tions and then to classify a simulation run’s event sequences. An explanation of this process is
in 4.3.3.
4.3.2 Government Process in detail
To clearly illustrate the government process, the following flow chart shows the steps we model
for the government in Figure 4.1. At the start of the period, the government knows the level
of debt, if it was in default and if it returned to good standing. It also knows the state of
the household and its effect on sanctions and finally, the budget setting using the fiscal policy
instrument that was set in the last period. From this, the government can calculate the tax
revenues, once it knows what the household will consume, and its expenses in social transfers
and general government expenditures. As it already knows the current debt, it can work out
8The same stochastic process with different paths apply to both households and government. The initial settings
households are excluded for about 6-7 years on average and governments that exclusion is zero.
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Mnemonic Description ALB NOB ASB BSB
BAILx Govt Bails out Household Yes Yes Yes
BFHDx Govt Attempts and fails bailout, HH
defaults
Yes Yes Yes
GDEFx Government defaults Yes Yes Yes Yes
HDGTx Government refused bailout debt greater
than limit
Yes
HDLTx Government refused bailout debt less than
limit
Yes
HD~GD Government forced to default, because
household defaulted first as government
limited bailout
Yes Yes
HDNBx Government does not bailout Yes
HDNGD Refuses bailout, Household default,
government defaults
Yes Yes
GDHDx Government defaults, then household
defaults
Yes Yes Yes Yes
HDGDC Household already in default, government
default
Yes Yes Yes Yes
BFGDx Bailout Failed, government defaults Yes Yes Yes
DGEXx Government returns to good standing Yes Yes Yes Yes
DHEXx Household returns to good standing Yes Yes Yes Yes
DGerr Error condition, logic failure
Table 4.3: Single event Mnemonic description and applicability to bailout rules, ALB - Always bail
out, NOB - No bailout, ASB - Bailout only above limit, BSB - Bailout below limit
how much new debt to sell and once the primary surplus is evident, the policy rules that it
follows, the determine the amount of debt to buy back. A short fall in the buyback is a default
with a haircut. If ether household or government default, then the government will need to
account for sanctions reducing taxation income and possibly creating a different outcome. At
the end of the period, government knows the budget forecast fiscal policy instrument, the level
of government debt and if sanctions are in place.
4.3.3 Event Sequence Classifications
Although individual events have some interest and they tend to be a part of a pattern of events
that make up a crisis. However, those patterns may not be predetermined. Moreover, although
there are a number of event classifications, some events are, under some policy settings, either
not realistic or highly improbable. Another aspect is that we observe in the real world is that the
same event may occur multiple times in a sequence and subsequently, another event occurs that
terminates the sequence. Another issue is that of causality when sequencing events together
that raises the question, what is the gap between events that would one normally expect that a
prior event has influence on a current event?
Conservatively, one would choose a gap of zero, and the events would be serial in the time-
sequence. However, the real world, does not have that tidy rule, a economy, due to its structure





























State of Fiscal Policy
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End t
Figure 4.1: Government State Process
points where government or the household gets to a point where the almost certain outcome
in a couple of periods is default. Although one may have returned to good standing, it has
set off a chain of events that cause the other to fail, albeit rarely, however, it is of interest. As
we discuss in Chapter 2 private sector defaults occur much more frequently than public sector
especially in sovereign denominated debt and that by direct or indirect intervention.9
This suite uses a heuristic analysis technique to identify common patterns in the simulation
results. This is somewhat akin to the way that virus detection programs work, they create a
simulation environment and then look for suspicious behaviours to identify threats, whereas
we looking for events that lead to and are a consequence of a crisis. The events are observed
suspicious behaviours and the crisis is comes though as a sequence of events that may be dis-
jointed. However, this may generate a number of false positives. We limit this possibility by
setting the gap between to be three time-periods. Although an event sequence may involve
many different events classifications repeatedly we only take the first two different events and
classify the sequence as that. Although further inspection of individual events may generate
insights, we are currently more interested in common patterns within a 10 period either side of
the first crisis event. Because crises are relatively rare, taking a longer tail period will be reliant
on less events limiting our ability to draw conclusions and the complexity of longer pathways
tend to be dependent on the initial conditions leading up to the event, whereas the event itself
and the immediate aftermath tends to be more compact. We demonstrate this with some of the
9Direct intervention is a bailout that its timing, size and nature cannot be determined prior to the event. Indirect
is increasing social transfers according to a policy rule and reducing the tax burden. Bailouts are, by their very
nature observable, whereas indirect may be hidden by socio-economic-political factors.
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analysis in the Foundation scenario in Chapter 3.
An important aspect is to be able to compare different scenario crises, therefore the heuristic
analysis builds a common database of sequences classifications that make comparisons of the
affects of policy and economic constraints on the crises. We list the all sequence classification
and their summarisation in The Appendix.
4.4 Software and Environment
4.4.1 Functional Structure
We utilise the MATLAB IDE as the development environment and LaTeX as the output lan-
guage. We utilise mainly procedural coding with some elements of object oriented techniques
to design and code the system. Much of the data is held in MATLAB structures in the form
of HIDAM10 with multi dimensional arrays for reference/static data, state transitions and
HISAM11 for output from scenarios, report generation and to the final latex output. Fig-
ure 4.3shows the data flow between core objects within the suite. The core design principles
are:
• Where possible, use structured data to drive all functions. Report specification, scenario
comparisons, rules etc. are all held in data and not program code.This makes adding or
changing scenarios, analysis and report easier and not requiring code modification.
• The programme control parameters specifies the configuration and the way the suite will
run though the process. This follows the core design principle.
• Design is procedural, block structured hierarchical utilising the dynamic call structures
within MATLAB.
• All structured data is self identifying.
• Where possible, invocation of functions is from an object handler. Major elements of the
reporting an analysis are object handler based functions.
• Limiting the number of parameters by passing structure dataset and that structure data
sets are written in one place and read in another using common routines.
The software structure has three distinct parts, namely, set up, simulation and analysis and
output. There are also a number of utilities to short cut reruns and add new scenarios and
reports.An outline of the functional structure is in Figure 4.2.
10Hierarchical Indexed Direct Access Method
11Hierarchical Indexed Sequential Access Method
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Proc main











































Figure 4.2: Software Suite Functional and Calling Structure. Each node represents one main function.
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The Setup is made up of four components that build all of the static data and the policy rules. It
also realises all of the scenario combinations and identifies the scenarios of interest based on the
reporting. Setup_PP is the program parameters including all of the definitions (Setup_PP_def)
such as interpreting internal variables into a form usable by latex and the analysis reports
formats (Setup_PP_analysis). Setup_MP composes all of the model parameters including the
ranges for the fiscal policy rule. Setup_SDBA sets up the basic and followed by Setup SD_yT
the state transformation matrix for yT and then the stochastic elements for yT and the return
to good standing sequences. Setup_SDDe puts together all of the debt matrices ready for pro-
cessing. Setup_SDpsi sets the fiscal policy rule and fiscal settings state transitions components
including tax and expenditures finally Setup_SDNT sets the domestic sector optimisation up
including flexible and wage rigidities.
Once the static data is set up and the foundations for the policy rules then Optimise_VFI builds
the household decision rules and state transitions by dynamic programming. Currently there
are over 800 dynamic programming solutions necessary to run all of the scenarios. following
on is Bail_sbar that builds the bailout rules and adaptations to the optimisation problem solved
in Optimise_VFI. This now concludes the setup for any of the scenarios.
Next major activity is Simulate., this has two components, first is to run the Simulation se-
quence (Simulate_seq) that generates the index pathways so that the variables can be generated
from the static data, transition matrices and policy rules. Next to populate the variables using
the indexes and find all of the defaults (Find_default). This generates the first part of the Heur-
istic analysis by chaining events together into candidate sequences. This forms the foundation
for all of the analysis and reporting.
Proc_Scenarios undertakes the detailed analysis and composition of all of the reports from the
scenarios and the combination of scenarios. There are two parts, Proc_scenario_I that processes
every scenario individually and creates the master event sequence table completing the heur-
istic analysis. This may reclassify candidate event sequences and consolidates into the ones of
interest. The event sequences classifications are nor pre-determined, the derive from the data.
Proc_Scenario_A builds the analysis reports that are for individual scenarios and the combin-
ation of ether scenarios or event sequence classifications for side by side comparisons. All of
Proc_scenario functions generate HISAM p_code type structures for each reporting component
specified in the reporting analysis table.
The final stage is Reports where all of the HISAM structures are compiled into latex ready for
word processing.
4.4.2 Data Structure
The core data structures are all have a root that is a mnemonic of their role within the sys-
tem. The core structure inheritance indicates the dependence structure, hence the order of
processing. This will illustrate in Figure 4.3 where:
• PP - Program Control Parameters - These control the running of the suite. They include
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everything from translating variable names, the report generator configuration, analysis
report instructions, simulation sequences and input output specifications.
• MP - Model Parameters - These are mainly the calibrated parameters that control the
calculations for the decision tables and policy rules. These are common to all of the scen-
arios where each scenario will pick a set of parameters according to the settings for that
scenario.
• SD - Static structured Data - The suite generates a significant quantity of static data in-
cluding all of the grids that translate indices from the decision tables and policy rules into
values.
• PR - Policy Rules - These are the core policy rules and decision tables that drive the paths
in the simulations.
• CR - Control Register - Master list of all of the possible scenarios, their parameters and
configuration, the subset of scenarios that the analysis uses and recording where all of
the files are.
• SR - Simulation Results - This is the indexed sequence data from simulation.
• DR - Data results from the simulation - This is the translated sequence data from SR when
using the static data to translate into meaningful values.
• QR - Sequence classifications - This is the output from the heuristic analysis that identifies
event sequences and dynamically classifies them.
• RR - Report structures - The core information from the analysis to generate the reports.
• DT - Data store - Common data store for report generation.
• .epsc - the images.
• .tex - latex output.
4.5 Reporting
The reporting engine in this suite is driven from configurable data structures in the Program
Parameters. This takes the data and processes it into charts, tables and diagrams in latex form
for use in documents. If the researcher requires a specific report, then they configure the report
data structure and add in the additional report specification. One aspect of the reporting is
that it generates a reporting datastore (DT) that can be reused by other programs to do further
analysis and comparison. This is the way that the empirical results were compared with the
simulation results in Chapter 3.
The reporting tools can generate reports for any simulation that conforms to the input stand-

















Figure 4.3: The Core Structures and the inheritance structure
mean a change to the reporting software. If additional variables are added then the configur-
able reporting data structures can have those added and reports automatically generated. This
degree of separation allows for flexibility in the rules generation and simulation processes.
4.6 Simulation
There are three parts to the simulation, first being preparation of the common stochastic se-
quences, second running the simulation using the state transition and policy rules to generate
indices for all of the core variables and third, populating the sequence with data from the static
tables using the indices. The common stochastic sequences are for tradable income yTsequence
and its respective state transition matrix, return to good standing probabilities for government
and private sector debt. The random number generator uses the same seed for repeatability.
Of course all of these can be overridden by setting parameters that control the simulation be-
haviour without affecting decision tables and policy rules. For example, if there was a desire
to test the effect of say the probability of returning to good standing, then by adjusting the
threshold model parameter the simulation will automatically run with a different setting. The
simulation runs with a burn in using the first 100,000 periods that is discarded. This is to en-
sure that stability in the process and that the initial conditions do not interfere with the analysis.
Then follows a run of 3,000,000 periods that forms the analysis.
Each period runs though the logic illustrated in Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5. As we have discussed
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at the beginning of the period, government and or household may return to good standing if
the stochastic process determine so. Once the new state is established, the next stage is to either
process the economy in good standing (that is without sanctions) or in bad standing (with
sanctions). Depending on the scenario strategy settings and the intentions of both household
and government, then the process flows though making decisions from the scenario decision
tables that then guide the states and stock of debt for both household and government and the
flows that are associated with these stocks. The final stage is to update the fiscal policy rule
to the next period and ensure that the log of events captures all of the elements. Fundamental
to the design of the simulation is that is all works of decision tables and state transition arrays
that the scenario parameters determine. It carries forward indices and boolean to record the

















Sanctions? Yes Apply sanctionsUse Y_loss
Set fiscal policy 
rule


















































No Cannot bailout HH (BFHD)
Govt 
default? yes


















































Figure 4.5: One step in the simulation process - The State Transition flowchart part 2
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4.7 Conclusion
The system that supports the the foundation model and has sufficient flexibility to manage
the range of strategy extensions. The design methodology incorporates state modelling using
a matrix data approach that permits the incorporation extensions without the need for addi-
tional coding. Another aspect is that adding a automatic calibrator for the fiscal policy rule
taking data from countries would be logical extension. By observing the interaction between
taxation, income, debt, government transfers and expenses then a suitable adaptation could
render a useful fiscal policy instrument. Calibration is a matter for changing Model Parameters
in the model file and then re-running the set up. If a scenario is already present, however not
simulated, then it is a simple task of selecting those scenarios that the researcher wishes to run
and then the software will automatically generate the reports.
We have shown that the suite is flexible and the subsequent chapters we exploit that flexibility







A core part of the foundation model is the fiscal policy rule. This mimics the role of govern-
ment forward planning with a budget by setting tax rates, social transfers and government
expenditures. A theoretical and model description of the fiscal policy rule is in Chapter 3, an
explanation of its implement in software is in Chapter 4 and the range of fiscal policy paramet-
ers is in the Appendix. This Chapter looks to extend the use of the fiscal policy rule beyond
the initial calibrations in Cantore et al. (2017). We illustrate in use by modifying the foundation
scenario’s fiscal policy parameters to generate new scenarios.
Our objective is to explore some of the limits of this rule within the model. What we do is
use a principle in software engineering called doubling and halfing the parameters to explore
the range of possibilities. An alternative approach is for us to use a selection of countries with
widely different fiscal policies and apply them though estimating the fiscal policy rule. Rather
than this approach, we prefer to experiment with the parameters to explore limits. If we can
create a range of possible fiscal parameters then we can safely say that the implementation is
reasonably generalised by testing. Moreover, when calibrating a country we could have some
idea on how the model will respond to their country specific calibration and possible directions
that a country could take regarding a fiscal policy style rule.
Another objective is to explore what the effects are of any giving weight to one input variable
over another such as say public debt over income. This naturally leads us to the questions:
should the government give more weight to long term consistency leading to some certainty
for economic agents? Or should the government respond to the level of income potentially
compensating for recessions and preventing booms in consumption and private debt? Altern-
atively, a government may have a preoccupation with public debt, Although this thought foun-
ded in neoclassical and neo-liberal ideologies, does it have substance? We explore the possible
limits using the original calibration as a centre-point. Some of the limits may be unstable partic-
ularly with other parameters. We can test these various possibilities by creating new scenarios
from the foundation scenario. We only change the fiscal policy rule parameters and keep all
other parameters and strategies the same. Once we understand some portion of the limits of
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the model, then we continue on exploring the questions of consistency of policy, is income
more important than debt, is there some combination of two of them that achieves the same
objective? This initial comparison provides insight into the potential directions that might be
worth exploring with other parameters.
5.1.1 Setup
The we use the formulation from Cantore et al. 2017 and expand out with a range of parameter
values to test the limits as we illustrate in Table 5.1. One consideration is that the fiscal policy
rule in itself needs to have a long run equilibrium, hence we need to choose parameters that fit
in with an equilibrium. There are three parameters, persistence, the effect of tradeable income
and the effect of public debt. We want to set each parameter so that the equation is either more
or less sensitive to that input variable. Within these constraints we chose a half as much again
as the more sensitive for income ρψy (High) and half for lesser sensitivity. With debt ρψd we
chose to power this by doubling the effect mainly because the starting value was quite small
and then the low end half. When experimenting we found that zero did not work well with the
model for the debt parameter. Finally the persistence ρψ this proved problematic so we chose
a point between unity and the foundation model for the high and 2/3 for the low. In both
persistence and income we zeroed out the parameter so that we could concentrate on debt.
Parameter Mid (M) High (H) Low (L) Zero (Z) VHigh(V)




3 ρ̄ψ 0 -
ρψy ¯ρψy 32 ρ̄ψy
1
2 ρ̄ψy 0 -
ρψd ¯ρψd - 12 ρ̄ψd - 2ρ̄ψd
ρψ 0.6252 0.7424 0.4168 0 -
ρψy 0.1478 0.2217 0.0739 0 -
ρψd 0.0777 - 0.0389 - 0.1554
Table 5.1: Fiscal Policy Rule Parameter settings. A combination these
three parameters applied though the fiscal policy rule set the next period
fiscal policy instrument value as a proxy for the government undertaking
a budget. ρψ is the persistence coefficient that determines how much
influence the last period’s policy rule setting has on this one, ρψy.
This gives a range of values that we can test that are likely to cover most countries without too
much problem. We base that determination on the testing that Cantore et al. (2017) did as part
of their modelling.
Next to to generate the list of possible combinations. If we take a Cartesian product of those po-
tential parameter values the combinations would make the analysis difficult there being over
48. Instead, we focus on the mid points (using the foundation model as our benchmark) and
the extremes.We list a selection of fiscal policy settings in Table 5.3. An important aspect is the
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Rule ρψ ρψy ρψd ψmin ψav ψmax
MMM 0.6252 0.1478 0.0777 0.39277 0.80341 1.3659
HHL 0.7423 0.2217 0.0388 0.37645 0.7955 1.4455
HHV 0.7423 0.2217 0.1554 0.28179 0.7911 1.5818
HZL 0.7423 0 0.0388 0.4139 0.7942 1.3147
ZHV 0 0.2217 0.1554 0.55635 0.8933 1.1159
ZZL 0 0 0.0388 0.81718 0.8968 0.9274
ZZV 0 0 0.1554 0.6117 0.8919 1.0149
Table 5.3: Policy rule parameter settings and the effect on the range and average
of the fiscal policy instrument ψ
range of the fiscal policy parameter given the range of income yT and public debt dG.Not un-
expectedly the widest range is where all of the parameter values are at their maximum (HHV)
and the narrowest range at the smallest values (ZZL). The rest of the parameter settings, and
strategies remain the same as the foundation scenario and any difference in the results from
simulation are solely due to the parameter changes. This provides a reasonable benchmarking













av gTmax gNmin g
N
av gNmax sTmin s
T
av sTmax
MMM 0.019 0.040 0.068 0.094 0.192 0.326 0.228 0.112 0.066 0.228 0.112 0.066 0.253 0.124 0.073
HHL 0.018 0.039 0.072 0.090 0.191 0.345 0.239 0.112 0.062 0.239 0.112 0.062 0.266 0.125 0.069
HHV 0.018 0.039 0.072 0.086 0.189 0.345 0.250 0.113 0.062 0.25 0.113 0.062 0.277 0.126 0.069
HZL 0.020 0.039 0.065 0.099 0.191 0.315 0.217 0.112 0.068 0.217 0.112 0.068 0.241 0.125 0.076
ZHV 0.027 0.044 0.055 0.133 0.213 0.267 0.162 0.101 0.080 0.162 0.101 0.080 0.180 0.112 0.089
ZZL 0.040 0.044 0.046 0.196 0.215 0.222 0.109 0.100 0.096 0.109 0.100 0.096 0.122 0.111 0.107
ZZV 0.030 0.044 0.050 0.146 0.213 0.243 0.147 0.101 0.088 0.147 0.101 0.088 0.163 0.112 0.098
Table 5.4: Policy rule settings effect on fiscal policy parameters with an EXP (expansionary) fiscal real-
isation. Note that where the minimum is greater than the maximum, the variable is downward sloping
All of the tax rates, government expenditures and tradeable social transfers remain the same as
the foundation scenario. If we apply the policy rule range and the averages to the expansionary
fiscal realisation (EXP) then we get the range and average for taxation, social transfers and
government expenditures as we illustrate in Table 5.4.
5.1.2 Policy Rule Descriptions
Some interesting aspects here are that some of the fiscal rule settings widen the range and shift
the range up or down the scale. This alters the government’s dynamic with the household that
changes the consumption and debt levels of both, this, in turn, changes the domestic market
for labour and consumption. We give the following interpretation to the fiscal policies:
1. MMM Foundation - this is a moderate path that takes into account the need for consis-
tency of policy and gradual change whilst responding income changes as well as debt.
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There is bias toward consistency in the Foundation with more emphasis on income than
public debt.
2. HHL This strengthens the bias in MMM with a strong focus on consistency and income
driving the budgetary process and debt being of little concern. Therefore the government
is likely to increase net contributions to the household in a downturn. This itself may
prevent the household from defaulting. This creates the most expansionary policy in a
downturn following more Keynesian expansion that one would expect of a sovereign
debt country.
3. HHV This is effectively a multiplier to the MMM policy, however there is a stronger
focus on public debt whilst maintaining consistency and that procyclical on income for
household transfers.
4. HZL The focus is on consistency and no consideration of income and little for debt. There-
fore government values consistency over that of net contributions to households. One
could classify this as conservative in policy that consistency matters
5. ZHV Government only response to income and debt and does not consider consistency.
This means that government budgeting can fluctuate significantly with potentially oppo-
site forces of income and public debt.
6. ZZL Fiscal policy effectively flat lines except for a little variation to public debt. The influ-
ence of this would be small. This follows more the Austrian ideology of non-interventionist
policies by government and let the market decide.
7. ZZV Focus is all on public debt regardless of consistency and income. This makes the
Expansionary Ideology into an Austerity policy about ’getting the debt down’ in that
when debt is high, then fiscal instrument is high, taxation is high with low social transfers
and government expenditures. This is almost the opposite policy to that of HHL.
The diametrically opposed fiscal rule policies would be HHL is diametrically opposed to ZZV
the former being expansionary in a recession and the latter being contractionary in high debt
situations, normally as a result of a recession. Another opposite is that HZL and ZHV where
the former focuses on consistent policy even in light of recessions and high debt levels whereas
the latter reacts quickly to recessions and high debt. ZHV might generate instability with the
expansionary fiscal ideology and might generate a double dip recession though the mechanism
of a recession starting with low debt, then social transfers increase, creating a public deficit
increasing debt that would then increase taxes and reduce social transfers.
One item to note is that the EXP policy only is expansionary if the fiscal rule focuses more on
income that public debt, namely HHL. From the table, we demonstrate that though the Fiscal
ideology, a configuration between ideology and the fiscal rule can create a ‘deficit hawks’ and
‘debt hawks’ by focusing on public debt as the core of fiscal policy. In the last 40 years, we can
observe a significant shift in developed nations ideology and that ideology being imposed on
developing nations that high levels of public debt are ‘bad’. A clearer observation is with the
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fiscal policies post 2010 for the UK and the imposition of such policies on Greece, Spain, Ireland
and Italy. Further examples are where the IMF imposed conditions on Argentina, Brazil and
many African countries. This fiscally conservative policy that sees public debt level as a proxy
for a poorly run government.
A question here is does this benefit the country with stability, prosperity and the resilience to
respond to external crises? Alternatively, it may stabilise the debt, however does it do this at
the expense of the household? One aspect to consider that we saw in the foundation scenario,
namely, that and externally induced recession will turn any primary surplus into a deficit,
that deficit will increase debt and with this most conservative of policies, does that induce
increasing taxation on the household and reducing social transfers in the middle of a recession
or weak recovery. This somewhat follows 2010-2015 UK government’s policy where there were
significant reductions in social transfers (that is cuts to social services) and reduction in taxation
for higher income groups, however, little in reductions to lower income groups and with the
effects of higher consumption taxes that disproportionately affect lower income groups, we can
conclude that the average or ‘representative’ household would have received a reduction in net
transfers. Therefore we might observe a so called ‘double dip’ recession. We would be looking
for that in a situation where households ‘default’ on their debt.
This leaves us with some important questions. first, do the extremes cause instability and if
so, under what circumstance. Does a focus on debt lead to a double dip recession.Can the
government use social transfers to bolster the household in a recession. How does consistency
affect the response by government, noting the forward planning model inbuilt into this analysis
that naturally creates a lag between the event and the response. Consistency would create
the effect of a greater lag in fiscal policy realisation though taxation and social transfers. An
important aspect is what is the effect on the domestic economy of such policies? Our focus is
crises and its aftermath rather than the periods in between, therefore use the crisis events of
private and public debt default.
5.2 Simulation Results
First we will look at the pathways for each one of the scenarios and comment on the responses
to different crises event sequences. We assume that the discussion in the foundation model
provides the sufficient background and we do not repeat that here. We compare the num-
ber of events that occur in the simulation for each scenario in Table 5.5 with the summaries in
bold. For easy comparison a bar-chart by Scenario provides a visual comparison of the table
in Figure 5.1. The left hand column is the foundation scenario and it immediately becomes
evident that increasing the weighting generally increase the frequency of all events (ALLxx).
Further inspection of summaries GDEFA (government default) and HDNBA (household de-
fault) indicate that fiscal rule calibration has a significant impact on the frequency of govern-
ment default with minor impact on the private sector. We can draw out that government fiscal
budgeting preferences of consistency, income and debt have a significant bearing on govern-
ment debt stability. One question was about the effect of an expansionary policy that takes
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account of income and consistency whilst paying little attention to government debt. Part of
this was that in a recession, the net transfer to the household is elevated and likely to prevent
a household from getting near to default. Our simulation in HHL indicates that this type of
policy reduces household default by 25% whilst doubling the possibility of government de-
fault. Although this is the least stable in terms of the frequency of events, such instability does
not induce the household to default at a later stage (GDEFx.GDHDx) unlike that of where very
active involvement (HHV) does induce a greater sequence leading to a household default.
Scenario MMM HHV HHL HZL ZHV ZZV ZZL
ALLxx 27734 37175 30488 24335 25398 24484 23753
GDEFA 6638 15005 14609 883 2983 343 264
GDEFx 6104 10619 12922 780 2754 306 230
GDEFx.GDHDx 125 3766 975 16 37 4 10
GDEFx.HDNBx 409 620 712 87 192 33 24
HDNBA 21096 22170 15879 23452 22415 24141 23489
HDNBx 19882 18350 13548 23378 21906 24108 23468
HDNBx.GDEFx 1115 3441 2110 66 469 27 20
HDNBx.HD˜+GD 99 379 221 8 40 6 1
Table 5.5: Summary of the frequency of Event Sequences. Summaries are in bold.
Except for HHL, the rest of the scenarios induce a small, nevertheless, significant increase in
household default over the foundation scenario. in the range of 5% to 10%. The scenarios
where either consistency and/or income is not a factor (HZL, ZHV, ZZV, ZZL) then govern-
ment tends not to default as frequently. It seems that the combination of consistency and in-
come focus leads to increasing possibility of government default. The most austere scenario
ZZV, behaves as one would expect in that the government is protecting public debt when it
potentially becomes unsustainable. This has some consequence on the household with the
highest frequency of default for all the scenarios we consider here. Government defaults are so
infrequent as not to occur as is with ZZL and HZL with only slight elevation in household de-
fault rates. This seems to imply firstly that the more note government takes of income the more
likely it is to default and secondly, if government does take account of income and consistency
then to reduce the effect on the household it need not take account of public debt (comparing
HHL with HHV). We suspect that the net transfers to the household to make up for shortfall in
income is having an effect here on both the household and government, effectively transferring
the risk from household to government.
A point to consider is does the household defaulting cause the government to default? that is
sequence HDNBx.GDEFx. Policy HHV tends to create the greatest possibility that household
default causing a government default. This could be likened to a government that is trying to
adopt a policy that is highly consistent whilst being highly aware of income and debt issues.
It almost indicates that if the government focuses on too many factors at the same time giv-
ing particularly high weight to all of them, is likely to create greater instability causing both
household and government both jointly and separately to default more frequently.
Next is to consider the length of defaults, costs of default and their time paths under each one
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of the scenarios, again, using the foundation as a benchmark. We finalise by undertaking a







































































































































































































































































Figure 5.1: Histogram of the frequency of each event sequence
5.2.1 HHV - Expansionary Policy in a Recession, However Moderated by Debt
This scenario intends to mimic a government that seeks to be highly consistent in its fiscal
policy whilst being very attentive to both national tradable income and debt. Note that this
policy configuration generates the highest number of crisis sequences of any of the scenarios
we consider in this comparison and that about 1/4 of the Government defaults (GDEFx) lead
to a household default (GDHDx). The nature of HCDL, default - haircut to debt limit is that
this tends to generate long government default sequences only recovering when there is suffi-
cient primary surplus to cover the service charge and lower the principle to more sustainable
levels (Figure 5.2b). Note that shorter duration of government defaults sequences tend to lead
to household and government defaults together (GDEFx.HDGDx) with only limited circum-
stances where government recovers, however household has not (GDEFx.HDNBx). This in in
contrast the private debt where most of the defaults are of one event (HDNBx) followed by a
period of exclusion that prevents them from defaulting again. However, there are some cases
where the household defaults multiple times within a sequence. In both cases, that period
where government and or household is defaulting results in cost to the foreign investor in
haircuts.
We observe in Figure 5.3a that the foreign investor haircut tends to be more frequently small,
that is skewed to the left with a long tail shown by the large vertical bar on the right regardless
of if it is the household or government. A question here is that is small cost due to deleveraging
prior to default by households or likewise by the government or is it some other dynamic?
We discuss this later in the time paths. There are a small, however, significant number of
sequences that result in significant loss to the foreign investor, this is important as an investor
will normally get ‘hit’ with a smallish haircut, however, very occasionally, a sequence leads



























Govt followed by other default
(a) HHV - Distribution of duration in de-
fault by the Government. Blue is govern-
ment only, brown is the additional de-
faults in the private sector that occur as
a result of government




















(b) HHV - Distribution of the duration in
default for the private sector
Figure 5.2: HHV - Distribution of the durations in default






















(a) HHV - Distribution losses from all de-
faults


























(b) HHV - Distribution losses from Gov-
ernment and Household defaults to for-
eign sector (note that the first column is
trimmed to give visibility to the cost dy-
namics.
Figure 5.3: HHV - Distribution of losses from defaults
It is likely that a government may end up in a ‘death spiral’ with foreign investors until some
stability in primary surplus occurs. Both investor and government are locked into this cycle.
We discuss these dynamics further in this chapter for haircut models Chapter 7. An interesting
comparison is between the various fiscal policy rule settings on how long the government
remains in this ‘death spiral’. One would anticipate that if government focuses more on debt
than income then with the Expansionary ideology, this will generate surpluses when debt is
high regardless of income. This is something we discus in ZZV.
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5.2.1.1 Time Paths for Crises
A government that tries to be consistent and responsive my give ambiguous signals and may
induce undesirable responses by other actors. First lets consider the time path for variables
when centring on a household default crisis. In Figure 5.4 we observe the slow decline in trad-
able income ỹTuntil it reaches the point t = 0 where crisis is centred, Household default at this
point, the first crisis event HDNBx. This creates an immediate loss to the economy as we have
already described in Chapter 3. Even though the household was deleveraging prior default
dHand reducing consumption in the tradables cTit was insufficient for it to continue and its
willingness to repay subsided and the household defaulted and the debt was written off. This
loss in income and consumption, creates a primary deficit for the government ΓGleading to a
rapid increase in debt. One aspect of this is that government Fiscal Rule instrument would be
sensitive to the declining income, thus lowering taxes and increasing social transfers, however
the debt effect does not come in until a couple of periods of accumulated primary deficits. The
rising debt becomes the focus that drives the fiscal rule instrument driving up taxation and
reducing social transfers.
A point to note is the s in these charts is both tradable and domestic social transfers, in this case
g follows the same time path as sTand that indicates that government’s social transfers switch
from tradable sector to domestic sector keeping domestic consumption cN reasonably flat even
with a real wage depreciation. The up-tick in cTimmediately after the default event is the return
of the household to good standing and a one period, bonus of not needing to service debt.
however, this short lived and consumption reverts to a level that is deeper than the crisis event
with a long tail even though tradable income ỹT is increasing during the period This effectively
creates a double dip recession with a long tail with parallels to that experienced in the UK. The
fall in price reflects though to real wages and although government, though social transfers is
able to maintain consumption, it is unable to maintain employment with a gradual decline in
labour in association with real wages. This is seems to reflect the experience of many worker
in developed economies post 2007/8 financial crisis, that is immediately unemployment and
then under-employment.1 This under employment and low wages leads to deficient effective
demand in the Post-Keynesian world. That in turn leads to under-investment in labour and
capital. The lower investment in labour (wages, employment and under-employment) keeps
the economy trapped in a low productivity environment and we show that even with direct
social transfers, the economy is, at best, slow to recover.
This low ebb in the economy has a direct effect on the government, it needs to increase revenues
to stave off the climbing public debt. Its initial response may have been expansionary in trad-
ables, however debt becomes the focus driving the fiscal policy instrument up, taxation up with
falling social transfers and government expenditures in an attempt to create a surplus. In some
cases, the government ends up haircutting its debt as the interest rates climb exponentially.
The experience of the household reflects into the government becoming trapped into trying to
1Under-employment is where skilled workers are employed in work that requires less skill therefore, the pro-
ductive value add is potentially attenuated. An economy may have full employment with under-employment. This
has a direct impact on output as the effective supply, if allocations fully employ all of the skills, hence maximise the
output, then effective supply would consume all of the productive capacity of the labour force.
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create surpluses to keep debt under control at the expense of the household. Effectively, with
debt denominated in a foreign currency, both household and government become trapped in a
long term depressed economy waiting for tradable income to recover (exogenously).
Effectively, the initial focus on income limited the effects of the crisis however, public debt ends
up ruling policy keeping the economy trapped. The domestic economy fairs no better with low
wages, under-employment and depressed output. Even in 15 periods, the economy remains in
this low state.



















































































































Figure 5.4: HHV - Household initiated default time paths
The less frequent crisis derives from a government default event (GDEFx). The fiscal policy
rule does not directly drive the response to a default event, that is the role of default and hair-
cut policy, it indirectly influences the path. A not unexpected core characteristic is that the
government runs a primary deficit leading up to the crisis (ΓG). At the same time the declining
tradable income decreases both the tax rate and tax revenue whilst increasing social transfers
and government expenditures. Government debt explodes as interest rate climb leading to the
default event. At the time of default, Sanctions have an immediate effect on tradable income
ỹTwith a sharp dip. This has a knock on effect to debt and consumption. Note that in the
domestic market, output was declining prior to default, however consumption was flat and
domestic social transfers make up the shortfall.
Post crisis, the domestic economy experiences a fall in employment with a fall in real wages
108
following the curve of pT. However, the effect is nowhere near as dramatic as that of a private
sector default. Likewise with the double dip, it is small and only for a very short time. Gov-
ernment debt remaining at its peak determines the involvement of government in the private
sector, the normal path is that it remains at the peak for 3-5 periods then a slow decline. This
reflects the haircutting and interest rates and follows though to the fiscal rule gradually de-
clining. AT the end of fifteen periods, the economy is in recovery, not quite pre-crisis levels,
however the stagnation when private debt defaults is not apparent here. There is a dip in em-
ployment and wages with a dip in domestic output, however, it is both short and small when
comparing to private debt crisis.
This fiscal rule setting tends to exacerbate the effects on the private sector whilst moderating
the effects on the public sector. This is a question for the comparison across scenarios.















































































































Figure 5.5: HHV - Government initiated default time-path sequences
5.2.2 HHL - Expansionary Policy in a Recession and Not Considering Debt
In this scenario, government’s strategy is around consistency and income that will, with an
expansionary ideology, making up for shortfalls in household tradable income and possibly
reduce the incidence of default. Our summary above, indicates that is the case, however, these
is a trade-off with greater incidence of public debt default crises. One aspect to policy setting is
does it perform better than MMM whilst not having the downsides on the private sector. One
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aspect is the distribution of costs on default as we show in Figure 5.6 when we compare with
those of HHV that takes public debt into account. Most defaults tend to be of low cost with a
long tail of infrequent defaults that create large losses for the foreign investor (Figure 5.6a). The
cost of household default is very small in this case indicating that the government is carrying
most of the cost of defaulting. Because government takes very little account of public debt then
one would expect it to default more than if it took the opposite view (HHV). This is not the case
in this model. A government that aggressively attacks debt tends require the private sector to
pay substantially more tax, hence putting the private sector at risk. Effectively the government
passes the risk of default from the public debt to private debt.


























(a) HHL - Distribution losses from all de-
faults

























(b) HHL - Distribution losses by investors
from Government and Household de-
faults
Figure 5.6: HHL - Losses by investors from default
There are to main sequence classifications for this HHL policy with an expansionary ideology
that we consider, namely, the summary classification: HDNBA - Household default, no bailout
and GDEFA - Government default. We illustrate their time paths in Figure 5.7 and Figure 5.8
respectively.
With a private debt crisis, that is sequences starting with HDNBA in Figure 5.7, we observe
that a default event sequence has similarities to HHV. In the tradable side of the economy,
we observe that consumption after the crisis and spike, flatten at a slightly lower lower level
even though tradable income is increasing. Government is not aggressive on taxation as ψ only
gradually increases in line with tradable income. One aspect is social transfers, their is a less of
a curve upwards and as tradable social transfers follow the government curve. Social transfers
with lower taxes flattens the tradable consumption limiting the effects on the household. In
the domestic sector, social transfers are significantly less, however taxation is also significantly
less. Wages post crisis, are flat with no sign of recovery, largely driven by the marked price
change. There is also a slight decrease in labour output and labour hours, however not to the
same scale as HHV.
Not unsurprisingly, the effects are more in the government side where debt increases to po-
tentially unsustainable levels. It does not respond with increasing primary surplus, remaining
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in deficit ΓG for much longer than HHV In some cases this results in the government haircut-
ting hcG. Because government does not respond though the fiscal policy rule ψ to debt dG,
debt remains high and persistent leading to much greater losses to the foreign investor hcG. If
the government defaults as a result of a household default then government remains in this
long term debt crisis until tradable income recovers sufficiently that it can start repaying its
debt. This is a function of ignoring the role of public debt that is in a foreign currency in fiscal
planning and only haircutting to the debt limit (HCDL). In turn this drive the loss function on
tradable income that effectively traps both private public sectors into a long period of stagna-
tion. AN important point to note is that private debt recovers quickly, however, not to the same
levels are pre-crisis within our window.
Although on the face of it, this expansionary policy that addresses the initial crisis most likely
better than the HHV policy, it seems to trap the economy in a low state largely from the high
levels of government debt. There is a trade-off here between exacerbating the pain during
the crisis and having a long slow recovery, or lessening the effects of the crisis and possibly
lengthening the period of stagnation. If the government can avoid defaulting, then the recovery
would be much quicker and from a post crisis level that is better than HHV. This is possibly
where the role of negotiation with foreign investors may lessen the debt service costs, therefore
reducing the compounding effect giving more room for the government to use debt to attempt
to resolve the problem in the tradable sector. Further investigation to the different time paths of
HDNBx - that is household defaulting sequences only and HDNBx.GDEFx - this is household
and then government defaulting sequences would further highlight these differences.
Moving now to government default sequences, that is GDEFx is the initiating event, we show
the time paths for the core variables in Figure 5.8. The first item is that the tradable consumption
is flat, except for a short period event at the time of the crisis. Tradable consumption does not
have the pronounced dip that HHV has and this reflects though the prince . However, in
the domestic sector there is a slow, gradual decline in output and employment, with wages
never really recovering. During this period the government has a persistent debt crisis that
seems to repeat at every period, eventually it reduces government expenditures (including
social transfers) in the tradable sector to be able to create sufficient primary surplus to service
the debt. This clearly shows why government debt denominated in a foreign currency means
either households have to tolerate austerity or public debt constraints the economy.
5.2.3 HZL - Policy with no interest in Income or debt, Focus on consistency
In this policy setting, government values consistency and takes no account of tradable income
and little account of the level of debt. One would expect that there would be a marked differ-
ence between this fiscal policy and both the foundation and HHV. This focus on consistency
of policy tends reduces the number of government defaults to less than 4% of the total and the
total is some 75% of the worst case HHV. The consequence is that the households make up
95% of the defaulting. In this scenario, household defaults are much less costly to the foreign
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Figure 5.7: HHL - Household initiated defaults
investor, as a single event and tend to be more inline with the foundation scenario (Figure 5.9).
With infrequent public sector defaulting and only marginal increases in private sector default-
ing, then this ‘hands off’ approach seems to perform better for the economy MMM and cer-
tainly better than the more active policies of HHV and HHL. The critical factor over HHL is
that it takes no notice of income changes and it makes such a marked difference in perform-
ance. This raises the question, if the government takes more notice of public debt then does
that improve the situation? We reserve that question until later.
Our focus on the time paths is more on the private debt household defaults rather than the
public debt as it occurs so infrequently. Inspecting Figure 5.10 that represents household de-
faults clearly shows a double dip recession in the tradables sector ỹT. An interesting difference
between the scenarios above is the double defaulting of the household on private debt dH. The
rebound after the initial crisis households can dedicate their income to consumption, albeit
at the sanctions level, Quickly, the debt recovers boosting consumption and effectively over-
heating the economy, although tradable income is weak. This creates the second recessionary
dip and another default. This repeats for another cycle, with a lesser peak and debt does not
crash again, stability eventually occurs. However, in the domestic sector, those ructions in the
tradables depress wages and there is a slow, inevitable decline in employment and output. We
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Figure 5.8: HHL - Government initiated default time-path sequences
have already discussed how this drag on the domestic economy effectively slows the recovery.
With depressed wages, then the economy’s consumption does not recover and if one takes the
demand drive supply, then this depresses employment. Over this short to medium run we can
clearly see Keynes low order equilibrium. This is one aspect of the foundation model, that is
it has two equilibria, one in good state and another in default. We show here that the process
for moving from default to good state may be quick in debt, however the hysteresis creates this
resemblance of a low order Keynesian equilibrium.
The response of government in these circumstances is somewhat more muted with the only
significant impact is the primary surplus going negative. This boosts debt, however, not to the
same extent as in prior scenarios. One aspect of this is that the movement of fiscal policy ψ is
slow and only reflective of debt to move it out of the consistency track. This means that social
transfers in the tradables sector decline with government expenditure, limiting the impact on
the the primary surplus. As the core driver entering into the crisis is yTdeclining and as the
government does not take this into account in setting fiscal budget for the next period, therefore
taxes remain static as does tradable social transfers. This protects the government, however, its
lack of action makes the household experience a greater hit in the crisis and that crisis may
occur more than once.
In the small number of cases where government default crisis, debt remains high and sustained
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(b) HZL - Distribution loses for foreign in-
vestors separating out Government and
Household defaults
Figure 5.9: HZL - Losses from default
with repeats in hair-cutting beyond the medium term. Conversely, the household fairs well in
the circumstance with growing tradables and wages. The small amount of monitoring that the
government does for debt slowly influences , however, not fast enough to allow the govern-
ment to increase revenues and decrease costs. The persistence marked by the high level in the
first term of the fiscal policy rule parameter creates hysteresis that causes a public debt crisis.
In comparison to private debt, these are approximately 5% of the number of crisis across this
scenario’s simulation. The household experiences the upper end of the number of private debt
crises, they tend to be deeper and repetitive. This is in contrast to HHL, where the govern-
ment’s response reduces the impact of a crisis. If one takes that government role is to protect
the household then HHL outperforms HZL, even though it defaults more in the public sector.
5.2.4 ZHV - Government focus on income and debt, no consistency
This scenario is diametrically opposite to HZL in that consistency does not matter, only the
response to income and debt, and those are very responsive in comparison to the foundation
scenario MMM. Because it is both debt and income that matters, then some similarities to HHV
should be apparent, the only difference should be that HHV has hysteresis in-build with con-
sistency of policy whereas this has none. Some important questions are about the recovery
such as is there a double dip recession and a slow path out in both tradables and domestic sec-
tors. Because this reacts to debt, then one would expect that some of the effects of Haircutting
to debt limit may be moderated. Furthermore, does this policy setting make it more stable or
unstable for either the household or the government?
The distribution of cost of default and household drive that those default costs. In comparison
with the foundation scenario, the costs distributions are similar in both the haircut and in the
cost of default when accounting for the household. Bar the frequency, there is little difference
between the foundation and this scenario, however, if a comparison with its diametric opposite
policy then the distribution of haircuts tends to have a much longer tail in this scenario as well
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Figure 5.10: HZL - Household initiated Default time-path sequences
as being skewed to the left. Another aspect is that the household dominates the cost with
many small frequent defaults rather than that of the government initiated crisis are infrequent
however, higher levels of haircut. One can only draw that the haircut policy keep the public
debt at the maximum and forces a repeat episodes for a long time. This is borne out by the bar
chart in Figure 5.12.
An important question is about the trade-off of less government crises, and a slight increase
in household crises and does this create an unstable household with more than one dip in
recession? We observe in our simulation of this scenario the household crisis in Figure 5.13.
We observe the same characteristic of crisis, bounce back and then a retrenchment, however,
the retrenchment is a prelude to the lower consumption and real wages that will be sustained
for the medium term. Although debt falls there is no apparent second private debt default in
most cases hcH. At the point of crisis, the primary surplus sharply goes negative forcing debt
to rise quicker for a couple of periods. The quick response by government puts the the primary
surplus ΓG back into positive territory. However the change in the fiscal policy instrument ψ is
a near constant increase. If one compares with that of HHV, then there are much greater swings
in the fiscal policy which is counter-intuitive to the idea that the consistency parameter would
prevent such extremes. One aspect is that the HHV does not experience the rippling effect in
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Figure 5.11: HZL - Government initiated default time-path sequences
consumption although the shape of ỹTis very similar. However, this policy setting does not
have the more rapid decline in employment and seems to recover wages along a similar path.
An interesting point it the total debt (or capital for the foreign investor κ). In this scenario the
total debt continues to increase and tails off at a new higher level. whereas in HHV, it is much
more hump shaped. One aspect of private debt crises is that public debt rises and does not
seem to return in the medium run. It is more likely that the economy grows making the level
of debt much less significant. In some cases, the household does generate a public sector crisis,
however, this is very infrequent and the significance in hcG is questionable.
Next is to consider the government. In Figure 5.14 we have adjusted the time-frame to include
more of the start prelude to the crisis as this is significant to understanding government default
under this scenario. The progressive decline in ỹTand as a consequence, cTand the household
de-leveraging dHforces the government to run a primary deficit ΓGthus increasing government
debt. Both the tradables recession and increasing debt causes ψ to rise reducing social transfers
and increasing tax revenues in an attempt to address the impending public debt bubble. The
one period budgetary lag of policy implementation means that government does not act quick
enough to prevent a crisis. Debt service effectively goes exponential with interest rates forcing
debt over the tipping point where recover without haircut is not possible. The slow increase
in social transfers is from the domestic sector as tradables social transfer is falling (it follows
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(b) ZHV - Distribution losses to in-
vestors broken down by Government
and Household
Figure 5.12: ZHV - Distribution losses to investors
g in an expansionary economy). There is a decrease in employment and a quite rapid decline
in wages that seems to bounce back slowly (however faster than the diametrically opposite
strategy HZL). Post crisis , government is locked into the high level of debt and has to haircut.
This is a feature of the hair-cutting policy HCDL. Unless government can generate sufficient
primary surplus to service the debt and repay principle, it will remain stuck at this level. In-
crease in ψ the fiscal policy instrument flattens as debt reaches the NDL. Therefore only the
recovery of tradable income would continue the increase in tax and decrease in social transfers
and government expenditures. As we saw above, although infrequent, public debt debt crises
tend to be long and persistent. This leads us to question of making all of the judgments on just
debt level and income actually improves the situation over say a policy such as HHL where in-
come matters and debt does not. Households tend to default less and the effects of government
default are rather limited on the household.
5.2.5 ZZV - Government focus on debt only, no consistency of policy
This policy is a more extreme version of ZHV and could be considered a ‘conservative’ defi-
cit hawks style policy where the level of government debt rules fiscal policy. With the fiscal
ideology set to expansionary, this fiscal policy changes the dynamic into contractionary at high
levels of government debt. This is though the mechanism of the fiscal instrument being in-
creasing in public debt level and this in turn increases taxation and decrease social transfers
and government expenditures. In a political context, one could draw parallels with the UK
Conservative Government in 2010 focus on debt, or the New Zealand Government of 1991-
1997, or the post crisis imposition by the IMF and others on Greece to reduce their debt levels.
Such a policy combination as ZZR and EXP tends to make fiscal policy all about debt and drives
potentially a austere programme by the government on the household. As we have already set
out, this scenario, the frequency of government default is so small (343 out of 24484 sequences)
that one could assume that this policy expunges government public debt crisis. However, this
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Figure 5.13: ZHV - Household initiated default time-path sequences
is at the expense of the household with a 15% increase in the private debt defaulting rate. Ef-
fectively, the government has traded it own risk and for that if the household. The mechanism
here implies that government forces the household to create a significant surplus that ensures
that the government’s primary surplus is always sufficient to repay debt.
Although government does very occasionally defaults in this scenario, it is the private sector
that creates the greatest losses more frequently for the investor Figure 5.15. One aspect of much
macro-economic thinking is that public debt is the problem, largely ignoring the role of private
debt. This policy effectively focuses all attention on public debt and ignores the role of private
debt. This policy aligns very much with many neoclassical researchers theories on debt and
crisis. in this model, we have had to push the envelope of fiscal policy to an extreme to achieve
those theories with a neoclassical model.
Our focus is on the household time path during a private debt crisis starting with sequence
summary household defaults (HDNBA) that we illustrate in Figure 5.16. We include the time
path for government crises (GDEFA) for completeness Figure 5.17, however the infrequent
nature of government debt crises may not give a clear indication of the how a crises unfolds
and what its outcomes are. Referring to HDNBA, we clearly see that the economy experiences
multiple default events and crisis to a more extreme level that that of any we have looked at
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Figure 5.14: ZHV - Government initiated default time-path sequences
so far. Removing the effect of tradable income has a dramatic and significant effect on the
household.
Contrasting between ZHV and ZZV we can clearly observe that the government’s lack of in-
tervention not only increases the chance of crises it also increase the length and depth of the
crises. Before the crisis, government is running a not unexpected surplus ΓG even in a declining
income economy. It only receives a negative primary surplus when consumption and income
collapses with the default private debt. From s (combined social transfers), there is no change
in response to either pre-crisis or post crisis. There is little movement in the fiscal instrument
ψuntil debt starts to climb. Therefore there is no change in policy throughout the first stage
of the crisis, and post crisis, that policy is to create greater primary surpluses to prevent gov-
ernment default by increasing tax and reducing tradable social transfers. This creates a second
and third dip in household consumption, and the effects resonate into the domestic sector with
wide movements in real wages that follow price.
Wages take the brunt of the crisis in the domestic sector, however, unemployment increases
gradually as government spends less in that sector. In passing, the public debt crises in Fig-
ure 5.17 seems largely driven by a recovering economy where government debt has hit the
tipping point. This is likely to be as a result of instability in the private sector not generating
sufficient tax revenues, hence primary surpluses, to keep the government away from the tip-
ping point. The one period lag in the budgeting process causes the government not to be able
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(b) ZZV - Distribution losses to in-
vestors broken down by Government
and Household
Figure 5.15: ZZV - Distribution losses to investors
to implement an austerity programme fast enough in some very limited cases.
5.2.6 ZZL - Government is agnostic to debt and income
This is our final scenario for this chapter, it is the diametric opposite of the first scenario HHV. It
is completely non-interventionist other than a mild response to public debt. Therefore it could
be likened to ZZV, with a lesser focus and ideological drivers. It still fits on that austerity
spectrum of policies in that it does not account for tradable income and takes only debt as
its policy setter. It is an interesting contrast to HHV, the highly interventionist economy and
ZZV as a measure of this ideological driver. Importantly, this ideological spectrum between
HHL, ZZV and ZZL almost represents the political-economic ideological spectrum from what
is ‘left’ social-democratic, possibly Keynesian interventionist and protecting the household to
the more ‘right’ conservative, possibly Austrian School deficit ‘hawks’ that insist government
needs to maintain a balanced budget, low debt.
The first element to contrast is the length of the crises, as there are insufficient GDEFA public
sector crises we only consider the private sector as we illustrate in Table 5.5. Not unexpectedly,
the majority of household defaults are short as they are with other scenarios. Likewise, the cost
of default Figure 5.18 to the foreign investor is heavily skewed to the left indicating that each
event is a small cost and as before government forms the majority of the long tail. In this case
The tail is low and flat with a very sharp peak for households. As the number of public debt
crisis is small, drawing any conclusions from them is somewhat problematic.
The important aspect is the effect on the time path for the economy. This non-interventionist
policy shows though with the only small change in the fiscal instrument ψand that reflects into
the income and expenditures with only small changes to the rates. This has an amplifying effect
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Figure 5.16: ZZV - Household initiated default time-path sequences
to the primary deficit in that there is no movement in the fiscal budget and the government
absorbs the deficits with debt. For the household, such inaction means that they focus solely
on their own debt, income and consumption problem and do not need to bare the burden
of additional taxes and declining social transfers in the same way as with ZZV. One aspect
of taxation is that it has a moderating effect on a increases in consumption though both the
income and consumption tax channels.
This may lessen the spike and a detailed comparison between ZZV and ZZL indicates that
ZZV response to debt is too slow to be effective in this way. The spike is for only a couple of
periods and public debt takes time to climb sufficiently to affect the immediate crisis. In com-
parison with HHV, and HHL, the most interventionist and the later the most ‘benevolent’ to
households, these only generate a single spike after default and the economy stabilises quickly.
Although ZZV and ZZL tend to be the policies pushed on developing nations when they get
into debt crises, this model indicates that they are more destabilising to the private sector as
it has to bare the risk rather than the government. The government time path, Figure 5.20 we
include for completeness. It has striking similarities to ZZV with a more moderate response to
public debt and as we have already commented, a more pronounced primary deficit ΓG.
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Figure 5.17: ZZV - Government initiated default time-path sequences
5.3 Cross Scenario Comparison
Our final section for this chapter is a cross scenario comparison on the two key crises initiators,
namely private debt summary and public debt crises summary. We already note that some
scenarios fiscal policy settings lead to double or triple dip recessions and that recovery in the
domestic sector can be slow with real wages seemingly stuck at a new level. We consolidate
all the time paths across all scenarios under consideration for fiscal policy in one chart Fig-
ure 5.21 for easy comparison. The left hand column is the foundation scenario and we order
the columns from the left in the same order as above. We can say that , bar the foundation
scenario, the left hand columns are more interventionist whereas the right hand columns the
government leaves the private sector to its own means.
First to note is that the three scenarios with policy settings MMM, HHV and HHL show similar
paths for the private sector, that is there is the crisis, then an up-tick in consumption as a result
of not needing to service debt, and then a period of stability with a gradual increase in total
consumption. One contrasting difference between these three is that wage and labour have
slightly different paths HHV tends to have greater wage deflation immediately after the up-
tick in consumption then gradually returns. The rate of of those becoming unemployed is
much more pronounced HHV leading to a fall in output. Partly, the increase in taxes and the
decrease in social transfers (tradables, domestic increases) and government expenditure with a
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(b) ZZL - Distribution losses to in-
vestors broken down by Government
and Household
Figure 5.18: ZZL- Distribution losses to investors from defaults
reduction in real wages depresses demand. We do not observe this effect in the other scenarios,
rather the decline in employment is much more gradual.
One important difference between the left and right hand columns is the double dip recession,
in HZL and ZZL the second recession is deeper than the first. Both of these have the char-
acteristic that they take little notice of fundamental economic variables such as income and
debt. This is somewhat evident in the ψfiscal instrument that sees a gradual incline upwards
in response to debt. Note in ZZL, the level of government debt is almost at the lower end of
the range, whereas if one takes the consistency (HZL) into account, then debt during a crisis is
much higher. Both these settings, government does nothing to a respond to a recession and to
provide additional income to the household when in difficulties. Our model shows that such
policies make the situation worse for the household that the foundation scenario fiscal policy.
We demonstrate that the ideology and principle focus on public debt in these two scenarios
is damaging to the economy. The adoption of this style of policy tends to have an association
with a politically right leaning demonstrating a hawkish view to public debt and a libertarian
view of government. This is contradictory to the view expressed by Keynes. This mantra
has gained considerable traction with international NGO across the world and is imposed on
many developing countries and those in the southern end of the European Union. As we show
in Chapter 2 this mantra derives from academic theories that are not supported by the evidence
nor banking practice. We show that such policies are counterproductive to the well-being of
the household and the economy in total.
Conversely, those policies on the left Figure 5.21 tend to recover the economy without the
double dip at the expense of public debt. In all cases, public debt increases by the natural effects
of a reduction in private sector income and consequential reduction in consumption. Further-
more, we show that the household attempts to deleverage, further reducing consumption. In
time of uncertainty, households seek to reduce their debt and with pressure from financial in-
stitutions deleveraging occurs. This deleveraging can create the Fisher debt deflation and for
firms, the deficit aggregate demand causes them to divest labour and eventually capital. In
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Figure 5.19: ZZL - Household initiated defaulting time-path sequences.
the scenarios HHV, HHL and to some extent, MMM government responds to the shortfall in
income with social transfers.
We see in HHL, where government focus is on consistency and income, the response smooths
out the path for the household. Similar paths are in MMM and somewhat surprising HHV.
The aspect with HHV is that initially, the government provides social transfers into both the
tradables and non-tradables, however as debt increases, it increases taxation and reduces gov-
ernment expenditures and tradable social transfers. The domestic sector tends to pick up the
additional tax revenue in social transfers creating an quicker movement upwards of wage rate.
This quick response does tend to narrowly avert a government debt crisis. If one takes the
Keynes approach then some policy setting for debt between HHV and HHL is likely to provide
both protection for the household and limit the possibility of a public debt crisis.
Juxtapose to the Keynes role of government, the more austere policies of ZZL and ZZV fully
protect the government. For the foreign investor in government bonds, this provides the best
outcome, however the cost on the household of more frequent multiple dip recession with long
slow recovery that have more than economic implications.
A comparison of public debt crises across all of the scenarios is in Figure 5.22 were we see that
only the most highly interventionist fiscal policy rule HHV reduces debt within a reasonable
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Figure 5.20: ZZL - Government initiated defaulting time-path sequences
time-frame. This somewhat reflects the desire of foreign investors or those NGO’s that come to
rescue a nation to impose strict fiscal policies that increase tax revenues and significantly reduce
government and social spending. However, this is done at the expense of the household that
reduces its tradable consumption and suffers significant reduction in real wages. Furthermore,
this generate unemployment. What seems to be a good strategy for the government to quickly
get government debt under control is a disastrous strategy for the private sector. If these effects
were short lived, then maybe an economy could live with the short term cost. Nevertheless,
HHV style policy has a long term stagnation in the domestic sector. There are similarities here
between the UK, Greece and Ireland on different scales. Another aspect that we do observe is
deleveraging in the private sector as incomes are suppressed. Again this pattern follows the
austerity style programmes evident after the 2008 crash.
The alternative is the more Keynesian style where government that tries to ensure that the
household is able to keep spending by not increasing taxation and maintaining a level of social
transfers. However, this is at the cost of high public debt and if a government is constrained
by foreign investors then it is likely to default or have to negotiate a package. From second
column left (HHV) which is the most interventionist the the right hand column (ZZL) covers
nearly the dichotomy between a Neoclassical neo-liberal Ideology practised in many countries
from the late 1980’s onwards to that of a more Keynesian approach certainly practised during
the Great depression and throughout the 1950’s.
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Figure 5.21: Comparison of Scenarios for household initiated defaults.
5.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we explore the range of possible fiscal policy rule parameters, particularly at
the extremes. Using the extremes allow us to explore both the flexibility and possibilities for
this style of fiscal policy rule tests the resilience of the model and possibly explantation for
particular economic behaviours that we observe. For example, the double dip recession that
we so often observe in the real world, it somewhat complex to model as the feedback loops do
not necessary induce the second or third dip. Furthermore, the fiscal policy rule parameters
may change quite dramatically in a crisis situation. What may be the norm for an economy in
a good state, may not be the most appropriate in a crisis. Such decisions are largely political,
therefore, difficult to model. Our approach is to model the different fiscal policy extremes and
contrast them against the norm or middle ground.
What we have is the fundamental difference in ideology and where government focus lay. This
clearly demonstrates that the more interventionist on debt fiscal policies, particularly when
mixed with a focus on tradable income may be able to stabilise public debt quickly, however
it does so at the two costs. First the private sector response is recessionary in both trade and
domestic sectors and household response it to deleverage. This creates debt deflation and
stagnates the economy. The other cost is that the economy is generally more unstable with a
greater number of default sequences.
Another aspect to consider is if the government is trying to protect debt then it is effectively
transferring the risk to the household that now has to carry the debt and risk of default. The
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Figure 5.22: Comparison of scenarios: for government initiated defaults (GDEFA).
worst cases are those with the interventions that focus on consistency of policy and public
debt. These create the greatest level of instability in the household. When is less influenced
by the key economic indicators and the need to be consistent, then it generate consistency
in that the number of public debt defaults largely disappear and household defaults remain
about the same. Only when the government is focused on consistency and income and largely
ignores debt does the number of household default fall. Nevertheless, this is at the expense of
government defaulting much more frequently.
Regardless of the fiscal policy rule, the private sector consistently default more frequently than
government and the less that government worries about public debt the more likely it is to be
stable. However, when in a public debt crisis, governments that ignore the debt take a long
time to recover. This would imply that such a government would be better to haircut the debt
to a much lower level and effectively re-baseline the economy
Fiscal policy is as much a political choice as it is an economic one. The role that the political
ideologies say is for government is important to understand in those political choices for eco-
nomic policy. Although this is a simple rule to apply to an economy, we have demonstrated
here that the flexibility of the fiscal policy rule provides a wide range of scenarios to discuss as
policy. This could contribute to the discussion on what is the role of government. Is it, at one
end, it acts as a social safety net, or the other end, more self interest than support of households.
We can see that austerity has a significant negative impact on the economy as the household
experiences instability and a long period of depressed outcomes. Both real data and this model
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confirm that finding. This creates uncertainty and most likely in the real world, a much more
short term view. This is reinforced by the post 2008 crisis, those countries that were impacted
the most and then adopted austerity as a response to debt have declining social outcomes and
do not have the resources to survive another crisis without significant assistance.
The neoclassical focus on public debt and to neglect private debt misses the point. The evidence
and these models show that private debt plays a significant role in the economy and cannot be
willed away with quantity theory of money. Replace the foreign investor with the banking
system that can create and destroy money, lends based on risk, then the model becomes more




‘....shall have a new birth of freedom—and that government of the people, by the
people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth’ - Lincoln, Gettysburg Address,
19th November, 1863
‘Gouvernement du peuple, par le peuple et pour le peuple’ (‘government of the
people, by the people, and for the people’) - Constitution of France, Fifth Republic
6.1 Introduction
One critical aspect that the our foundation model and most economic models do not cover
the government bailing out the private sector. Here we introduce government bailout of the
private sector as a mechanism to limit the effects of a crisis. In the past 100 years, government
in the OECD has stepped into bailing out the private sector over 20 times, some quite small
interventions, others large such as the 1933 New Deal, the 2008 UK, US and European response
to the financial Crisis, 2020 response to the SAR-Cov-2 Pandemic. Each one has quite different
dimensions and methods of delivery and who they target. However, they all have one thing
in common, there is a transfer of wealth from the government to the private sector resulting in
public debt increasing. These transfers tend to be limited to a few months and are purported
to be largely unsustainable in the long run. We extend the foundation model with the addition
of a unique bailout mechanism that calculates the funds required to stop the private sector
deepening the crisis within the constraints of its own budget. We also include the ability for
foreign investors or for the government to set covenants on the bailout as a function of the level
of debt.
In Chapter 5 we discuss the fiscal rule policy settings and consequences on households. This
was both in taxation and social transfers noting that if government is appreciative of some eco-
nomic indicators over others then the effect on the household in a crisis can be dramatically
different. A few scenarios, the government provides additional funds to the household though
the social transfers channel and reduces taxation when income is low. However, tradable in-
come is a proxy for the state of the household and does not account for its current level of debt.
As we discuss in Chapter 2 private debt has a significant role in crises, therefore, the mechan-
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isms in the foundation model are potentially insufficient. We have seen many different ways
of directly and indirectly of governments intervening in the economy to prevent or limit the
effects of a crisis. We discuss these further below. We refer to bailout as a general term that cov-
ers any direct intervention by the government using its funding resources to fund part or all of
the private sector so as to prevent or mitigate a crisis. Therefore bail-ins, equity injections, re-
financing/structuring, a grant, wage subsidy, a temporary universal basic income, transferring
bad debt at full face value and many other mechanisms as a bailout if it involves government
using its funding resources.
What motivates a government, how it goes about identifying a crisis the methods use we dis-
cuss here in a set of simple questions with rather more complex answers. First, why intervene
a crisis. Although, in part we have contextualised this discussion above, we now need to look
deeper into identifying that a country is just about to go into crisis, some of the goals and mo-
tivational aspects in both the short and medium term. Second, identifying that the country is
in crisis and why we cannot forecast them accurately. Third, if a government intervenes, how
does it go about intervening to achieve its goals. Finally, what actors in the economy does
the government focus on and finally does bailing out create some expectation in the future of
government intervention.
6.2 Foundation Model and Scenario Extensions
6.2.1 Decisions on Debt and Bailout
In this model, households internalise their own debt, however they do not consider the overall
debt position of the country, nor the level of government debt. This is contrary to the normative
assumption that Ricardian households would expect that increases in government debt would
result is some form of austerity measure at a later date. The Ricardian assumption requires
a level of household sophistication households in the understanding of taxation, government
finance, and government debt to forecast accurately the consumption level and savings. One
could argue that, particularly in periods of stability, households are largely not concerned with
government debt. Furthermore, when a crisis looms large, households may seek a bailout to
prevent default or government sees a potential debt crisis in the private sector and attempts to
prevent it without considering the longer term impacts.
Households may understand the cost of default in terms of the loss of output, they do not
comprehend the consequential loss government revenue and the ability to service debt. We
propose that households consider only themselves and government assesses the ‘state’ of the
overall economy determining the level of social transfers and debt that is appropriate to main-
tain stability. If a private sector debt crisis is about to unfold, government, either at the initiation
of the private sector or its own self interest in preserving revenues steps in with a bailout (an
elevated level of social transfer). We will demonstrate that as crises looms, then government
may be forced to bail out the households to prevent a loss in tax revenue and a consequential
default on its own part.
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We start with the household debt decision making followed by the government deciding if
bailout is required, and the level of bailout.
6.2.2 Bailout Modelling
The foundation model can indirectly influence the household behaviour though taxation and
social transfers, however, it cannot directly affect the household’s decision to default or not. We
treat the default event as the crisis point where both government and household become aware
that the current private debt position is untenable. To achieve the direct transfer, we create
an additional variable st indicating additional social transfers that are necessary to prevent
the household from defaulting. If the decision path set out in section 4.6 determines that the
household is about to default then the government needs to determine how much additional
income the households needs to prevent default whilst not defaulting itself or breaking any
policy rules regarding the level of debt. Starting with the simple case, the first step is to solve
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(6.1)
where IHt = 1 is no default, that is remaining in good standing. The utility from household is
not going to default (we assume that if the the utility from remaining in good standing is the














































Where cTt is the consumption with bailout and s
T
t is the social transfers necessary to prevent
default where st = s
T
ψt
+ IH∗t sTt .
The household may default, that is IHt = 0 and needs to consider the value of defaulting and
then returning to good standing with probability θH. Hence the value of defaulting:
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Note that sTt = 0 in the default state as this only occurs if the government is successful in bailing
out.
When the household defaults, then tradable consumption is reliant on the revenue from the
attenuated tradable output, social transfers less tax on output and consumption. . This im-
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yTt , ht, ψt
)}
(6.4)
If the result of solving these equations by increasing sTt > 0 until (6.2) is satisfied and that there
is no desire to default, namely IH∗t = 1. An important issue to discuss is who initiates the
bailout. Does the private sector seek assistance from government or does government identify
the impending crisis and act? In the case of the 2008 crisis, the UK’s initial response was from
the regulator identifying that some financial institutions were very close to the prescribed limits
and unlikely to be able to recover successfully. They were running out of capital and liquidity at
an accelerating rate and a crash of the financial sector that would spill over to the real economy
was highly likely. Here the government stepped in, ‘persuaded’ the banks that they needed
refinancing before the system crashed.
In the US, it is maybe a little less clear, however, with the bankruptcy of Lehmans after a period
of uncertainty, and with the highly interconnected transactions to diversify risk, the banks lost
trust in each other to actually repay or settle within the normal course of business. Effectively,
a liquidity crunch, driven in part by restructuring assets on the balance sheets in response
to mark-the-market asset prices. It took some time for legislators to agree. From just these
two cases, who actually discovers that ‘we have a problem’, does not really matter, it is the
agreement between government and the private sector that there is a problem is the turning
point.
The next issue to manage is the government’s debt limit in the context of bailouts. We assume
that governments cannot both bailout the private sector and default on its own debt, however
desirable that may be for some ideologies. Once government establishes the level of bailout















with the debt revenue in the current period being qdGt+1. In the foundation scenario we demon-
strate that the government has a natural debt limit dGndl that is at the peak of the debt supply













generating the possibility that the government does not have the resources to bail out the
household. This creates the situation where government may not necessarily default, how-
ever, it cannot prevent he household defaulting. Alternatively, when the household defaults,
the government does not receive sufficient revenues to fund a primary surplus that then drives
the government debt over the tipping point as we have already seen in Chapter 4 and Chapter
5.
If the government survives and bails out the private sector, then this intervention is likely to
incur considerably higher levels of public debt that has an effect on the fiscal rule parameter
ψt+1and drive the government to implement measures to recover post crisis. One outcome may
be austerity measures until public debt falls to a sustainable level and the speed of implement-
ation is reliant on the persistence parameter ρψ. If the government defaults, then it may be the
imposition of sanctions on the economy and with the exclusion from receiving foreign investor
funds similar to that of the household. The government’s probability of returning to good
standing with probability θG. For simplicity in the the modelling here we assume that gov-
ernment returns to good standing in the next period model, we consider the situation where
the government is able to access foreign investment in the next period. One could question
this assumption, as normally there is a period of exclusion. However, countries such as Argen-
tina, Brazil and many of the Asian crises countries, governments were able to access foreign
investors funds almost immediately.
An alternative two other settings is that the government and/or foreign investors set a coven-
ant, that is a debt limit below the dGndl above which the government is not allowed to intervene
in the private sector. Alternatively, the government, as a form of self and national protection,
may set a level that, if debt is above that level then it is necessary for it to bailout the private
sector to ensure that the sanctions do not cause a runaway government debt problem. Hence
government protects its revenue stream and the household at the same time. the cut off level is
a point where debt below can be serviced by the revenue from taxation. We refer to this target
level as dGgs.
The implementation of sTt in the simulation is by increasing y
T
t by the the gross of tax payment
sTt
1−τYt
for the calculation consumption debt payments and default status. This simplifies the
implementation and the net effect in increasing income for the household simulates the normal
way that bailouts occur.
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6.2.3 Scenarios
These scenarios use the foundation scenario as the basis only varying the strategy. A discussion
on the theoretical background, its composition and the foundation scenario is in Chapter 3. We
consider two sets of comparisons of scenarios.
The first set is to compare the foundation scenario (with no bailout) with one modification,
namely bailout if the household is going to default. We should observe that the default rate for
households decreases substantially; however, it is questionable if this reflects into the govern-
ment default rate. Therefore, by changing one factor of the model we can observe the effect on
the pathways during a crisis for different crises classifications.
1. ALB - Always Bailout: The Foundation Scenario with the addition of bailouts. Bailout
always occurs if there is sufficient availability of funds to bail out the household.
2. NOB - Never Bailout: This is the benchmark Foundation Scenario, no bailout under any
circumstances.
The second comparison is to set an public debt arbitrary limit that we will call dgsthat the
government chooses. An example of this is the fiscal budgetary constraint on public debt in
the Eurozone of 60% of debt/GDP and a budget deficit of greater than 3% Commission (2015).
Therefore, if we set that governments can only bailout the private sector below dgs limit then
depending on the state of public debt, how this rule affects the path of a crisis. As the average
level of public debt with the foundation model is somewhat lower than the Eurozone limit,
however we set the limit at 60%. An alternative specification is that of government only bails
out above dgs. This seems somewhat counter-intuitive, however, lets look at the logic that could
parallel the gambler’s curse. If a government is in a situation that it knows that a private debt
crisis will likely end up with a a public debt crisis through the implementation of sanctions will
reduce government revenue, hence create deficits to the extent that it pushes public debt over
critical point. Although this scenario would be quite unusual, we include it for completeness.
On top of the first comparison we add:
1. ASB - Only bailout when debt is above a set limit- This is the Foundation Scenario, with
bailouts only occur when public debt is above 60% of long run GDP - this is a form of
gambler’s ruin scenario.
2. BSB - Only bailout when debt is below a set limit - Again, the Foundation Scenario,
bailouts only occur when public debt is below 60% of long run GDP. This is the EU fiscal
responsibility scenario.
6.3 Simulation Results
6.3.1 Frequency Comparison Between Bailout and No Bailout
These two policy extremes, that is bailing out the household or not does not necessarily in-
crease the frequency of event sequences, however by it does change the event sequences from
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refusing bailout to attempting bailout as we illustrate in Table 6.2. The two scenarios share the
same foundation model parameters and structure, therefore any difference is due to the change
from never bailing out to bailing out. First we note that although the government is funding
bailouts though public debt, this makes very little difference in government defaulting GDEFA
sequences. Note that sequences with BAILx start with a successful bailout event BAILx then
if successful classified as BAILS, if the sequence ends in a default then is counts in BAILF.
BFHDA sequences are where the government is debt constrained at the time of the crisis and
this would also be the same as some ending of a BAILF sequence, that is the net result gov-
ernment is unable to stabilise the economy by bailing out the household. As to stability of the
economy, bailing out does not seem to cause any more instability over the economy with less
than about 1% change in the total number of defaults. So, if bailing out gives better outcomes






ALLxx All event sequences 28034 27734
BAILA All bailout attempts 21034 0
BAILS All successful bailouts 19923 0
BAILF All bailouts that eventually failed 1111 0
BFHDA Could not bail out, household
defaults
123 0
GDEFA Government default 6877 6638
HDNBA No bailout, household defaults 0 21096
Table 6.2: Summary of the Number of Event Sequences by summary
(in bold) and sequence classifications. Note that Any bailout sequence
that starts with a bailout (BAILx) and ends with a failure counts towards
BAILF. Any sequence that bailout failed, due to debt level being too high
and government would default immediately, starts with BFHDx. In no
bailout, household defaults as a result is event HDNBx.
We observe in the limiting factor is the number of times the government uses debt to bailout the
household as we illustrate in 6.1. Although failure represents less than 7% of the total bailout
attempts (that is BAILA plus BFHDA in table 6.2). With our introductory analysis, this leans
us toward the view that governments should always attempt bailing out the private sector.
Nevertheless, there might be a limitation on the number of times that implies debt limit has
an effect with increasing number of failures the longer that the bailout continues. We therefore
contrast this result with the consideration an arbitrary debt limit constraint to bail out later in
this chapter.
Next to consider is the the periodicity of crisis for each scenario. We illustrate the different



























Figure 6.1: (ALB) Always Bail out - Distribution how many periods bailing
out either before success (Blue) or eventual failure (brown). Note that column 1
represents 85% of the bailouts and is cut off to illustrate the longer sequences.
never bail out scenarios. We define the period between events as the difference in period count
between the start of a new event and the end of the last event sequence. The ALLxx repres-
ents all event sequences, regardless of classification. We observe that the average periodicity
between event sequences is approximately 80 periods, household defaults/bailouts approxim-
ately105 periods and government defaults are rare at about 750 periods. We find that between








































































Gap between event sequences














































Gap between event sequences
(b) (NOB) - Never Bail out
Figure 6.2: The elapsed time between events of the same type. This compares bailing out
against not bailing out.
From our introductory analysis, the bailing out the household has a benefit its income is not
attenuated by default sanctions, the foreign investor, as they do not loose their capital and to
the government maintains tax revenues without minimally impacting the frequency of default.
Furthermore, only if the household requires bailing out more than once in a sequences is there
the possibility of failure. We conclude that governments should bailout if they can afford to do
so, even when the debt is not in their own currency. Furthermore, the model supports the view
that the infrequent nature of crisis We test in the second part an arbitrary debt constraint and
the effects on bailout.
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6.3.2 Pathway Comparison Between Bailout and No Bailout
We illustrate the results from the simulations for Always Bail out Figure 6.3a and never bail
out Figure 6.3bas time paths summarising multiple event sequences as we discuss in Chapter
3 and Chapter 4. The crisis point is t = 0 and we record 5 periods before and 15 periods after
the crisis inducing event. A successful bailout is a crisis event as much as failing to bailout or
public debt default. Therefore the defining event is the first event in the sequence. As expected,
the time path for a public debt default (GDEFA) are the same for always and never bailout as
we do not change any other parameter or setting in the two scenarios.
Our interest is in sequence classifications bailout (BAILS) in Figure 6.3a and Household default
no bailout (HDNBA). Note that ỹTfor the bailout has a much less sharper dip than that of a no
bailout as the implementation of sanctions on household default. The effects of a bailout is a
reduction in private debt dH to sustainable levels by the addition of the bailout s that might
be followed by a smaller bailout and increase in public debt dGreflects the deficits ΓG from the
bailout outflows. Consumption suffers a short period dip as does the labour wage income wh.
As wages are flexible, the lack of demand drives prices down to counter the effects of wage
decline. The net effect on the household is a temporary quick V shaped recession that quickly
recovers, however not quite to the same levels. One key aspect of bailout is that it produces a
much more stable economy that recovers quickly.
Looking at the alternative no bailout where the government is not as benevolent as the bailout
scenario. No Bailout (6.3b) consumption similarly troughs, then peaks then troughs again to
a lower level of consumption as sanctions bite into the tradable income stream. We observe
the same effect in labour wage wh with prices adjusting accordingly, therefore domestic output
and consumption remain flat with a long tail. The main issue is that when the government does
not bail out, the household defaults on private debt that goes to zero. For the government, the
attenuation on tradable income and consumption directly affects tax revenues, therefore the
tradable primary surplus ΓGfor much longer than if the government had stepped in and bailed
out the household. Although not bailing out does not have the same sharp increase in primary
deficit, this longer period of deficits has the net same impact on public debt. A counter-intuitive
aspect is that bailing out that actually leaves the government better off than not bailing out.
Both bailout and no bailout scenarios have a dip in income and tradable consumption and do-
mestic income, however no-bailout has a immediate bounce back then a fall as the default on
debt changes the dynamic of the household. Household devotes all income to consumption,
however the imposition of sanctions limits the recovery. This creates a primary deficit that
exists for much longer than the bailout scenario leading to increasing public debt and a gov-
ernment response to increase tax rates and decrease tradable social transfers. Increasing the
burden on the household during a recovery slows the recovery and the economy remains weak
and unstable. In contrast, bailout, although there is a significant impact to the primary deficit,
the household recovery is quicker and more stable, making it more resilient. Furthermore, the
government tax revenues recover quickly putting the government back into a primary surplus
without the necessity of raising taxes to the same extent.
What seems on the face of it to be a non-interventionist Austrian School ideology actually
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makes the economy behave more poorly than bailing out the household and as a consequence
protecting government revenues and the foreign investor. we clearly show that the non-interventionist
strategy is far worse for all the economic actors in the economy than a more Keynesian oriented
strategy of bailing out the household. We have already shown in our fiscal policy rule analysis
that more benevolent government policies work favourably for the household with only a small
increase in defaults by the government. Later we will look at a combination of bailing out and
a more benevolent fiscal policy setting than the foundation scenario.
Finally, if we consider the situation where government wants to bail out the household, how-
ever debt levels prevent to from doing so (BAILF in Figure 6.3a). The sequence path for a failed
bailout is that government successfully bails out the household, however, repeated bailouts
drain the governments resources, namely public debt, to such levels that it cannot bail out
or the government defaults in the next period. Examples include a sequence such as BAILx,
BAILx.BFHDx (bailout failed, household defaults) or the most frequent failure sequence is
government then household BAILx.GDEFx. What this implies is that the government’s lim-
ited resources when government debt is denominated in a foreign currency causes a default.
Therefore if we set a lower limit to debt, this should occur more frequently as we discuss below.
Looking at failed bailout sequences (BAILF) and comparing them with no bailout household
defaults (HDNBA in Figure 6.3b) we can see that the initial successful bailout provides relief
for the household and prevents the instability that we observe even though a default event
occurs during the sequence. Thus bailout creates stability over that of a no bailout strategy
by government. Note that the no bailout also can cause the government to default in the next
period at a similar frequency to failed bailout. This further reinforces the the view that the
government attempting to bail out the household is preferable to that of not doing so.
6.3.3 Public Debt Limit on Bailout in Comparison with Never and Always bailout
The next consideration is setting some arbitrary limit to the level of debt that constraints the
government in bailing out the household. The example we explain above is that of the EU
fiscal responsibility pact that constrains governments to 60% debt/GDP ratio. In our setting,
we introduce a finite limit of 60% of the long run tradable GDP although many analysts take
the current GDP. As the design of the model is that a falling tradable income generates adverse
conditions in the household and government. A falling GDP would naturally increase the debt
to GDP ratio accelerating the speed to a crisis. Using a long run GDP provides a stable basis to
conduct the analysis of a different pathways that a 60% debt/GDP limit would show. We show
a summary of the frequency of sequence in Table 6.4. The left two columns are a repetition of
the above analysis; the right two are where we consider an arbitrary debt level; second from
right is the above 60% gamblers ruin scenario, the right most column (Below 60%) represents
the current EU fiscal responsibility pact.
As before, we consider the periodicity between events sequences of the same classification
and all event sequences classifications in Figure 6.4a and Figure 6.4b for the two additional
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(a) Comparison of events successful bailout (BAILS), failed
bailout (BAILF) and Public debt default (GDEFA) for Always
Bailout scenario
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(b) Comparison of events government
(GDEFA) and household default (HDNBA)
for Never Bailout scenario
Figure 6.3: (ALB) Always Bailout and (NOB) never bailout summary event sequence comparison
scenarios. We note little change in the overall periodicity or overall frequency, therefore the
effect is just changes the action by the government on bailing out or not. If the policy of setting
an upper public debt limit (BSB) actually prevents government default, that is does the EU
and IMF policy actually achieve its objective of fiscal responsibility. Note that as we have
already demonstrated there is a significant cost to the household and the foreign investor if the
household does default.
We note from our simulations that we do not see any change in the public debt defaulting
rate (GDEFA is the lowest in this comparison) and that a very small number (427) of bailout
failures result in the debt limit being reached (BAILx.HDGTx). As the policy does not seem to
prevent defaulting by the government and in only very limit circumstances does bailing out the
household by the government result in crossing the debt limit then it brings into question the
value of the policy. Moreover, defaulting has significant negative implications for all, including
the government.










ALLxx 28034 27734 27860 27896
BAILA 21034 0 3499 17687
BAILS 19923 0 2530 17396
BAILF 1111 0 969 291
GDEFA 6877 6638 6788 6722
HDGTA 0 0 0 3487
HDLTA 0 0 17444 0
HDNBA 0 21096 0 0
Table 6.4: Note that Any bailout sequence that starts with a bailout (BAILx) and ends with
a failure counts towards BAILF. The four columns are Always bailout the household subject
to breaching debt limit (as above), Never bail out (as above), bail out if public debt is above
60% and bail out if public debt is below 60%.
ernment to bail out. Part of the MMM policy rule settings tends to keep public debt low. If
a policy setting was to raise the level of debt or there is a lower limit then all it would trigger
more situations where government refuses bailout, increasing the impact on the household.
Although such a limit may have merit as a target during normal times, it has negative impacts
in crises the economy, foreign investors and particularly on households that the government is
there to protect.
The alternative is the bailout only when debt is high. This raises the question, such a strategy
would be the worst of both worlds, that is punishing to the household when the government
has fiscal space in public debt to bail out the household, the attempt to protect the government
from the consequences of sanctions affecting tax revenues. Again, there is little difference in
the periodicity or frequency of crisis other than it changes driven by the debt limit Table 6.4.
Such a strategy has little effect on the public debt default (GDEFA) or bailing out and then
defaulting (BAILx.GDEFx). Nevertheless, it does have serious implications for the household
when government operates such a strategy. The household defaults as a result of the constraint
(HDLTA) climb making it similar to the effects of not bailing out on the household and the
economy. Although the government is able to survive a private debt crisis even with reducing
the tax revenue from the effects of sanctions, not bailing out under these circumstances detri-
mental effects and the political landscape that it is likely to fall on is probability going to cause
civil unrest.
6.3.4 Time-path Comparison Between Different Event Classifications
Next is to compare the time paths for never bail out, our worst case with bailing out above
or below the policy debt limit. Starting with a comparison between never bail out with bail-






































































Gap between event sequences

























































































Gap between event sequences
(b) Below 60% (BSB)
Figure 6.4: The elapsed time between events of the same type. This compares bailing out
above 60% and below 60%
note that, as before, there is no difference in the paths of public default (GDEFA). An inter-
esting point is that when the government does not bailout when debt is above debt limit and
household defaults (HDGTA) follows a similar time path as the never bailout (HDNBA). Some
important differences however, in the government debt that are not unexpected. That is in the
sequence HDGTA, public debt hits its debt limit with a greater frequency and earlier after the
crisis commences. As, effectively, the bailout limit policy filters out all of the low debt circum-
stances with a bailout; when the government is above that limit then it likely that the sanctions
will cause a default as tax revenues drop and a primary deficit occurs ΓG < 0 at the worst point
making a perfect storm in a crisis. Although not every refusal results in public default, approx-
imately 1/3 do indicating that the policy is counter-productive to the government in protecting
itself from a crisis.
The alternative policy setting is that of only bailing out to prevent a crisis that will put public
debt at risk of default. This somewhat self interested has some elements of a gambler’s ruin,
however it does split the bailout scenarios into two classes when considering the fiscal respons-
ibility pacts above. We do not take into account any foresight by foreign investors that would
lead them to recalculate the risk beyond the next period, however, we can show that bailing
out even when government debt is in excess of the fiscal limit has merit as it does not cause
additional government defaults, whilst protecting the household. We illustrate these points
in Figure 6.6 by observing the time paths of bailout (BAILS) where there is little change in the
frequency of events and the time paths demonstrate better outcomes for the household. The
arbitrary cut off point causes households to default as the alternative to bailout as we show in
Figure 6.6b event sequence household default, HDLTA. Note that not bailing out causes a rip-
pling effect in both household consumption cT and government primary surplus ΓGthat reflects
into the domestic economy in wage income wh.
One aspect is that government not bailing out is in someway a strategy for not increasing its
level of government debt, however the rippling of a primary deficit has a similar effect as the
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(b) Bailout only if below 60%
Figure 6.5: comparison between No Bailout and Bail out if below
government bailing out the household (see Figure 6.3a column BAILS), so what seems on the
face of it to be a mechanism to protect the government does not really achieve that objective.
The reverse in actuality with the household being negatively impacted by government failure
to respond leading to its own income deficit. We can only conclude that this self interested
strategy is at best, short sighted. The whole economy and foreign investors would be better
served if the government bailed out the household.
Another way of looking at this particular problem is if the foreign investor had influence over
the government. One could logically argue that high levels of government debt, then the impo-
sition of sanctions on the economy would cause the government to default with the household.
The foreign investor might perceive that such a crisis is far worse than bailing out the house-
hold in high debt situations and taking a risk that government ends up defaulting. However,
at low levels of debt, the foreign investor might not be so included and not extend credit to the
government to fund such a campaign of bailouts. This would be an example of the old adage of
good money chasing bad. We demonstrate that this is also shortsighted, it would be better for
the government to bailout the household and take the increase in debt, albeit only marginally
greater than the situation where it does not bail out. The issue for the foreign investor is are
they taking a gambler’s ruin strategy or are they actually protecting their investment. We con-
jecture that more often than not, protecting their investment by allowing the government to
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(b) Bailout above the public debt limit.
Figure 6.6: comparison between No bailout and bail out if above limit
bail out the household.
6.4 Conclusion
Our modelling shows that the never bailout policy (foundation scenario) is significantly the
worst option for the economy when comparing with any bailing out strategy. Always bailing
out has little impact on the frequency or periodicity of crises including government lead public
debt crises. We include the debt limited strategy to replicate the EU/ECB fiscal responsibility
pact. We show that such a pact is actually worse for the country that it is being applied to that
just bailing out the household and then dealing with any fallout from public debt. One aspect
of this model is that it bails out the household and not the bank or foreign investor. However, the
foreign investor does gain out of the bailout in that they do not suffer the losses from household
default. This implies that the foreign investor would be best to work with the government on
a private sector rescue package and fund the government debt, even if it has to accept some
haircut at a later stage. If this is the case, the it becomes a political decision on the role of
government as a backstop for the private sector. We discuss the implications of bailing out or
not households and firms in the context of the 1929 and 2008 crisis with some reflection on the
2020 crisis as it unfolds.
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We note that the focus of the 1933 New Deal package in the US was largely about improving the
household by work schemes of national and local importance, restructuring core elements of
the economy and improving the support to the general workforce. These were largely demand
side Keynesian style expansionary policies. This is in contrast to the the 2008 bailout packages
that largely focused on preventing financial system collapse and then trying to create sufficient
supply of credit with very little real structural change and future relaxation of workforce pro-
tections. This was a largely supply side bailout. 2010 saw some southern EU countries and
the UK enter a period of austerity to varying degrees in an attempt to address the so called
burgeoning public debt crises, without addressing the underlying socio-structural-economic
issues. The idea that public debt is a problem comes largely from Academic economic actors of
note over an extended period from the 1950’s onwards. The more right wing political parties
became guardians of these fiscally conservative policies and the free market ideology. Further-
more, this school aligned with the Austrian/Heyakian ideologies on the role of government
minimalism.
The evidence from prior crises and this model is that any bailout must focus on the household
rather than firms and financial institutions. If the damage to the household can be limited, then
this will flow though the economy to banks, with lower default rates and firms with demand for
the output. An important point is that from the 2008 crisis, banks may need to be recapitalised,
however there must be an onus on the government to ensure that banks never put the economy
in that position again.
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Chapter 7
Public Debt Management In a Crisis
7.1 Introduction
In this chapter we broaden the government’s strategies from a fiscal policy and bailout inter-
vention to that of how it manages public debt in a crisis. A core assumption of much of the
current research is that government defaults on all of the public debt similar to that we have in
the private sector. We contend that this assumption does not reflect the what happens during
a crisis and we uniquely create some alternative scenarios to cover other possibilities. It is rare
that a public debt default is on all of the debt, rather it is on some level that either can fund
though issuing more debt and primary surpluses or some agreed level.
Under the Paris Club, there is a process for negotiating a settlement between countries that are
in default and the investors. Normally, triggering this process is either a default event by the
government on public debt or there being the threat of public debt default. Most defaulting
or events leading up to default are strategically or tactically made at the time rather than a
hard and fast ex-ante policy setting (Haldane et al., 2003; Yue, 2010). The mere threat of default
tends to bring both debtor and creditor into negotiation that restructures the payment sched-
ules and principle of the debt. We observe this behaviour during corporate and sovereign debt
negotiation. It is neither in the interests of the government nor the investor for a full default
to occur. The government and country loose though exclusion from credit and restrictions on
trade finance and the foreign investor looses the asset principle. In some cases the loss of the
asset and write down causes serious issues for the investor.
In Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, we have already discussed the historical, socio-political and em-
pirical backgrounds to these strategies that we will briefly expand on here. Our focus is on
countries that have some restriction on theory monetary control and denomination of debt.
These restrictions may be by treaty, pegging or banding a currency, government policy or situ-
ations where a significant part of public debt is denominated in foreign currency (Fullbrook
and Morgan, 2020). A government that has full monetary control over its currency and it is
acceptance by foreign investors that its domestic currency denominated public debt has flex-
ibility in managing its debt situation. There is no reason for it to ever default on its debt,
freeing the government to use fiscal policy as a mechanism to regulate the economy (Connors
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and Mitchell, 2017; Fullbrook and Morgan, 2020). The governments only limitations are that
of demand in excess of supply and that if government uses excessively expends by importing
or induces such behaviours. Moreover, if foreign investors are the principle source of debt
income, then exchange rate depreciation risk is likely to play a role in quantity and interest
rate expectations. Large sovereign nations with a safe currency and political stability is likely
to always be able to fund its debt; however a smaller currency may experience problems if
the international market for credit and currency perceive an ‘excessively’ creating money for
non-productive purposes or importing (Mankiw, 2020). One issue that is largely missed by
the classical schools in economics is that commercial banks create most of the money in the
economy and that money creation or destruction derives from banker’s preferences for profit
and risk within a regulatory framework (McLeay, Radia and Thomas, 2014; Faure, 2020). We
contend that for ‘trusted’ nations, with what appears to be well regulated regimes, are likely
have a greater degree of flexibility over those with a ‘developing’ status where institutions are
not so mature.
One aspect is the changing role of taxation for sovereign currency governments (Baker and
Murphy, 2020). Traditionally, though the classical lens, taxation is seen to fund government
expenditures and debt, particularly the case with debt that is in a foreign currency. Therefore,
in our modelling, this is the important mechanism for preventing public debt. However, taxa-
tion holds a unique aspect in that it can be highly targeted and redistributive when compared
to other tools such as interest rate control. This redistributive and regulating effect on the eco-
nomy has fallen out of favour for the more monetarist strategies for regulating the economy
over the past 30 years. Now, it might be more difficult in a country that has not the freedom
aspects to government debt that we show above, nevertheless, it can still operate with a com-
bination of fiscal and monetary policy. The government is only limited by the productive capa-
city of the economy and that excess effective demand in any particular sector creates Inflation
in that sector. Therefore the government can use taxation and social transfers to ensure that a
balanced economy across all sectors and strata of society. Core to this philosophy is the ability
to make and destroy money by the government (both fiscal and monetary), domestic banks
and foreign banks with a domestic license (McLeay, Radia and Thomas, 2014; Kelton, 2020).
This is in stark contrast to that of neoclassic economics, where all governments our bound by a
inter-temporal budget constraint as we specify in the foundation model. Therefore we paint a
worst case constrained view of government policy and strategy regarding default.
There are two aspects to consider on the quantity of defaulting debt when a crisis occurs. First is
that not all of the debt is repaid at the same time, a normative assumption in classical economic
modelling. Generally, there is a schedule of debt terms, quantities and effective interest rates.
Government is only obliged to repay what falls due which may be a combination of interest
and principle. It is common that government only partially default on debt, that is they default
on what is due. Sometimes this is strategic, that is they might only default on interest or some
of the principle, sometimes this is due to the inability to sell sufficient debt at a price to fund
repayment or some combination. The next effect is that only a small proportion of the debt is
defaulted on, the rest continuing to be serviced. Second, a core difference between public debt
and private debt is enforceability by the court system or internationally. An organisation may
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be forced into into administration and assets distributed under a judicial process; however,
the same rules do not apply to nations (Bulow and Rogoff, 1986). Nation states cannot be
forced into administration, taken over or forced redistributing of their assets. Therefore, the
power of the creditor is limited to the imposition of sanctions and likely to force all parties into
negotiations.
Normative prescription of commercial debt is for creditors and debtors to enter into negoti-
ations rather than force administration. The creditor is more likely to negotiate to limit losses
and possibility restructure the funding of the organisation rather than take the risk of loosing a
significant part of the principle in a liquidation. Hence, the formation of the Paris club over 60
years ago to assist creditors and debtors to negotiate debt restructuring (Cheng, Díaz-Cassou
and Erce, 2018). Over time this organisation has morphed from one principally aiding to re-
cover debt for creditors to one that has an orientation towards developing country improve-
ment, reducing poverty and inequality. These debt renegotiations tend to have a lasting effect
on the productive sector of the economy, in our modelling, the domestic sector. Repeated de-
faulting by the government where the haircut initially was insufficient, keeps the risk premium
high and a tight fiscal policy (Arteta and Hale, 2008). A government may enter into debt re-
structuring before an actual crisis event occurs . The crisis event becomes the point at which
the restructuring occurs and the implementation of a limited haircut.
Most defaulting models have some form of exclusion and sanctions as summarised in Na et al.
(2014) following the pattern that default is on the total level of debt. The foundation scen-
ario provides the first alternative to default on all debt, namely considers haircuts to what the
government can immediately repay when it has insufficient funds to repay debt (Mount and
Zumel, 2016). That is, it will repay to the foreign investor as much as it can obtain from sale
of new debt and the primary surplus. However, the nature of debt repayment and the near
exponential increases in interest rates to cover risk means that the government is more likely to
default in the next period as well. Only when debt service costs accelerate beyond the capacity
of the economy to generate foreign funds does it contemplate default. We show in the found-
ation scenario public debt default sequences that run for many periods. This is undesirable to
both the country and the foreign investor (Bulow and Rogoff, 1986). Repeated haircuts may not
provide the optimal outcome for ether party Furthermore, the imposition of sanctions on the
economy impacts the household’s ability to repay debt, and their consumption. The rippling
effect though the economy, as we show in the foundation model can be significant creating
an almost second subsistence equilibrium akin to that found in the General Theory (Keynes,
1936). Therefore, continuing with haircutting only sufficiently to get the government out of the
immediate crisis is unlikely to be realistic (Arteta and Hale, 2008).
In the following sections, we consider the effects of these different defaulting strategies by the
government comparing them with the foundation scenario, default to the maximum level of
debt that can be funded by the primary surplus and acquisition of debt. We consider some
alternative strategies that the government may take including defaulting on almost all of the
debt, a level that makes debt affordable using the current level of primary surplus and finally
an arbitrary level of debt that may be agreed by Paris negotiations.
147
7.2 Foundation Model and Scenario Extensions
The set up to of the additional scenarios is founded on foundation scenario permitting us to
compare the relative performance of each of these strategies with a baseline foundation. The
only modification to the foundation scenario to generate the debt management strategies as
follows:
1. Default to natural debt limit (HCDL) - this is the foundation model and scenario strategy
that we have already discussed in Chapter 3 in detail.
2. Default to an affordable level of debt (HCPS) - this is what one could call a ‘sensible’
strategy that should ensure that persistent public debt defaults do not occur after the
initial event
3. Default to the lowest level of debt (HCLL) - this is the worst case strategy for the foreign
investor and has potential for use as a threat by the government to force foreign investors
not to attempt to implement a high level of debt repayment
4. Default to a nominated level of debt (HC23) - This is a arbitrary level of debt post crisis
that we intend to model as an agreement between government and foreign investor. By
construction this strategy can be set to any level between the lowest level of debt and the
natural debt limit.
We apply these strategies to the foundation scenario’s mid point point fiscal policy rule (MMM),
a no bailout policy (NOB), a flexible wage environment (FW) and an expansionary fiscal ideo-
logy (EXP). An extension is to combine in the always bail out (ALB) strategy that we discuss in
Chapter 6 with some form of debt management. One of the main problems with bailing out is
the rapid build-up of public debt.
7.2.1 Foundation Model, Recalling the Strategy Public Debt Default to Natural
Debt Limit (HCDL)
We need to logically extend the Foundation model mathematics and theories to incorporate the
new strategies. We illustrate the implementation of the above strategies in Chapter 4. For com-
pleteness, we start by reiterating the core parts of Chapter 31 to provide the basic government
budget equation to generate a primary surplus ΓG:
dGt − qGt dGt+1 = Γt (7.1)
therefore, in this model, governments running persistent primary deficits will result in increas-
ing levels of public debt and there be a balanced budget, that is an equilibrium:






dG∗ = Γ∗ (7.2)
This means that it is necessary for governments to run a primary surplus that is equivalent to
the debt service charge by foreign investor. The debt service charge derives from the core of
the foundation model here for clarity and by way of introducing the changes for the different
defaulting and haircutting strategies. Government repays its debt in full, if the current level
of debt is below the effective government debt limit. In any other circumstance, it defaults,
formally:
IGt =
1 dGt < dG∗t0 dGt ≥ dG∗t (7.3)
Where the stochastic debt limit ,dG∗t is drawn from a exogenous distribution, d
G∗
t ∼ DG∗ that is
non-linear in that it rapidly rises once the probability of default starts to rise. We express the
debt limit cumulative density using a logistic function with two parameters with calibrations
from the data. The probability of default, φt that is the probability of IGt → 0 given that the














Any given level of government debt dGt , the default probability is φt that represents the risk
premium over the gross international interest rate 1+ r∗. Hence, the determination of the price















The government’s demand for debt dGt+1 at the price the foreign investors are willing to offer










 = dGt − Γt (7.7)






If the required level of debt is greater than the natural debt limit,dGt+1 ≥ dGndl then the govern-
ment needs to default on public debt and that will limit the debt repayment dGt :
dGt =
qGt dGt+1 + ΓG dGt+1 < dGndlqGndldGndl + ΓG dGt+1 ≥ dGndl (7.9)
Hence, the haircut is:
hcGt =
0 dGt+1 < dGndldGt − qGndldGndl − ΓG dGt+1 ≥ dGndl (7.10)
alternatively, using the default indicator for government, the government repayment dGt is the
either new debt revenue priced at qGt plus any primary surplus or the natural debt limit at price















If in default, then the haircut is the current outstanding public debt stock dGt less the revenue





dGt − qGndldGndl − ΓG
)
(7.12)
7.2.2 Strategy - Default to an Affordable Level of Debt (HCPS)
Haircutting to the debt limit is not necessarily the most effective strategy for either the govern-
ment or the foreign investor. We observe that this strategy tends to generate a long period of
continual defaulting that creates large losses for the foreign investor. More reasonably, if we
apply the outcomes from a Paris Club style negotiations where the government and creditors
to agree to an affordable level of debt then we are more attuned many real world examples. We
use the current primary surplus to determine the affordable level of debt. When the govern-
ment cannot afford to repay its debt as in dGt+1 ≥ dGndl then we start at (7.7) and find the level of










+ hcGt = dGt − Γt (7.13)
where hcGt is the haircut necessary to obtain an affordable level of debt. The price of the afford-
















This then provides for a haircut hcGt when default occurs.
hcGt = d
G
t + Γt − qGald,tdGald,t+1 (7.16)
Note that if ΓGt ≤ 0 and the the affordable level of debt cannot exceed the natural debt limit
by definitiondGald,t+1 < d
G
ndlthen we use the lowest level of public debt and it reverts to the 3rd










ΓGt > 0, d
G
t+1 ≥ dGndl , dGald,t+1 < dGndl
dGlow Γ
G
t ≤ 0, dGt+1 ≥ dGndl
(7.17)
Furthermore, government is in default when IGt = 0:
IGt =

1 dGt+1 < d
G
ndl
0 ΓGt > 0, d
G
t+1 ≥ dGndl , dGald,t+1 < dGndl




0 dGt+1 < d
G
ndl
0 ΓGt > 0, d
G
t+1 ≥ dGndl , dGald,t+1 < dGndl
1 ΓGt ≤ 0, dGt+1 ≥ dGndl
(7.19)
Note, if there is a primary deficit, that is IGLt < 0 then we cannot calculate the affordable level
of debt and we assume that both the primary deficit and the debt is written off as a haircut. We
also assume that in such a crisis with a primary deficit, a clean sheet base level of public debt
near zero operates2.









dGt − dGlow − ΓGt
)
(7.20)
We illustrate graphically, the implementation of this strategy in both the debt transformation
and haircuts in Figure 7.1. The affordability has a significant influence on the size of the haircut.
2The log function in the fiscal policy rule prevents using zero debt or negative debt, therefore we set to a near
zero value to simulate the circumstance were public debt is clean slated however a minimal level still operates in a
public debt crisis. Our testing shows that this has little impact of the performance of the model in demonstrating
the impacts of such defaulting strategies.
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Note the difference between haircut to debt limit and affordable debt level Figure 7.1a. At the
line the demarcates between in good standing and default, the haircut to debt limit has a slope
from that point, whereas the affordable debt level has an immediate correction, represented by





















(a) Haircut size given a current level of pub-
lic debt and primary surplus to determine
the haircut that is necessary for the govern-



















(b) Public Debt in the next period, given the
current level of debt and primary surplus.
Note that as the primary surplus decreases
(or goes to a deficit) the level of debt in the
next period decreases.
Figure 7.1: HCPS - Haircut debt to affordable at current level that the primary surplus indicates
7.2.3 Strategy - Default to the Lowest Level of Debt (HCLL)
Another strategy that a government may adopt is when negotiations fail to reach an agreement.
This is a full default that writes off all of the debt3. This follows the norm of most classical mod-
els. The calculation is similar to that of defaulting to a fixed debt limit with the modification
that the target level is the lowest level of debt. Furthermore, the primary surplus becomes ir-
reverential in this case as the haircut is deep and written off as part of the haircutting process.
This is the worst outcome for the foreign investor and likely to cause a long period of sanctions.
In summary we set the debt and haircut:
dGt =
qGt dGt+1 + ΓG dGt+1 < dGndldGlow dGt+1 ≥ dGndl (7.21)
where dGlow is the lowest level of debt. Hence, the haircut is:
hcGt =
0 dGt+1 < dGndldGt − dGlow − ΓG dGt+1 ≥ dGndl (7.22)
3We set the debt level to the lowest level according to our decision rules. This simulates the worst case for the
foreign investor.
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This strategy is the threat to the foreign investor to initiate negotiations and come to a settle-
ment. Again we illustrate the public debt state transitions and the haircuts in Figure 7.2. Note
that the vertical wall is high and parallel top and bottom indicating the ‘reset’ nature that this
strategy operates. Further the we assume that the debt is not discounted by the sell price qGt as







































(b) Debt In next period
Figure 7.2: HCLL - Haircut to lowest level of public debt
7.2.4 Strategy - Default to a Nominated Level of Debt (HC23)
This strategy is somewhat similar to that of hair-cutting to the lowest level of debt (HCLL) and
it a logical extension. This strategy is likely to be after some period of negotiation between the
government and foreign investors. Although government may desire to cut to the lowest level,
the threat of exclusion by foreign investors is likely to have a significant impact on both do-
mestic private and public sectors. Likewise, the foreign investor might consider the haircutting
to the NDL as a short term strategy as the likelihood of the next period being in default is high.
One observes this in the Foundation scenario time paths where haircutting occurs many times
after the initial public debt default. This would lead us to some agreement that the affordable
level of debt would be the logical conclusion. However, if the government is running a primary
deficit then the haircut will be the same as hair-cutting to the lowest level of debt. There is only
a narrow band where a primary surplus would give a fair indication of the level of debt the
government can sustain. Therefore, the only option is for government and foreign investor to
negotiate. We determine that the government would want some ‘headroom’ in the level of debt
and the foreign investor would want to see as much repaid as possible. Arbitrarily we set the
negotiated debt level to two thirds of the NDL which is below the point that governments are
unlikely to default within a couple of periods. The effect is that the fiscal policy rule response to
debt would induce higher tax rates and lower social transfers/government expenditures akin
to the austerity measures that IMF and World Bank impose as a matter of course when shoring
up a nation’s financial position. Nevertheless, we can set the nominated level dGNL at any level
between the NDL dGndland near zero d
G
low. to simulate a particular circumstance. We assume
that the investor forgives interest as a part of the negotiations. The specification:
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dGt =
qGt dGt+1 + ΓG dGt+1 < dGndldGNL dGt+1 ≥ dGndl (7.23)
Hence, the haircut is:
hcGt =
0 dGt+1 < dGndldGt − dGNL − ΓG dGt+1 ≥ dGndl (7.24)
This strategy is the threat to the foreign investor to initiate negotiations and come to a settle-
ment. Again we illustrate the public debt state transitions and the haircuts in Figure 7.2. Note







































(b) Debt In next period
Figure 7.3: HC23 - Haircut to 2/3 between debt limit and target debt
7.3 Simulation Results
We run additional simulations for the three new strategies and report them here. All Scenarios
are run using the same model and the scenario governs the decision made in the simulation.
All simulations use the same seed for the stochastic processes limiting the only variation to the
changes imposed by the scenario.
7.3.1 Frequencies and Durations
Our basic summary statistics on the frequency of event sequences for scenarios with a no-
bailout Table 7.2 and those with always bail out Table 7.4. An inspection of the event sequence
frequencies indicates that defaulting to debt limit (NDL) is the least frequent and somewhat
surprising is defaulting to the lowest level being the most frequent. An explanation is that the
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event sequence heuristic analyser sets a limit of four periods between one period events (unless
in sanctions) to tie them into a sequence. Defaulting to the lowest level might mean that debt
recovery path from near zero takes longer than a default to the debt limit. We should observe
that government default sequences (GDEFA) tend to be shorter with defaulting to the lowest
level when comparing with defaulting to the natural debt limit4.








ALLxx All defaults 27734 30295 36815 32216
GDEFA All government initiated 6638 7700 12939 9110
GDEFx Government only 6104 5554 12311 8038
GDEFx.GDHDx Government followed by
household & Government
125 1546 230 390
GDEFx.HDNBx Government followed by
household only
409 600 398 682
HDNBA Household initiated 21096 22595 23876 23106
HDNBx Household only 19882 21244 21949 21661
HDNBx.GDEFx Household then followed by
Government
1115 1230 1714 1295
HDNBx.HD~GD Household followed by
both government and
Household
99 121 213 150
Table 7.2: Frequency of event sequences under the no bailout (NOB) strategy of default to debt
limit (first left), the strategy of affordable level of debt after default (second), strategy of lowest
level of debt after default (third) and right column is the target level/agreed strategy.
As expected, the changes are in the government default sequences and any spillovers are due
to the government debt sequences such as in household default followed by a later govern-
ment default (HDNBx.GDEFx). An interesting point to note is that government defaulting to
an affordable level of debt reduces significantly the number of government default sequences
(GEDFx), nevertheless, increases the chance that a government default will induce a household
default (GDEFx.GDHDx).
Turning to the always bail out strategy where we record the frequencies in Table 7.4. As
we observe a marked increase in the total number of event sequences for the affordable de-
fault strategy. Moreover, a significant part of this increase derives from government defaults
(GDEFx, as a part of the summary GDEFA), which is in stark contrast to that of the no bailout
strategy. There is also an increase in the number of all bailouts, successful (BAILS) and un-
successful (BAILF, BFHDA) that we would expect would align with HDNBA above in counts
however, affordable is slightly elevated as a result of a bailout strategy. There is some inter-
action between these two strategies of bailing out and the public debt default. Some of this
frequency may be put down to event sequences being shorter for those strategies generating
4With a NDL strategy we would expect that a sequence of events might go GDEFx, GDEFx, GDEFx....... end,
compared with a lowest being GDEFx then ending the sequence.
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lower public debt outcomes after default such as affordable and lowest over those of target 2/3
and natural debt limit.








ALLxx All defaults 28034 37491 30704 32696
BAILA All bailouts (good or bad) 21034 23794 22573 23059
BAILF Failed Bailouts on first
attempt
1111 1737 1242 1310
BAILS Successful Bailouts 19923 22057 21331 21749
BAILx.BFHDx Bailout followed by failed
bailout
34 58 42 43
BAILx.GDEFx Bailout followed by Govt
default
1077 1679 1200 1267
BFHDA All non first attempt
bailouts
123 249 144 182
GDEFA All government initiated 6877 13448 7987 9455
GDEFx Government only 6329 12819 5788 8352
GDEFx.GDHDx 120 225 1566 405
Table 7.4: Frequency of event sequences under the foundation (baseline) scenario (WITH ALWAYS
BAIL OUT) strategy of default to debt limit (first left), the strategy of affordable level of debt after
default (second), strategy of lowest level of debt after default (thrid) and right column is the target
level/agreed strategy. Note some rows omitted for brevity.
This leads us to look at the distribution of durations of government event sequences which we
illustrate as distributions of durations for each one of the default strategies (NDL, Affordable,
Lowest,Target) in Figure 7.4. Our assertion that the duration of government defaults (GDEFA)
is much longer when the target debt level is high (default to NDL, default to 2/3 target) when
we compare with the lowest level of debt target. One interesting aspect is that defaulting to
a target level of 2/3 NDL provides, on average, has shorter default sequence lengths than
default to to affordable level of debt. One aspect is potentially interaction between the fiscal
rule responding to the immediate change in debts, that then drives tax revenue down and
government expenditures up potentially creating a follow on crisis within a couple of periods.
We should be able to observe this effect in the time-path analysis below. Likewise, the fre-
quency of defaulting to the lowest level of debt strategy would have the same effect. As it
starts at near zero level of debt, the fiscal rule response would still drive down tax revenue
and increase expenditures that increasing debt quickly but not to crisis level within what the
heuristic analyser determines as being an associated initial event. This draws us to a very
specific issue: what is a reasonable period between events that would make those events inde-
pendent? Increasing the parameter that determines the gap would possibly result in what are
independent event sequences being coded into one event sequence, hiding valuable informa-
tion. Nevertheless, shortening the independence gap may create a increase in the frequency
of particular event sequences or other event sequences that relate to the originating sequences.
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We use four periods (approximating to one year) as the maximum gap between events for the
events to be associate into a sequence as a reasonable balance between repetitious sequences
and creating spurious associations and sequences.
We therefore have two extremes that have significantly different outcomes on how long the eco-
nomy is in sanctions imposed by foreign investors. Defaulting to the NDL keeps government
in default for a long period of time whereas the alternative of defaulting to the lowest level of
debt and returning to good standing quickly. Although defaulting to an affordable level does
mitigate the effects of a NDL default by shortening the duration of the event sequence, nev-
ertheless, surprisingly the target 2/3 debt default gives a better outcome for the economy and



























Govt followed by other default
(a) Foundation scenario - No bailout and






























Govt followed by other default
(b) Foundation scenario changing to default


























Govt followed by other default
(c) Foundation scenario changing to default to


























Govt followed by other default
(d) Foundation scenario changing to default
to a target level 2/3 of the NDL, , Govern-
ment defaulting sequence
Figure 7.4: Distribution of the number of time periods in an event sequence
for Government initiated defaults
7.3.2 Time Paths - Default to NDL
Full analysis of default to debt limit is in Chapter 3 and draw on that here with the main time-
path illustration for government initiated defaults Figure 7.5. Key key feature that reinforces
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the conclusions drawn above is the persistence of public debt dGand the degree that haircut-
ting goes on during the event sequence tail. Every haircut, the foreign investor is loosing out
and likewise the economy is being constrained by the imposition of sanctions. Until the tax
revenues increase and expenditures decrease though the fiscal rule ψ then the government will
continue to default on public debt as it does not have sufficient primary surplus to service the
debt at the NDL. We use this foundation as the baseline.
















































































































Figure 7.5: GDEFA - Government initiated default - Default to the Natural Debt limit
7.3.3 Time Paths - Default to Affordable Level
In contrast the the defaulting to the NDL (see Figure 7.6), defaulting to an affordable level of
debt reduces the debt burden immediately, however, a further defaults can occur less frequently
in subsequent periods. The important aspect is on the household, although the private sector
haircutting hcHseems to indicate a problem it is restricted to a small number of cases and not
significant. Private debt, tradable consumption increase in tradable income as sanctions are
only applied when the government defaults. The important aspect of the strategy is to avoid
defaulting again after the initial crisis event. Our policy setting attempts to find the sustainable
level of debt, however, it seems that it is still to high and the response to low levels of debt by the
fiscal policy rule creates a situation where the primary deficit increases when the public debt is
just about affordable. In such a circumstance with the fiscal policy rule set up in the foundation
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scenario then possibly setting the debt below the maximum affordable would provide for a
better outcome and meet the strategy objectives.


















































































































Figure 7.6: GDEFA - All events starting with a government default when Default to Afford-
able Level
7.3.4 Time Path for Default to Lowest Level of Debt
This strategy is the opposite to that of foundation, default to NDL. We illustrate the time paths
of government initiated defaults in Figure 7.7 and this shows significant instability in the eco-
nomy immediately after the crisis event. Observing dGone observes the crisis and default at
t = 0 followed by a rapid increase in the government debt over the next seven periods to
the next peak driven largely by the significant primary deficit ΓGthat immediately follows the
crisis. The fiscal policy rule responds to the drop in debt pro-cyclically and this decreases the
tax revenues by decreasing tax rates, With social transfers in the tradables sector, there is an
increase in tradable consumption cTafter the crisis. This causes the price pTto fluctuate that
translates into domestic real wages. At the same point, labour increases in response to wages
and domestic demand from government and to offset the rapid decline in domestic social trans-
fers5.
5We can make this statement as tradable social transfers follow the same path as government expenditure in the
EXP fiscal ideology, hence, domestic social transfers must decline more if overall social transfers decline immedi-
ately after the crisis.
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Even with the 15 period time window post crisis, we see a gradual return to stability; how-
ever, the pattern indicates further short term cycles. A point to note is that as we conjectured
above when inspecting the frequencies and duration, defaulting to the lowest debt level puts
off the next crisis event beyond that of our heuristic analyser boundary. Noteworthy is that
the initial haircut by the government is significant and much greater than the combined im-
pact of any other defaulting strategy. The only strategy that comes close is defaulting the the
debt limit where the persistence accumulates successive haircuts that could be comparable to
that of defaulting to the lowest level. We contend that both government and foreign investor
would enter into negotiations rather than see the extremes of default with the potential for
large losses and instability. Politically, the instability could cause civil instability especially if it
causes a widening of inequality.

















































































































Figure 7.7: GDEFA - All events starting with a government default for defaulting to the
lowest level of debt
7.3.5 Time Path - Default to Target 2/3 Debt
Our final strategy for consideration is defaulting to the 2/3 debt level after potentially a short
negotiation (see Figure 7.8). This reduces the debt level below that of the NDL however, it is
likely to be higher than that deriving from the affordable develop level strategy. A key point to
note is that public debt dGdefault reduces debt sufficiently that any follow on default are very
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much smaller than those of a default to NDL. Furthermore, the small reduction in debt does
little to change the fiscal policy rule that affects tax revenues and expenditures, therefore able
to generate a primary surplus that limits the necessity to borrow immediately after a crisis.
Although the haircut is comparatively small to those of affordable and lowest level strategies,
it is sufficient to stop public debt being trapped in the NDL post crash defaulting sequence and
it is sufficient to prevent the fiscal rule creating another crisis. Another aspect to consider with
this moderate haircut is that of economic stability in labour-wage and tradable and domestic
consumption and output. We do not observe the effect of the NDL and its repetitious defaulting
causing the imposition of sanctions, nor that of defaulting to lowest level with a fiscal policy
potentially creating instability. This implies that somewhere between NDL and defaulting to
the lowest level is an optimal defaulting strategy for the government taking into account both
fiscal rule and ideology settings.















































































































Figure 7.8: GDEFA - All events starting with a government default where default is to a
target level
7.3.6 Time Path Comparisons
In 7.9 we compare the core variables for each one of the strategies, side by side. From the top,
the stochastic process yTsets the levels for ỹTwith the only other influencing factor being the
loss function with the imposition of sanctions. All show the same trend of recovery, however,
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the variations are from the effect sanctions imposition. For example, the default to NDL has
repeated haircuts with the imposition of sanctions that attenuate tradable income until there is
sufficient recovery in the primary surplus ΓGas government implements a limited set of aus-
terity measures on Government expenditures and social transfers in the tradable sector. This
is in somewhat contrast to that of defaulting to affordable and the target default where after
the initial crisis, there may be some follow on events that cause the imposition of sanctions (the
ripples in ỹT indicate successive sanctions impositions) albeit short lived by comparison. As a
result, the economy grows quicker from those two strategies than the foundation defaulting to
NDL.
One interesting aspect is that defaulting to the lowest level causes a double dip recession in both
the tradable and domestic sectors. The wide fluctuations is fiscal policy though the feedback
mechanism of the fiscal policy rule implements expansionary measures in the tradables sectors
and with the expansion of domestic government expenditures, the residual domestic social
transfers sN declines markedly. An explanation is that this is part of the government budget
constraint in the domestic sector where the revenues from taxation must be in balance with
the government expenditures and social transfers. This specification, social transfers carry the
residual, nevertheless, government expenditure could carry the residual and social transfers
set algorithmically. For example, unconstrained social transfers is a function of the tax rates for
consumption and income, and government expenditure that are modified by the fiscal policy
rule (7.25). Likewise, constraining social transfers swaps government expenditures for social













The important part of defaulting to debt limit is that the reduction in tax revenues and increase
in expenditures in the tradables sector creates a persistent primary deficit ΓGand as such causes
public debt to increase that induces a government response in increasing tax rates and reducing
expenditures that then causes another recession 5 periods out from the original crisis. Whether
that recession causes another public debt default or not rather depends on the level of tradable
income yT. Moreover, such contractionary actions by the government force households to de-
leverage at the time of the recession, Deleveraging causes a mini-dip in consumption and has
a moderating effect on consumption in the longer run.
For interest and comparison, it worth inspecting if there are any interactions between no bailout
and bailout. We maintain the same fiscal policy rule and ideology parameters, only changing to
always bail out. In all four scenarios, the main difference is in public debt defaulting to lowest
level (HCLL) tradable consumption, labour-wage and private debt paths. Note at period t = 5
post crisis event, the household receives a bailout sTindicating that in the no bailout situation,
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Figure 7.9: Comparison of scenarios in a Government default sequence. From
left to right: Haircut to debt limit (HCDL), Haircut to the lowest level of debt
(HCLL), Haircut to an affordable level using the primary surplus as a basis
(HCPS) and Haircut to a target of 2/3 NDL (HC23)
private debt default occurs in some of the sequences. This smooths out consumption, labour-
wage and non-tradable income. We can conclude that the instability is partially addressed by
government bailing out the household. As this is five periods after the crisis and there are
likely no conjoining events in between, this means that this default event is separate from the
public debt default event in the analysis tool. We can conclude that some of the bailout (BAILA,
BAILS, BAILx in Table 7.4) or bailout refused events (HDNBA in Table 7.2) in this scenario are
likely to have some association with the earlier government default event. This implies that
(BAILA and HDNBA) are artificially high and that government default event sequences are,
in some cases, longer than implied by (7.4c).
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Figure 7.10: Comparison of scenarios for bailout with public debt defaulting
strategies of default to the NDL, default to the lowest level of debt default to
an affordable level of debt and default to a negotiated target level of debt.
7.4 Conclusion
We introduce a unique analysis to our foundation model with government strategies to handle
public debt default. We model the extremes, namely defaulting to the natural debt limit and
to the lowest level of debt, as well as two cases that seem more relevant to real world circum-
stances. The norm in most of the literature is a default to the lowest level of debt. We contend
that this is rare for two main reasons. First, the public debt portfolio normally has a range of
durations and expiration dates; not all debt expires at the same time. Default occurs when the
government does not have sufficient resources, either as a primary surplus or as revenue from
new debt issuance, to repay the current debt. Hence they will haircut some of the outstanding
debt that is due at that time. Second, many defaults have a strategic element to them. The
Foreign investor may be forced to into negotiation to accept a larger haircut in the face of gov-
ernment defaulting on all debt. The threat implies that some level between the NDL and lowest
level of debt is more appropriate as a means of reflecting a settlement. Hence we introduce two
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additional default levels of debt: first to an affordable level, second to a negotiated level.
What becomes apparent is that the defaulting to the natural debt limit, although may limit the
haircut in the short run; in the long run, the losses for the foreign investor are very significant.
The impact of sanctions on the economy are a factor to consider, as repeated defaults cause
similar sanction events until the economy eventually generates sufficient primary surplus to
service the debt. This is a common sequence where countries repeatedly default until some
the implementation of corrective measure, normally some form of austerity programme. The
other extreme, defaulting to the debt limit may give the economy respite from sanctions; how-
ever, it has the potential to lead to instability across both tradable and non-tradable sector, and
eventually lead to a private sector default and a double dip recession. Again, what seems to
have merit to the country may, in the long run, make the country worse off in both stability and
successive cyclical recessions.
This leaves us with with considering two strategies that sit somewhere between. One would
expect that defaulting to an affordable level using current primary surplus would render a bet-
ter outcome that the two extremes. However, we find that this strategy does not necessarily
resolve the problem and may create short period defaulting cycles until sufficient primary sur-
plus. Maybe there is a point lower than our algorithms identify that would provide a better
outcome. One advantage over default to the lowest level is that is it more stable in both gov-
ernment and household finances; nevertheless, it is less stable than defaulting to the debt limit.
One advantage is that sanctions are only intermittently applied to the economy and allow a
much more speedy recovery than either of the extremes.
Finally, defaulting to a negotiated level of debt, in this case 2/3 NDL. This keeps debt high,
however, not to the level where repeated defaulting occurs as in the NDL scenario. The fiscal
policy rule ensures that the primary surplus is ramped up much as in the affordable to cover
the debt service costs. This implies there is a optimal level of debt to haircut to taking into
account the policy rule settings and parameters with the state of tradable income. Of course,
the closer a negotiated agreement is to the extremes, the more that it will behave like those
extremes.
An important aspect is the role of fiscal policy rule and how much it is influenced by debt. As
we observe in Chapter 5, fiscal policy rule can turn a fiscal ideology that is progressive tax and
social transfers regime into a austerity policy if one makes the focus about debt. Increasingly,
governments, at the behest of much academic research, have focused on public debt. Fur-
thermore, NGO’s such as the IMF, World Bank and the EU commission have imposed severe
austerity measures on countries heading towards or are in default. Originally, the Paris Club
was purely to minimise the losses to foreign investors, this over the last 30 years has taken a
much more progressive approach noting that severe austerity measure have a disproportion-
ate impact on the most vulnerable sectors of society. Such effects can lead to socio-political
instability that actually works against the foreign investor. What we show is that rather than
taking a hard line, government and foreign investor are better to negotiate a pathway out of
crisis, taking on the losses whilst maintaining economic, therefore socio-political stability. Un-
fortunately, modelling something that is akin to affordable, acceptable given a set of policy
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parameters and economic circumstance could only be done on a case by case basis. However,




Labour, Wage, Exchange Rate and Fiscal
Realisation
8.1 Introduction
To this point, we have only considered flexible wages, floating exchange rates and a moderately
expansionary fiscal policy in all of the previous scenarios. This chapter explores downward
wage rigidity with fixed exchange rates starting with the ideas in in Na et al. (2014) and it
follows with some preliminary work on looking at how fiscal policy rule is realised into tax
rates and government expenditures. Again, we are basing this on the Foundation scenario only
changing the wager for fiscal realisation settings, all other parameters and strategies remain the
same.
We create some new scenarios to explore the effects on government, employment, wages and
consumption. The presentation of this chapter follows in similar lines to prior chapters in
comparing frequency, duration and time-paths of default sequences. In the first part of this
chapter, we consider the flexible and a downward wage rigidity with fixed exchange rates and
in the second part is more of a thought experiment to conduct testing different fiscal ideologies
in the context of foundation scenario.
8.2 Wage Flexibility, Labour and Effective Demand
The foundation flexible wages principle implies that labour will accept any wage to remain
employed, thus the level of wages adjusts rather than labour. Therefore firms maintain the
same level of output by reducing the price of output with a commensurate adjustment in the
labour wage. Social transfers and non-lump sum taxation do have a distortionary affect on
both labour and consumption. In the current model, what government does not expend from
taxation on domestic goods, is returned in social transfers. Therefore the only distortionary af-
fect is the level of output and any differences in the taxation rates for consumption and labour.
Following this classical view that real wages are self adjusting maintaining a near practical
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full employment or that there is some friction that lessens the effects of a perfect competition
thus creating unemployment. We introduce into the foundation model an extension that makes
nominal wages have a downwards rigidity following the ideas set out in Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe (2016a)1. Another aspect to consider is the price of non-tradables and tradables in the
context of a variable exchange rate effects on wage. We note from the foundation scenario ana-
lysis in Chapter 3 that exchange rates can adjust to the economy therefore, real wages follow
price that follows the differential between tradable and domestic consumption. By removing
nominal wage reductions and fixing the exchange rate then we should observe the effects of
crises in changes in employment rather than though the wage mechanism. This implies that
workers prefer unemployment over a real wage reduction juxtaposed to firms releasing la-
bour because of insufficient demand for their output. Its worth investigating this contradiction
between classical economic modelling in an RBC environment and that of observed employ-
ment norms.
Back to the motivation of downward wage rigidities (DWR), namely, trying to induce some
form of change in employment labour hours rather than changes in wage rates. There is some
empirical and theoretical support for some form of wage compression causing unemployment
as Barattieri, Basu and Gottschalk (2014) and Elsby (2009) illustrate Many developed econom-
ies have a lower bound to legal wage rates including a minimum wage and unemployment
supplements. Furthermore, Keynes argues in Keynes (1936) that‘nominal wages display down-
ward rigidity, that is workers are reluctant to accept cuts in nominal wages’.
The literature’s suggestion that DWR and minimum wage have a significant bearing on un-
employment inducing behaviour, particularly in a crisis or recession. Since the 1980’s, there
is consistent political pressure to reduce the minimum wage in real terms, particularly in the
US and the UK in the name of labour market flexibility. These is a supply side argument sug-
gesting that workers rather take unemployment than a pay cut. This neglects labour market
conditions, that is if there market is buoyant then workers are less likely to entertain employer’s
reductions in pay whereas a market characterised by mass unemployment list likely to accept
nominal pay cuts especially if there is little in the way of unemployment supplements (Shapiro
and Stiglitz, 1984). Again, this does not necessarily explain how DWR logically induces un-
employment. Normatively, firms suffering a downturn in demand for their goods will employ
a number of strategies to reduce the cost of labour whilst retaining engagement at equivalent
wage rates. This includes no overtime, short time working, recruitment freezes before employ-
ers consider voluntary redundancies, early retirement and finally, compulsory redundancies.
Of course, the nature of the workplace has transformed with the sensualisation of labour that
could be more akin to a rigidity in both directions. We would argue that Keynes postulate that
only when near full employment will labour be unwilling to accept lower wages has merit as
uncertainty of income drives household behaviour.
Another aspect to consider on using wages flexibility to maintain employment is that if gov-
ernments need to provide additional services and subsidies to households for low wage indi-
1Rather than repeat the the comprehensive analysis in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2016a) regarding wage, labour
and unemployment, we refer readers to that article for the theory and analysis. Our focus is more on debt and if a
wage rigidity has a material impact on public or private debt.
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viduals, is that not just an indirect subsidisation of the firms that offer low wages? As Ricardo
stated, workers will work for a subsistence level of wages and not below, setting a lower bound
for wage income. Ideally, the minimum wage needs to be at least above that of subsistence
levels which in economic terms would place those wages above the marginal product. Further-
more, imports, goods in particular, from low wage & cost economies could effectively create
unemployment making domestic industries non-viable. This may reduce the price of imported
goods and provide access to goods that were out of reach for the many, however at what cost?
This combination of below subsistence wage income, government subsidies, lack income se-
curity with cheap imports does not provide for a stable socio-political system that can sustain
the impacts of a crises.
One aspect of labour economic thinking in this style of model is that labour skills and other
factors remain largely constant regardless of their employment status. Unfortunately, unem-
ployment has a significant impact on current skills, continuing skills development, workplace
know-how that effectively depreciates the value of the labour force, particularly in certain pro-
fessions (Ortego-Marti, 2017; Pavoni, 2009). Furthermore, The psychological impacts on both
individuals and communities cannot be overstated regarding unemployment that are often
neglected by economists.
There is always going to be a Schumpeterian creative destruction process that will require the
workforce to change, reskill and adapt to new working environments, however, this affects
lower income households and communities are particularly in times of crisis (Kapuvari, 2011)
leading to a breakdown in civil society and distortions in the political system (Chambers and
Kopstein, 2001). The nature of unemployment and its effects on skills, work ethic, not only
reduces the income levels for those out of work, the psychological impacts can create intergen-
erational disillusionment and scaring (Arulampalam, Gregg and Gregory, 2008). This in turn
has a dramatic effect on the labour force’s resilience to crises and ability to adapt to changing
circumstances. Clear examples exist in the Rust Belt of the United States, the South Wales and
Yorkshire Coalfields, UK Midlands manufacturing where industry’s demise was hastened by a
combination of Schumpeterian creative destruction, repeated crises and failures of successive
governments to address the societal impacts. Unfortunately, these feedback loops do not mix
well with tradition of utility functions, equilibrium or parsimonious models, rather that they fit
into the realm of stock flow consistent and/or agent based models where their may be multiple
local equilibria.
As we observe in the 2020 Crisis, government policy across Europe and Australasia is to keep
employees attached to their work and to provide sufficient wage supplements to ensure that
they can meet their base level of essential consumption and for firms to effectively hibernate
during the worst times. Although those workers on furlough are effectively unemployed or
under-employed, they remain connected to their employer. This means that firms have access
to their trained labour force when and if they need them and removes some uncertainty from
the employee. Albeit, some will not return as a result of the crisis either voluntary or involun-
tarily.
This is in stark contrast to that of the US where lay-offs are reaching record levels and the
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possibility for a firm to re-engage its trained workforce easily is somewhat compromised2.
Although there is some extensions to unemployment assistance, although time-limited, there is
a significant part of population that has not met its basic housing and well-being needs. In both
cases, one can foresee significant company restructuring creating long term unemployment
that has not been seen in places like the UK since the 1970’s and 80’s. Households are likely to
be reluctant to spend on less essential items with an environment of uncertainty about future
income streams. So is it labour supply at a price is the issue or is it firms having to address the
lack of demand for their output?
If we continue with the tract in the Neoclassical style ideology then we can turn to Ohanian
(2010) to explore the the adverse impact on labour when comparing it to capital. This paper
notes that the 2008 crisis had a significant and real impact on labour input, however not the
same impact on capital returns. The issue with this article is that it fails to understand the
flow of credit compared to the stock of private debt. De-leveraging, that is a negative flow of
credit, means that the private sector firms and households have to produce sufficient surplus to
fund repayment of stock of debt and the interest accruals. This materially impacts household
consumption that affects firm’s revenue stream. A contracting revenue stream leads firms to
divest labour as we describe above. Furthermore, in debt markets, it is the volume of trade mat-
ters, when trust is eroded, then trade freezes and the normal flow of liquidity that ‘lubricates’
operations at both a financial institution and at corporate level.
A significant part of regular liquidity drain on firms is labour wages that have to be paid reg-
ularly, therefore firms, without support such as the furlough schemes of the 2020, will release
labour to prevent liquidity insolvency. The government’s actions are to create stability in the
liquid debt markets by effectively underwriting corporate and financial institution debt. These
only address the supply side issues, not demand for output. This is a fundamental ideological
difference between this example neoclassical analysis and that of a effective demand model.
To this point, we have entertained Say’s law, where as Keynes said ‘Demand will meet Supply’
(Keynes, 1936) that he rejected, particularly in a crisis. Moreover, he suggests that there are
at least two equilibria at extremes in an economy, at one end of the spectrum, being the full
employment state, the other end the subsistence state. The upper near full employment state
is subject to events that could result in the economy declining into the subsistence state, hence,
we can deduce from Keynes and Kalecki more insightful analysis that the near full employ-
ment state is less stable than the subsistence state. This leads us to the idea of the entrapment
of the economy in the subsistence state is somewhat parallels that of the 1929 to 1933 US Great
Depression, something that Keynes himself drew and reflected in Skidelsky (2018). The core
difference between the Say’s law and Effective demand is Say’s uses prices (goods and labour)
to adjust to supply whereas Effective demand uses investment and the motivation to invest by
as the adjustment mechanism that determines labour and real labour wage (Dalziel and Lavoie,
2003). If demand is deficient then, there is an over supply in the economy and nominal prices
may experience a deflationary spiral. Hence, firms will divest from labour first and then cap-
2There are a number of other issues with disengaging the workforce in the US in that many of the health and
well-being services are tied to employment
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ital.3The reduction in labour reduces aggregate labour income that in turn reduces demand for
goods. Any reduction in aggregate labour income, particularly on the lower income brackets,
is likely to reduce effective AD, leading to a lower, possibly subsistence, equilibrium. The para-
dox of thrift for firms trying to maintain profits implies also that the labour share of income will
also reduce. Hence we have another effect, that being a widening wealth gap between waged
labour and capital investors. This leads us to the discussion in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 re-
garding government intervention and creating effective demand though household using bail
outs. As in Arulampalam, Gregg and Gregory (2008), continuing unemployment has a long
term effect on the productivity of labour. We could draw that a low wage environment would
also have a similar effect.
During the past 20 years, many European (Excluding Germany) and the US have seen a stag-
nation in labour productivity and real wages whilst there is a steady increase in private debt
to fund consumption. Most of the lower socio-economic deciles have little in the way of in-
surance though saving and are reliant on labour wage to sustain them. One could conjecture
that post 2008 crisis, the UK and US economies never fully recovered and are sitting at some
lower nearer to subsistence level. Only time will tell if the 2020 crisis will lead to another lower
equilibrium level. Already, firms are indicating that they are likely to lay off workers once
government interventions tail off.
One aspect that erodes the consumer’s power to demand is the inflationary effects on nominal
wages as well as any employer driven wage reduction. In our model, a rise in prices effect-
ively depreciates the domestic currency causing the corrections that we have already seen in
the foundation model. We shall explore if a nominal wage rigidity has any impact on the de-
flationary and inflationary effects of a crisis. This model is somewhat limited in its ability to
simulate a crisis event that has multiple equilibria, however, by using a combination of fiscal
policy rule and fiscal realisation that we discuss in the next part of this chapter does provide
some similarities to a multiple equilibria unstable environment.
8.2.1 Changes to the Model and Foundation Scenario Operation
We take the foundation scenario in Chapter 3 and extend it with an additional constraints on
wages and exchange rates. This is equivalent to pegging the domestic currency to a the inter-
national currency that we observe in many countries round the world. Commonly, either the
government has a policy of pegging or there is a de facto pegging in that much of the domestic
trade is in the international currency. We often observe this in countries where the domestic
currency does not show stability, perceived to be over valued or an extended period of infla-
tion. Moreover, countries such as many of the southern European bloc that are members of
the EU and the EURO currency experience that their domestic goods experience significant
price fluctuations as they cannot use one weapon in the monetary armoury, namely, depreci-
ation of domestic currency. Post 2008 financial crisis we note in most of the southern European
3Labour has a flow cost to the firm whereas capital can effectively be mothballed and largely only the fix rate
of depreciation will have an impact. Furthermore if the economy is experiencing a downturn then the demand
for capital goods including land and buildings will diminish. We observe this on a regional basis in all developed
countries.
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countries as significant progressive decline in real wages mixed with an imposed austerity pro-
gramme to address what is deemed as excessive government primary deficits and rising public
debt.
The two aspects are: a downward nominal wage rigidity and fixed exchange rates. Here, we
will only show the differences in the model specification. Please refer to Chapter 3 for the
details of the full model. We start with prices and inflation. The gross inflation rate is the ratio












As a result, firms make nominal profits derive from the revenue from production less the labour
wage cost thus:
εtΠt = PNt y
N
t −Wtht
However, although labour supply is flexible, wages are not. Firms experience a downward
nominal wage rigidity where households will only supply labour if nominal wage rates are
maintained near or above the previous period’s rate. This characteristic is prevalent in many
developed and developing economies (USG and others) where wage inflation is unlimited,
however households see wage deflation as negative and rather not have the income. therefore:
Wt ≥ γwWt−1 (8.2)
Again, normalising into tradable prices wt/εt ≥ γwwt−1/εt−1 → wt ≥ γwwt−1/εt. Firm profits are
subject to the wage wage deflation constraint. Note that real wages in foreign terms may fall
much more as inflation reduces the value of the domestic currency.





However, if the exchange rate is hard pegged then εt = ε ∀ t hence, εt = 1 therefore from 8.4
we have that real wages are downward rigid:
wt ≥ γwwt−1
The combination of a hard peg and a downward wage rigidity should alter the dynamics of
both a private debt crisis, and that of a public debt crisis. We will consider four scenarios,
namely the foundation with flexible wages (See Chapter 3) contrasting the same settings with
a wage rigidity. Both these scenarios are no bail out policy response to a private debt crisis,
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therefore it is important to consider a bail out situation as well. We have a baseline bailout
(foundation model with a bailout policy response) and bailout with a wage rigidity/pegged
exchange rates.
8.2.2 Simulation Results
We will assume that the reader is now familiar with the foundation scenario time paths that
form the baseline for the no bailout, flexible wage and wage rigidity comparison and only
include them in the cross scenario comparisons. Below in Table 8.2 shows the frequencies as
an account for the scenarios under consideration in this chapter. Comparing the foundation
(the left column) with the introduction of a wage rigidity (second left) we note a marked de-
crease in the total number of event sequences (ALLxx) by 25% that particularly translates into
a near 50% decrease in government initiated default sequences (GDEFA) and a smaller reduc-
tion in the household defaults (HDNBA). An interesting point is that wage rigidity creates
a situation were initially a household default leads to a household and government default
(HDNBx.HDGDx) as well making up 30% of the total default sequences.












ALLxx all events 27734 20999 28034 27964
BAILA All bailout good or bad 0 0 21034 20979
BAILF First attempt failed bailouts 0 0 1111 1107
BAILS Successful bailout 0 0 19923 19872
BAILx.GDEFx Bailout followed by Government
default
0 0 1077 1073
GDEFA All government defaults 6638 3733 6877 6863
HDNBA Household default, no bailout 21096 17266 0 0
HDNBx.GDEFx Household default followed by
government default
1115 715 0 0
HDNBx.HDGDx Household default followed by
household and government default
0 5596 0 0
Table 8.2: Event sequence Frequencies the flexible and wage rigidity with a policies of no bailout and
bailout
The important aspect here is the private sector crisis turns into a private and public sector crisis
in that sequence. If we compare this with the bailout scenarios (the two right hand columns)
we can see that the government bailing out the private sector prevents such a sequence de-
veloping4 when there is a wage rigidity/pegged fx. Although government defaults less on its
own with a wage rigidity that any other scenario under consideration, if the private sector gets
4if the same sequenced was to occur under bailout then we should see the BAILx followed by a combined
government and household default, that is HDGDx or BFGDx depending on the sequence.
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into trouble then choosing not to act creates a greater chance that it will induce a public sector
default as well. We can liken this to the Greece situation during 2010 to 2012/4 where the a
private sector crisis eventually lend to a public sector crisis. One aspect that is different, Greece
was effectively forced to bailout its financial system and then impose austerity measures as a
result of debt. With regard to frequency under bailout, wage rigidity seems to have no signi-
ficant impact on the frequency or distribution of event sequence classifications, therefore we
draw that bailout does in some way mitigate the effects of a wage rigidity and a pegged fx.
Next is to move to looking at the durations of public and private sector initiated crises.
8.2.2.1 Wage Rigidity With No Bailout
Although the frequency of public sector defaults decreases under a wage rigidity, the distribu-
tion of event duration is similar, as we illustrate in Figure 8.1. As we have discussed before,
the effect of defaulting to the debt limit increases the length of the crisis. Nevertheless, when
it comes to a private sector crisis, we have a significantly different outcome. A flexible wage
regime tends to keep the private sector defaults short as we illustrate in Figure 8.1a, whereas
the wage rigidity and pegged exchange rate increases the duration and the likelihood of a
long duration markedly, as we illustrate in Figure 8.1b. What this implies is that the domestic
economy’s inability to adjust affects the tradable side of the economy making the crisis much
worse. We should observe this effect in the time-paths for a private sector crisis (HDNBA).




















(a) Flexible wage, floating exchange rates
with no bailout
















(b) Wage rigidity, no bailout
Figure 8.1: Flexible and a wage rigidity effect on the duration of all defaults
In analysing the time-paths, lets consider a public sector default first, as we illustrate in Fig-
ure 8.2. The graphs indicate that there is a long run into the default sequence where the tradable
income stochastic process has suppressed the economy for some time before. This we show
with the increasing levels of government debt dG and a primary deficit. Note the particular
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‘hockey stick’ shape of the the interest rate rG. As we have already discussed, there is a tip-
ping point in government debt where the almost certain outcome is default. Only if there was
a rapid increase in a primary surplus could the government reverse the situation. Moreover,
private debt dHis at a low level indicating that households have been deleveraging prior to the
event and suppressing tradable consumption. The effect is that households tend to then work
more to make up for the lack of consumption, that is h is increasing. However, real wages w are
being suppressed and the decline in price differential p tradable and domestic goods indicating
inflationary pressures in the domestic market5
The increasing utility, except for the crisis point, derives from domestic consumption. Part of
the domestic consumption is funded though increasing levels of social transfers sN . Note that
in this fiscal realisation, tradable social transfers are declining following the path of govern-
ment expenditures g. Therefore government policy is in-part creating the additional domestic
consumption, hence improving the standing of households. One aspect of the wage rigidity is
that government debt remains in default for much longer than the equivalent foundation scen-
ario. Governments are effectively trapped and need to increase the primary surplus ΓGthough
reducing tradable government expenditures sT, gT and increase the tax rates following the path
of the fiscal rule ψ.
So does this seem to match a public sector crisis. If one inspects the charts in Schmitt-Grohé
and Uribe (2016a) and Na et al. (2014) for Greece, Argentina the it follows many of the variables
time-paths for a public sector default6. One aspect of this is that Greece in the 2012-4 crisis
experiences follow very much these paths. Note that Greece had first a private sector crisis in
2010, bailed out the banking sector at the ‘instruction’ of ECB and European Commission7.
Next we consider the private sector default sequences in Figure 8.3 where the household de-
faults with no bailout (HDNBA) as the start of the sequence. At the point of crisis, there is a
marked drop in both tradable and domestic consumption (cTcN) flowing across from the pro-
gressive drop in household tradable income yTprior to the crisis. The imposition of sanctions
has a dramatic effect across all both public and private sectors with government experiencing
an immediate primary deficit ΓG and an escalation in government debt. One aspect of this
default that is quite different to most other scenarios, is that private debt remains near zero
effectively locked out from foreign investment by a combination of high interest and sanctions.
5Price is a function of the ratio between marginal utility of tradable consumption and non-tradable consumption.
if cTis level and cN is upwards sloping the the ratio is reducing and this indicates price differential between tradable
and domestic is reducing though an increase in domestic pricepN .
6These charts are silent on the private sector default, debt levels and interest rates.
7There is much conjecture that the main driver was German Government protecting its own as they many Ger-
man financial institutions had invested heavily in Greek government debt as it was exhibiting higher than average
returns within the EU boundaries. Furthermore, Greece was fairly close to many of the fiscal target and respons-
ibility criteria (Commission, 2015) and the pre financial crisis analysis of debt b the rating agencies was, at best,
poor at worst, criminal. Although the Greek Banks that German banks had invested in seemed to be only moderate
risk, they did not take into account the significant systemic risk in the Greek economy. The Greek government
book keeping and poor tax collection, as well as the grey and black markets that make up a not insignificant part of
the economy leaves the government weak if there is a crisis. The 2008 crisis had amplified the stress on the Greek
economy and government, therefore bailing out the banks had only one real outcome for the Greek public debt un-
der a fixed exchange rate mechanism (the EURO), namely, public sector default. Post default, Austerity measures
imposed by the Troka. saw a net decrease in GDP within 5 years of nearly 25%.
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Figure 8.2: GDEFA - government initiated defaults with a wage rigidity and fixed ex-
change rates and no bailouts
Although domestic consumption improves, like with the above government default, much of
this is funded from social transfers and a decline in domestic government expenditures. The
net effect is a dramatic decline in utility for the household into an almost Keynesian subsistence
state.
The escalating prices of domestic goods does increase output though increasing labour hours
after the crisis event. However, the return to pre-crisis levels is greater than 15 periods, indicat-
ing a slow stagnant economy. This can be liked to many of the south east Asian countries that
we discuss in Chapter 1, where recovery was long and slow. The important difference between
this model with separate public and private debt, and the more traditional mainstream models
is that is clearly illustrates the different dynamics between public and private debt in a crisis. The
core driver to many crises is in the private sector rather than from the government. Moreover,
with the elevation of private sector defaults frequency of leading to a public sector default with
pegged exchange rates and downward rigidity we clearly model a protypical small developing
economy where a quasi sanctions by foreign investors prevent them borrowing in their own
currency and that they have to trade domestically using US Dollars. Although a government
may have a floating currency, the inability to borrow in own currency limits the ability of the
country to respond to a crisis without incurring another form of sanctions, namely Austerity
measures, from NGO’s such as the IMF and World Bank (or in the case of Greece The ECB and
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EU commission) (Blyth, 2013).


















































































































Figure 8.3: HDNBA - household initiated defaults with a wage rigidity and fixed ex-
change rates and no bailouts
8.2.2.2 Wage Rigidity with Bailout from the Government
In our frequency analysis we identify that bailout with a wage rigidity and pegged foreign
exchange has a marked positive effect on governments not getting into a public sector crisis.
This runs counter to many of the theoretical papers with support for this found in Guajardo,
Leigh and Pescatori (2014) that states many papers overstate the expansionary nature of aus-
terity, further Guajardo, Leigh and Pescatori (2014) claims austerity has long term detrimental
effects to both the economy and the people. One may question why the pill of austerity for the
Greek economy post 2012 and the economic and social decline that is likely to be intergener-
ational is any better than attempting to refloat the economy with expansionary measures and
cleaning up the debt with haircuts. One aspect of the US policy post 1945 was to create expan-
sion of crippled economies from WW2 rather than making them pay for the damage caused.
We contend that externally or ideologically imposed austerity is a form of discipline device
on a country or a people. Indirectly foreign investors bail out the private sector by lending to
the government sufficient funds. As we have already discussed, default is not always neces-
sary and renegotiating debt with an expansion may be a better alternative. Therefore with this
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wage rigidity and fx pegging, we can demonstrate the difference between not bailing, effect-
ively government imposing austerity measure on the private sector and bailing out, a form of
expansionary policy.
Here we introduce the scenario of bailout with rigidity showing the marked difference to that
of no bailout that we illustrate in the time path Figure 8.4. The important difference is the
recovery of both tradable and non-tradable consumption immediately after the successful bail-
out event. With that, there is a short period of unemployment h and wages exhibit the same
gradual decline, however to a lesser extent. An interesting point is that with the bailout s̄
private debt is settled and then recovers a little, however not to the prior to crisis levels. In-
terest rates on private debt do not remain a block to households acquiring new debt. Moving
to the government, there is a great deal of similarities in the primary surplus, debt profile and
fiscal policy rule, however, social transfer are affected by the fall in domestic tax revenue then
there is a equivalent fall in domestic transfers. This is a facet of the model, where domestic so-
cial transfers are the residual from government expenditures. With this scenario, utility drops
and recovers quickly when compared with a no-bailout. A side by side comparison of flexible
and wage rigidity in both bailout and non-bailout for a private crises is in Figure 8.5.














































































































Figure 8.4: BAILS - Successful Bailout by government with a wage rigidity and fixed
exchange rates
In the side by side comparison Figure 8.5, the columns to the left of each sub figure are the
foundation (no bailout) and foundation with bailout, and the columns to the right are wage
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rigidity scenarios. Only the foundation scenario has up tick in tradable consumption that af-
fects real wages. One aspect of the rigidity is that the disturbances that occur in real wages
are now transferred into domestic labour, income and consumption. In both bailout and non
bailout, wages are typically higher for a wage rigidity at the start of the sequence, as the down-
ward pressure we see in flexible wages is being constrained. Note also that only the foundation
model is running a primary deficit prior to the crisis; in all other scenarios the primary deficit
is small and insignificant. However, the rigidity imposes quite a significant deficit, not unex-
pected in the case of a bailout, until the fiscal policy rule increases; therefore increasing tax
rates and decreasing government expenditures in response to rising public debt. One aspect
common to the bailout in either flexible or rigid wage regimes is that private debt remains low
post crisis, the deleveraging that occurs is largely from the government subsidy and prevents
the rebounding that we see in consumption for the foundation scenario.
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(a) No Bailout with flexible (left) and wage
rigidity(right)
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(b) Bailout with flexible (left) and wage
rigidity(right)
Figure 8.5: Comparison between no bailout and bailout with flexible and wage rigidity
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8.2.3 Wage Rigidity - Summary and Conclusion
We can observe that the model shows a marked difference between a flexible wage regime and
a wage rigidity with pegged fx when comparing with a bailout. Government bailing out the
private sector has two main implications, first, government is less likely to default as a result of
bailing out when compared to adopting the no-bailout. Second, the economy recovers quickly
and there is no long tail akin to the Keynesian subsistence state. One aspect of a wage rigidity
is that real wages decline and it induces unemployment at the crisis point. Neither bailing out
or not has any real effect on the sudden drop in employment however, bailout does tend to
reduce the impact in the domestic sector. There is a less pronounced decline. From the foreign
investor’s point of view, government bailing out the private sector means that the private sector
deleverages by retiring debt rather than defaulting on it. Therefore, a foreign investor is likely
to support the government in such a move as they reduce their own losses. This argument
and model supports the view that even if a country has a pegged currency or that most of the
business is in a foreign currency, then governments stepping in a resolving the private debt
crisis is a much better outcome for all sectors. Although we have not tested austerity directly,
the foundation model settings in fiscal policy imply that government will increase tax revenues
and decrease expenditures to reduce the primary deficit.
8.3 Fiscal Policy and Realisation
We conduct the next exercise in exploring economic stability and crises with a thought exper-
iment which we realise though our implementation of the model. Normatively, tax rates and
government expenditures in many models are either fixed or a smooth monotonic function of
some government policy monitoring as in Cantore et al. (2017). In the foundation model, we
have a fiscal policy rule that derives from three factors: that of consistency or persistence of
policy, national tradable income, and level of government debt in the form of a Taylor type
rule. Further discussion on this is in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5 where we explore the effects of
changing those fiscal policy parameters on the stability and response to crises. To this point,
we employ what we term a fiscal expansion realisation: tax rates for consumption and income
are linear increasing function the fiscal policy rule, and government expenditures and tradable
social transfers are decreasing functions. We already demonstrate that what could be deemed
as an expansionary policy could easily turned into a austerity policy if one focuses on govern-
ment debt. Therefore, the policy parameters for the fiscal policy rule and the fiscal realisation
are closely bound and need fine tuning to the specific country setting.
Rather than limit ourselves to just one fiscal policy setting, the implementation of the model
allows us to using any function, continuous or not, monotonic or not, step, flat or anything that
can be coded into a grid that gives values for tax rates, government tradable and domestic ex-
penditures and social transfers transfers independently of each other. The consequence of this
flexibility is that it is quite easy to create fiscal ideologies that match government behaviours
much more closely. For example, consumption taxes, normally in the form of a VAT (Europe),
GST (Australia and New Zealand) are applied to a range of goods and services with differential
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rates for those products and services. However, governments are loathed to change the con-
sumption tax rates unless there are extreme circumstances, therefore they tend not to respond
to small incremental policy rule variable changes, rather, the act step wise. For example, the
UK has had VAT at 0%, 5% 7.5%, 10%, 15%, 17.5%, 20% and 25% and is applied selectively at
different rates to different goods8. Likewise New Zealand has had GST at 0%, 7.5%, 10%, 12.5%
and 15%, however it tends to be universally applied to all goods and services except financial
transactions9. If we assume that a basket of consumer goods is likely to remain proportion-
ally quite constant, then the calculation of realisable tax rates for consumption is possible as
D’Erasmo and Mendoza (2016b).
Our current fiscal policy realisation indicate tax rates are increasing in income and public debt,
and social transfers with government expenditures are declining though the fiscal policy rule.
This is a form of automatic stabiliser that acts counter-cyclically to revenue. However, this is
not always the case. The recent UK government announcements in June 2020 and subsequent
announcements show that policy responses may NOT conform to a countercyclical stability
regime; rather, a short term measure to address select sectors in the economy in the face of
mounting public debt levels. Moreover, the worker furlough schemes are countercyclical in
both income and debt; this is a significant ‘bailout’ of the private sector in the face of a crisis.
There are many other examples where government response to a crisis may not be initially
counter-cyclical, therefore relaxing the assumptions that we make in our initial mildly expan-
sionary stability realisation to test out other combinations so as to demonstrate the flexibility
of both the model and its implementation though the scenario mechanisms.
8.3.1 Changes to the Model and Scenario Operation
One aspect of this model is that all of the tax rates, government expenditures and social trans-
fers are coded into grid points in their own tables that relate to the fiscal policy rule. We discuss
how the fiscal policy rule responds to income and public debt accounting for consistency in
Chapter 5. We note already that our policy experiments can turn a mildly expansionary fiscal
realisation into an austerity policy by focusing principally of public debt. Our initial exper-
iment is to have two settings for each tax schedule: government expenditures and tradable
social transfers. Effectively, the second setting of the schedules is the reverse process. For ex-
ample, if τCψ1 = τC1 through to τ
Cψ200 = τC200 in our current policy setting, then the reverse is
τCψ1 = τ
C
200 through to τ
Cψ200 = τC1 . Just by using this provides for 25 different fiscal ideolo-
gies that we can draw into any combination of consumption, income, government expenditures
and social transfers.
For this experiment we chose five representative ideologies that could either stabilise or destabil-
ise the economy. We illustrate the relationship tax and expenditures to the fiscal rule instrument
8As at January 2020, VAT is 0% for most food items, 5% for home fuels/electricity, 20% for all other goods and
services except for financial transactions and second-hand goods. Stamp duty on property is a questionable if it is
a consumption tax
9NZ current rate is 15% on all items including unusually food. This is questionably quite regressive considering
the nature of foodstuffs consumption
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Code Description τC τY gT gN sT Noted Stability
EXP Downturn - Expansionary
policies
Pro Pro cntr cntr cntr Very stable in most cases as
it tends to generate low
levels of government debt
SOC Downturn - Expansionary
policies
Pro Pro Pro Pro cntr Tends to be unstable in
government as there is a
mismatch in tax revenues to
the expenditures.




Pro Pro Pro Pro Pro Tends to generate a level of
instability, very quickly
reaches a tipping point.
AUS Downturn - Increase taxes,
increase expenditures
cntr cntr cntr cntr cntr Again tends to be unstable.
EAU Downturn - Increase tax
and decrease both govt
expenditure and transfers
cntr cntr Pro Pro Pro This causes the government
debt be very unstable.
Table 8.3: Experimental fiscal Realisations. EXP is the foundation realisation. Under The columns
under the fiscal variables τC though to sT indicate the classicality with the fiscal policy rule. This fiscal
policy rule is pro-cyclical in both public debt and tradable income.
for the five policies in table Table 8.3. These combinations provide a wide perspective over the
possible fiscal ideologies currently set up in the model’s implementation. However, further
experimentation may render other stable combinations from this base set of schedules.
The technical implementation means that for every fiscal policy realisation, we need to redo
the policy rules and structured data, as well as recalculate the domestic optimization for both
flexible and wage rigidity. Of course, this work can be paralleled. Once the optimization and
policy rules are set, then use simulations in the way we describe in Chapter 4 to form the basis
for analysis. Additional fiscal ideologies which require different coding for the two experi-
mental schedules per variable are a simple addition and then any combination of realisation
for tax and expenditures can be set up in the configuration data. In this way, many different
policy experiments can be run to contrast and compare outcomes.
8.3.2 Simulation Results
Use the foundation scenario with defaulting to the lowest level of public debt as the basis for
our analysis. Unfortunately, default to the NDL (Natural Debt Limit) creates very unstable
results in some of the scenarios10. Although our analysis of default to different levels indic-
ates that defaulting to the lowest level create some volatility, it does give the opportunity for
the least stable fiscal ideologies to achieve some form of stability. Figure 8.5 provides a break-
down of the five scenarios that cover the different ideologies. Not entirely unexpected, the non
10In a couple of cases, the lack of fiscal stabilisers causes continuous public debt defaulting, trapping the economy
in an unstable state.
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foundational scenarios demonstrate a much higher degree of instability in public debt, namely,
public debt defaults (GDEFA occur an order of magnitude greater than the foundation. An
interesting point here is the effect on private sector debt (NDNBA) in that all of the alternative
ideologies reduce private sector initiated defaults however, increase the possibility of a private
sector default after a public sector default (GDEFx.GDHDx and GDEFx.HDNBx, that is house-
hold and government default, and household default respectively). What seems to happen is
that if either default then it is likely to trigger the other into default. This is particularly appar-
ent in ideologies CON, AUS and EAU. We now look at the time paths for public sector default,
GDEFA Figure 8.7 and private sector default HDNBA Figure 8.6.
Event Default Description EXP SOC CON AUS EAU
ALLxx all events 36815 123340 108200 193090 125550
GDEFA All bailout good or bad 12939 102630 101490 177510 122330
GDEFx First attempt failed bailouts 12311 72979 46696 93244 59532
GDEFx.GDHDx Successful bailout 230 27699 53514 80881 60728
GDEFx.HDNBx Bailout followed by Govt default 398 1948 1283 3384 2071
HDNBA ALl government defaults 23876 20711 6704 15585 3221
HDNBx Household default, no bailout 21949 9082 37 3808 0
HDNBx.GDEFx Household default followed by
government default
1714 9755 514 9748 145
HDNBx.HDGDx Household default followed by
household and government default
0 0 4713 0 1963
HDNBx.HD˜+GD 213 1874 1440 2029 1113
Table 8.5: A comparison of fiscal realisation impact on event sequence frequencies.
Starting with public sector defaults (GDEFA), it becomes immediately apparent that both CON
and EAU are generating cyclical behaviours with a periodicity of 15-18 periods and 6-8 periods
respectively. In some way this is an interaction between the fiscal rule’s possibly over respond-
ing to income and public debt and reflecting that into tax rates and government expenditures.
In the case of EAU, this materially impacts tradable consumption cT with a number of steps
downwards as each cycle affects the household. In both these cases private debt dHcollapse
at the crisis point and do not recover within 15 periods as does labour wage wh. Effectively,
these two scenarios generate a low state in the economy similar to that of what Keynes argues
in Keynes (1936).
As we commented in Chapter 7, part of this instability generating mechanism is the govern-
ment defaulting to the lowest level of debt, this then drives down the fiscal rule instrument.
Both these scenarios share government expenses (sT, gN , gT)which are pro-cyclical with the
fiscal rule instrument. Characteristically, the residual term sN has a counter-cyclical relation-
ship with domestic government expenditure in EAU and a pro-cyclical relationship in CON.
We can explain this though the difference in tax schedules in that CON is pro-cyclical in tax and
EAU is counter-cyclical. In SOC we observe a rippling effect into the domestic labour wage
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Figure 8.6: Household initiated Defaults with no bailout. Comparison of fiscal realisation scenarios
default to the lowest level of public debt (HCLL). From left to right Expansionary, Social, Conservative,
Austerity and Extreme
paralleling that of tradable consumption. This implies that the differential price p between
tradable and non-tradable is transmitting the tradable economy’s fluctuations into the non-
tradable. Note that tradable income yThas a double dip recession and the second recession is
only mitigated by the government increasing tradable social transfers sT in deference to the
domestic transfers. One could conjecture that maybe higher reference tax rates τC and τYin
these cases might provide for greater stability. This we will leave for future experimentation.
Next, to consider a private sector default (HDNBA) in Figure 8.6. In this case, on EAU demon-
strate continuing instability with a periodicity of about seven periods. Effectively, government
is unable to stabilize the primary surplus ΓG generating wide swings in public debt. We do
not observe this with the other fiscal ideological scenarios analysed here. As with Public debt,
CON and EAU experience a a significant deleveraging; however, this is by defaulting and what
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Figure 8.7: Government initiated Defaults with no bailout. Comparison of fiscal realisation scenarios
default to the lowest level of public debt (HCLL). From left to right Expansionary, Social, Conservative,
Austerity and Extreme
follows is a long period of no access to debt. Deeper inspection indicates that the household
is stuck in a low ebb state until the economy yTrecovers sufficiently under sanctions to lift it
out of poverty. One aspect is that CON and EAU consumption remain flat and low without
a peak after default reinforcing the argument that they are stuck in this Keynesian low state.
Even social transfers seem not to lift the economies out of this state indicating that taxation is
having a suppressive effect when combined with sanctions.
8.3.3 Fiscal Realisations - Summary and Conclusion
Although we cover four more scenarios which reflect alternative fiscal ideologies, this is only
a preliminary investigation into how a fiscal policy rule and fiscal realisation can create both
stability and instability. Furthermore, the implementation of the model allows for a number of
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different taxation policies and government expenditure strategies, which are possibly more re-
flective of the real world where governments make step changes to rates and do not necessarily
follow a continuous monotonic profile. An interesting part of this exercise is that model config-
uration can generate cyclical behaviours, albeit of a shortish periodicity; however, with some
development in the parameter settings, inspecting and calibrating the fiscal policy rule, tax
and expenditure functions then it should be quite possible to generate a business cycle with a
periodicity somewhat approximate to that of what we observe. Furthermore, by calibrating the
persistence/consistency parameter in the fiscal policy rule, then it is possible to generate long
wave hysteresis. We have already shown that we can create a double or triple dip recession in
either tradable or non-tradable sectors or both.
This extension to the model and its implementation goes far beyond that of much of the lit-
erature and is an opportunity for further experimentation, calibration and configuration in an
attempt to replicate real world crisis episodes.
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Chapter 9
Summary, Discussion and Conclusion
9.1 Summary
Going back to the original question in Chapter 1:
Is it possible to create a flexible parsimonious macroeconomic computer simulation
model that can illustrate the frequency, types and time-paths of various financial
crises in an open economy with credit restrictions?
And then breaking it down into its component parts. First is a parsimonious macroeconomic
computer simulation? In answer, we can say that the underlying source macroeconomic model
is parsimonious and seminal using Eaton, Gersovitz and Stiglitz (1986) with modifications by
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2016a). The extensions include , using a fiscal policy rule (Cantore
et al., 2017) to drive variable tax, social transfers and government expenditures and the separ-
ation of private and public debt and its defaulting. By us separating public and private debt
we introduced a number of government bailout strategies, government debt default strategies
and haircutting policies. With the fiscal policy rule we introduce dynamic budgetary process
and the ability to set different fiscal policy realisations though taxation, social transfers and
government expenditures. The model uses the idea of policy scenarios to construct the pos-
sible combinations of parameters and strategies into meaningful calibratable replications of
real economies.
The second part is can system illustrate frequency, type and time-paths for crises? We demon-
strate throughout this work a wide range of simulations that show all of the information in a
comprehensible form. Moreover, we have a range of heuristic learning tools that analyse simu-
lations looking for crises sequences and then automatically classifies them. We then compared
a number of different classification of crises with real world data noting that the underlying
strategies in the real world are largely hidden. We show that we can replicate both private and
public debt crises paths.
Finally, to add to the answer, the suite that underpins the model has currently coded over
11,500 possible scenarios. We show that the flexibility of model by pushing the limits of the
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calibrations to identify areas of weakness and its ability to cover open economies. The only next
step would be to calibrate the model to the middle and low income countries and scenario test
the model’s veracity against the real examples. An important aspect is that crises are infrequent
in many cases and investigation into the political thinking at the time is normally clouded with
rhetoric. This we will leave for future development and research.
Now we have shown that a suite of models that can represent crises scenarios for a open eco-
nomy, its now important to reflect on the discussion in the first chapter. We took a pluralistic
approach to analysis, interpretation, and conclusions looking at the different economic schools
for theories and practical examples that may explain some of the outcomes. Moreover, we
draw on both narrational and empirical historical analysis to identify the strategies, policies
and actions governments, the private sector, foreign investor and NGO’s take when address-
ing a crises. Combining the different economic schools, the historical aspects with the more
traditional neoclassical theory tends to provide a clearer understanding of these most difficult
times for countries and their people.
Drawing back to the quote that started this work and the context that it provides for both
historical and recent events, we need to look at the role of economic actors in the wider context
of political power. For some, crises are an opportunity to gain wealth and power, for others
they are a source of misery. This leads us into our discussion.
9.2 Discussion
The following sections cover the important issue of Role of Government and Economic Actors,
Why governments intervene, what do the identify and what do they do and how they target
the intervention funds at. Finally we discuss why forecasting the timing, scope and depth of
crisis means that the economy is normally unprepared for a crisis and they response tends to
be emergency measures.
9.2.1 Why intervene? The Political Goals and Motivations
History may give some guidance on government policy on intervention or not as the case may
be, and the mechanisms. Finding a economic theoretical basis to determine the reasoning and
motivation from economics without considering the socio-political motivations as well would
fall somewhat short of justifiable hypothesis. Starting with the political reasoning, consider
the power differential between the financial institutions and the government. Over a period
of time leading up to the 2008 crisis there was a significant consolidation providing them with
structural power in the relationship (Culpepper and Reinke, 2014). First, this meant that the fo-
cus was on financial institutional bailouts, and not necessarily the rest of the economy, second,
the power dynamic worked differently in the UK and the US. In 2008, the threat of systemic
collapse was imminent, however, in both cases the regulator/government did not exercise its
power the take control by appointing commissioners of the functioning system part of the
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financial institutions1, rather it chose to inject a combination of capital and liquidity into the
institutions.
In the US, Congress railed against any public ownership or control only accepting a equity
injection into AIG to settle CDS liabilities as this was the primary source of mark-to-market
write-downs. In the UK where the government did not necessarily have the structural power,
they participation was voluntary and only participants where the highest risk with risk based
fees. As at 2016, the government still is in a loss position with the bailouts. In the US all
institutions, good or bad had to participate and a system or warrants ensured government got
is money back, the government has a net gain in the bailouts.
One characteristic common to both, shareholders retained their equity and if they waited until
the financial institutions had recovered, then regained all their losses. In the UK case, Gov-
ernment lost and shareholders gained (they did not loose the investment). The US, both gov-
ernment and shareholders made gains, however at the expense of future investors. The US
financial institution’s framing was that if they failed, that the real economy would be directly
affected though transactional banking. This is a significant consequence on the real economy if
it really occurs(Strahan, 2013). It is somewhat difficult to determine a direct motivation, how-
ever some factors include, political donations from the ‘shareholding’ class, the framing that
some financial institutions are too big to fail and the framing that the consequences are ‘unima-
ginable’. As the voting public do not have the direct influence that lobbying Corporations and
‘shareholding’ class has, the bias in motivation would be towards bailing financial institutions
to protect investors. A by-product is that the transactional part continues. We have the possible
set of motivators and the the reasoning to intervene.
Keynes focus would not necessarily be on the side of bailing out financial institutions. Rather,
the Keynesian directs effort to the household and protecting the household by boosting their
suppressed consumption creating effective demand. Nevertheless, one needs to consider in the
modern economy the almost total reliance on financial institutions to provide the transaction
infrastructure. This presents the government with a conundrum, does it protect the household
or does it ensure the transactional infrastructure continues. Many present this as mutually
exclusive, however they are not. If the government has sufficient resources and the political
will then it can protect all. However, even in the 2020 pandemic, countries such as the US have
not had that political will to protect the household, rather they put most of the relief into large
corporates. Money power reflects in political power that determines who wins and who loses
in a crisis.
9.2.2 Who do you protect? Competing ideologies
Once a crisis is upon a country, the government needs to decide what response. In the found-
ation scenario, the government only applies the fiscal rules and ideology whereas we observe
government intervention going beyond some formulaic tactic, rather taking a much more ag-
gressive intervention by transferring wealth from the government to the private sector to either
1There was one case, in the UK, Bradford and Bingley, government took control of the functioning transactional
part with deposits
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prevent or mitigate the crisis. We have already discussed in the motivation who is the intended
recipient of the intervention and the recipient that benefited from invention.
Many government proclaim that their policies are to benefit the people, however we dispute
this, rather government intervention tends to benefit firms and the select few of high value
investors with significant wealth transference from the lower two quartiles to the 1% Young,
Banerjee and Schwartz (2020). Fundamental question is, who is the government trying to pro-
tect? If is uses a supply side ideology, then it is more likely to be motivated by calls from FI
and corporates whereas a demand side ideology is more likely to focus on a household and
consumer difficulties. A cynical view is that government will only intervene if its power in the
current term or ability to be re-elected is compromised. Alternatively, the case of 1933 Germany
it was an excuse to concentrate of power in a single party. We can observe today in the US the
2020 crisis response motivation is more that of concentrating power in the donors and their
supporting political actors, thus shifting the political spectrum towards corporatism (Young,
Banerjee and Schwartz, 2020).
The US 1929 crash and the following fallout from policy by Hoover administration , it was clear
by 1932 where the impacts were and the bleak outlook, the role of austerity and classical eco-
nomic think was tested and failed (Skidelsky, 2018). Effectively, the US economy was close to a
subsistence level as Keynes hypotheses in The General Theory (Keynes, 1936). With increasing
civil unrest (something Keynes was always trying to avoid) similar to that of Germany in the
1920’s & 30’s could authoritarianism take old? Enter the New Deal.
The 1933 New Deal was clearly aimed at addressing the rank depravation from both the 1929
crash and the drought that the mid west America was experiencing(Kennedy, 2009). The causes
are a point of contention with claims that poor monetary policy, labour wage being that brought
about the crash. However, the consequences are well understood with the longest period of
depravation in US history and rippling to other economies including the Germany where it had
disastrous political consequences. The expansionism of the New Deal (and similar, however
for different purposes, expansionism in Germany under the NAZI regime) with the imposition
of substantial regulation on the financial infrastructure decreased unemployment by 50% in
18 months and the US economy started to expand. Only the fiscal conservatism of 1936/7
did the economy contract until WW2. The government created effective demand though big
infrastructure and many other projects whilst improving worker outcomes. Although firms
profited from the New Deal, they did not do so necessarily at the expense of the working and
middle class unlike the 2008 and 2020 crises (Jeffries, 1990).
There is significant criticism of the response and follow up to the 2008 crisis as many contend
that the government intervention focused on bailing out those that were the major contributors
to the crisis with little recourse to those that caused the crisis. This is seen as more egregious
in the case of the UK, that followed was a period of austerity supposedly motivated by the
notion that public debt levels pose a problem to the government Skidelsky (2018). The events
surrounding 2007/8 crises, although similar in the causal institutions, had very different re-
sponses by government to the crisis. Furthermore, the impact of the crisis was more direct
with much of the population dependent for their daily transactions on the financial infrastruc-
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ture.
When the fear of a financial system freeze, largely though a lack of trust leading to liquidity
not being distributed to those that needed it and the collapse of financial institution’s balance
sheets. The immediacy of the problem resulted in the intervention initially that stopped insolv-
ency, then attempted to get the financial institutions to extend credit though liquidity trans-
formation commonly known as QE. There are a number of issues with this approach, firstly,
it creates a moral hazard in the face of a scant regulatory environment that was significantly
degraded from the 1980’s onwards. The complete lack of enforcement of regulation through-
out Europe, UK and the USA with reinforcement by punishments for those organisations and
people that break them.
This is unlike Iceland where those that perpetrated fraud and mismanagement were fined and
imprisoned. Effectively, the government targetted the least vulnerable by injecting and pre-
venting financial institutions going into administration whilst offering very little to those most
affected (Skidelsky, 2018). Effectively, the government reduced the risk to investors in those
institutions, thus bailing out those with wealth. As to QE as a mechanism to bailout the cor-
porate sector, this inflates the equity and corporate bond market whilst not addressing the
fundamental issues of a lack of funds in the the consumers hands (Shah et al., 2019). The net
effect of continued QE is to suppress bond yields that many pension funds rely on as a ‘safe’
asset, hence a wealth transference to those that hold equity (Young, Banerjee and Schwartz,
2020; Kaymak, Leung and Poschke, 2020). In the UK, the 2010 policy changes in government
also contribute to this wealth transference with average UK household debt increasing and net
wealth remaining largely for the lower two quartiles of the population.
Example policy responses include 2010 UK budget that sought to resolve public debt at the
expense of social services, the IMF/ECB/Commission imposition on Greece in 2010, the lack
of response by the ECB during the financial crisis and such policies dating back to the New
Zealand Government in 1992. Furthermore, motivating tax cutting regimes as a form of stim-
ulus to the economy relying on a trickle down effect’ which was the mantra of Thatcher,
Regan and Trump, and with tacit support in learned economic text such as Elmendorf and
Gregory Mankiw (1999). These economist continue to imply taxation causes a dead-weight loss
and government debt is problematic to the economy relies largely on a homogeneous house-
hold agent (Stiglitz, 2018).
What often is the cause of policy misspecification is a lack of appreciation of the affects of par-
ticular assumptions. Furthermore, well known is that a representative agent may not scale all
agents that it represents (Sonnenschein, 1972) where income, consumption and savings habits
across the wealth spectrum can be very different. Economists that continue to portray their
beautiful mathematical models as some policy panacea without considering the assumptions
and social implications not only contribute to wealth concentration, they also complicit in the
consolidation of power (DeMartino, McCloskey and Nelson, 2014). Political history has taught
us that continuing down this style economic pathway is likely to result in civil unrest and pos-
sibly regime change, sometimes with dangerous consequences. Therefore, any government
intervention needs to address the problem of the people and not the problem of the wealthy
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few.
On the one hand, we have the neo-liberal, neoclassical socio-political economic ideology, on the
other the more socially constructive and societal cohesive socio-political economic ideology.
One could characterise the former as self serving individualism and the other as a form of
collectivism. Next to discuss the role of government and economic actors.
9.2.3 Role of Government and Economic Actors - Opinion
“The fact that an opinion has been widely held is no evidence whatever that it is not
utterly absurd; indeed in view of the silliness of the majority of mankind, a widely
spread belief is more likely to be foolish than sensible.” - Bertand Russell, Marriage
and Morals
In recent times, government has sought, in the private sector, to prevent or limit the damage
from a crisis which raises some policy and ideological conundrums. A fundamental question
that frames the way that we think about this intervention discussion is what is the role of
government and what role has economics had on influencing government policy?
In many legal and political texts, there is much debate over the role of government, in contrast,
most macro-economics texts, government tends to be either cast as a benevolent dictator or an
agent with the power to levies taxes, sets interest rates, borrows, social transfers and consumes.
These leaves a troubling question, for what purpose? We turn to Snowdon and Vane (2005, p7)
for some initial guidance on the literature. In summary, the different schools have widely
diverse roles for government. From Keynes with a more active role for government to that
of the classicals and neoclassicals where efficiency and optimality of the private sector and
government role is limited.
Smith (1937) and Smith (2010) although raises many concerns over government intervention
in a Laissez-faire whilst being the enforcing the law, arbiter of justice and defence of the nation.
The Austrian school follows ideology that markets will self correct with only short term pain
that is a contradistinction to that of Keynes that the free market is subject to coordination fail-
ures that lead to excessive and entrenched unemployment, eventual erosion of capital though
lack of investment and a subsistence equilibrium, hence a poor nation with little hope of re-
covery in the medium term. Therefore, turning back to politics and constitutional matters, as
Lincoln in the Gettysburg Address and the Constitution of France’s fifth Republic state clearly,
’ .... for the people ’ and if it acts in any other role then it shall perish. Translating that back into
Keynes, then one could argue that ‘... for the people’ would imply some form of protection in
times of trouble as market coordination failure cannot be attributed to every economic actor.
Furthermore, the matter that concerned Lincoln and the founding fathers was that although
individual freedoms need to be respected, there is an unequivocal role for government in gov-
ernance goods in common for the common good, enforcing the rule of law and protections
against abusive of power. Smith and Keynes would agree that regulation is a necessity to limit
the effects of excessive cycles, as is enforcement, albeit the degree would be for some debate!
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To use Smith’s analogies, the invisible hand becomes the guiding hand and the helping hand
when the the market fails.
So why have this discussion now. It is often neglected by Neoclassical economics is that its ideo-
logy limits the role of government as we illustrate above. However, we contend that without
defining the role of government in both social and economic settings, then any analysis and res-
ulting policy is, at best, misleading(Stiglitz, 2018). There is a darker side to the interpretations
from classical and neoclassical worlds. At worst, such limiting roles for government provide
political actors with a framing that promotes a select set of political ideologies using economics
as an excuse for their actions. Whether the motivation for those political actors is in their own
self interest and/or those that sway over political actors is beyond the scope of this work. Nev-
ertheless, the last 40 years has seen a concentration in wealth in a select sector of society and
disenfranchisement of those without the means to influence beyond the ballot box (Chomsky,
2017; Goda, 2018). Suffice it to say that such concentrations of wealth and their influence over
political actors can determine the which group of ’ ...for the people ’ will benefit from any gov-
ernment intervention. One could conjecture that the rescue response to the 2008 financial crisis
and the US government’s response to the 2020 pandemic is more about concentrating wealth
and power in a few rather than protecting the people.
One aspect mooted by the economics profession is that their responsibility ends at the publica-
tion of a article or paper and it is for policy makers to decide on the appropriate policy(DeMartino
et al., 2014). Many academic papers attempt to draw conclusions and pass judgements on gov-
ernment policy recommendations. An example is Thomas Sargent’s YouTube lecture entitled
“Computational Challenges in Macroeconomics” where he makes claim to simple mathemat-
ical models being tools for policy. However, many of the claims ignore the underlying assump-
tions that make them tractable, mathematically beautiful and/or parsimonious and these can
be material to the conclusions, therefore the judgements on policy. Economics is not an exer-
cise in mathematical beauty with some contest fought out in academic journals, its value comes
from the economic, hence social betterment of society. As in DeMartino, McCloskey and Stiglitz
(2014) ethical economic actors need to consider the wider implications of policy recommend-
ations and its moral implications. It is inexcusable for the economic actors to not appreciate
the contexts that judgement by those in eminent influencing positions both academic and pro-
fessional (Wallis, 2002). Furthermore, such lack of appreciative judgment making in the way
that academic ideas, namely mathematically solvable models and parsimony, are portrayed to
political actors with the glossing over core assumptions and a lack of explanation of model
limitations, leads to, at best, misinformation put in the hands of policy makers. At worst, rein-
forcing political ideologies, particularly at the conservative end of the political spectrum, with
hawkish government fiscal policy and near total reliance on monetary policy to solve macro-
economic cycles.
Regardless of motivational considerations of economic and political actors, it is plausible that
a significant crisis could trigger a sequence of events akin to those leading up to significant
civil unrest and move the political landscape in dangerous directions (Snyder, 2017). Therefore
we contend that economic actors, particularly those that influence policy either via academic
research or professional advice must be cognizant of the implications on social fabric of society.
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Failure to do so is a failure by those actors to consider the ethics of policy recommendations
with potentially deficient moral compass.
9.3 Conclusion
In this work, we take both an economic and political interpretation to understand and interpret
crises. Why both? Macroeconomics without politics is just empty theory and politics without
macroeconomics is just rhetoric. We claim that discussing one with the other is an exercise in
futility. As the world stands on a precipice of potential economic and social ruin, one lesson
from it is that the way that political actors think about economics is instrumental in how they
respond. They gain that knowledge from academic and professional economists. In the last
40-50 years, those educational economist have come from a range of similar thinking schools
that suit certain political ideologies. In some-way, we attempt to redress some of that balance
by taking a typical neoclassical mainstream model and adapting it to perform in a more in
line with the typical strategies employed by politicians to address crises. Making the model
flexible and adaptable ensures that it could be calibrated and configured to most middle and
lower income countries. We make clear the assumptions and the impact on any results from the
model. As we stated at the start, we make no policy claims, just insights into how economies
operate in a crisis.
As to implications from the modelling and simulation exercises herein, we have shown to some
extent that governments that act in a more benevolent way to the household normally have
better crisis outcomes. Moreover, and in contradiction to many of the mainstream economics
literature, our modelling reflects the empirical evidence that the private sector causes twice as
many crises as governments do and if government do cause a crises, it is normally as a result
of a corrupted political system. For the foreign investor, we confirm some of the findings of
Obstfeld et al. (2009) and the evidence from the Paris Club that it is in the interests of foreign
investors to negotiate rather than attempt to enforce unenforceable contracts. In many cases we
identify that foreign investors are better off continuing to fund the government accepting lower
returns so the government can bailout the private sector, thus preventing economic collapse.
One aspect it is important to address and a constant theme throughout this work is austerity.
This has been the mantra of many governments, NGO’s and macro-economists in response to
high levels of public debt. We show from both a historical narrative and a model derived form
that austerity actually makes the situation much worse and makes the economy much more
unstable. The obsession with the level of public debt by politicians and macro-economists is at
best foolhardy and at worst dangerous with civil unrest and social depravation. We have seen
that since the 2008 crisis, the lack-lustre socio-economic programmes and austerity policies has
boosted wealth interests of the already wealthy and deprived the low wealth individuals. With
wealth comes political power and that political power adopts policies in the interests of those
that fund them. Where this ends up, no one knows. Nevertheless, history has a nasty habit of
repeating itself.
However, it seems we do not learn the lessons of history. Although governments are better
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off protecting the household with credible interventions than a more self interested or non-
interventionist strategy, we still see many economists maintaining the same rhetoric of infla-
tion, debt and belt tightening based on fictional theories of the economy. Unless academic
economists explain the background and consequences to these ideologies to students then the
next generation will again repeat the same mistakes. As in the Dickens at the beginning of
this work, “It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it
was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity....” we
academic economists have a societal responsibility to ensure that future generations are not
preprogrammed with select set of ideologies but, are able to learn from history to make better
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Rule ρψ ρψy ρψd ψmin ψav ψset ψmax
MMM 0.6252 0.1478 0.0777 0.39277 0.80341 0.9 1.3659
MML 0.6252 0.1478 0.03885 0.43258 0.80553 0.9 1.3255
MMV 0.6252 0.1478 0.1554 0.32381 0.80111 0.9 1.4504
MLM 0.6252 0.0739 0.0777 0.40538 0.80301 0.9 1.3234
MLL 0.6252 0.0739 0.03885 0.44647 0.80513 0.9 1.2842
MLV 0.6252 0.0739 0.1554 0.33421 0.8007 0.9 1.4053
MHM 0.6252 0.2217 0.0777 0.38054 0.80409 0.9 1.4098
MHL 0.6252 0.2217 0.03885 0.41911 0.80621 0.9 1.368
MHV 0.6252 0.2217 0.1554 0.31373 0.80178 0.9 1.497
MZM 0.6252 0 0.0777 0.41841 0.80287 0.9 1.2822
MZL 0.6252 0 0.03885 0.46081 0.80499 0.9 1.2442
MZV 0.6252 0 0.1554 0.34494 0.80057 0.9 1.3616
LMM 0.4168 0.1478 0.0777 0.47541 0.82713 0.9 1.2384
LML 0.4168 0.1478 0.03885 0.52359 0.82932 0.9 1.2018
LMV 0.4168 0.1478 0.1554 0.39194 0.82476 0.9 1.3151
LLM 0.4168 0.0739 0.0777 0.49068 0.82672 0.9 1.1999
LLL 0.4168 0.0739 0.03885 0.54041 0.8289 0.9 1.1644
LLV 0.4168 0.0739 0.1554 0.40453 0.82435 0.9 1.2742
LHM 0.4168 0.2217 0.0777 0.46061 0.82783 0.9 1.2782
LHL 0.4168 0.2217 0.03885 0.5073 0.83001 0.9 1.2404
LHV 0.4168 0.2217 0.1554 0.37974 0.82546 0.9 1.3574
LZM 0.4168 0 0.0777 0.50644 0.82658 0.9 1.1625
LZL 0.4168 0 0.03885 0.55777 0.82876 0.9 1.1281
LZV 0.4168 0 0.1554 0.41752 0.82421 0.9 1.2345
Table A.1: Fiscal Policy Rule Parameters (1)
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Rule ρψ ρψy ρψd ψmin ψav ψset ψmax
HMM 0.74236 0.1478 0.0777 0.35279 0.79274 0.9 1.4432
HML 0.74236 0.1478 0.03885 0.38854 0.79483 0.9 1.4005
HMV 0.74236 0.1478 0.1554 0.29084 0.79046 0.9 1.5326
HLM 0.74236 0.0739 0.0777 0.36412 0.79234 0.9 1.3983
HLL 0.74236 0.0739 0.03885 0.40102 0.79443 0.9 1.3569
HLV 0.74236 0.0739 0.1554 0.30019 0.79006 0.9 1.4849
HHM 0.74236 0.2217 0.0777 0.34181 0.7934 0.9 1.4896
HHL 0.74236 0.2217 0.03885 0.37645 0.7955 0.9 1.4455
HHV 0.74236 0.2217 0.1554 0.28179 0.79113 0.9 1.5818
HZM 0.74236 0 0.0777 0.37582 0.7922 0.9 1.3548
HZL 0.74236 0 0.03885 0.4139 0.79429 0.9 1.3147
HZV 0.74236 0 0.1554 0.30983 0.78993 0.9 1.4387
ZMM 0 0.1478 0.0777 0.69651 0.89512 0.9 1.0181
ZML 0 0.1478 0.03885 0.7671 0.89748 0.9 0.98798
ZMV 0 0.1478 0.1554 0.57422 0.89256 0.9 1.0812
ZLM 0 0.0739 0.0777 0.71888 0.89467 0.9 0.98643
ZLL 0 0.0739 0.03885 0.79175 0.89703 0.9 0.95724
ZLV 0 0.0739 0.1554 0.59266 0.89211 0.9 1.0475
ZHM 0 0.2217 0.0777 0.67483 0.89588 0.9 1.0508
ZHL 0 0.2217 0.03885 0.74323 0.89824 0.9 1.0197
ZHV 0 0.2217 0.1554 0.55635 0.89331 0.9 1.1159
ZZM 0 0 0.0777 0.74198 0.89452 0.9 0.95573
ZZL 0 0 0.03885 0.81718 0.89688 0.9 0.92744
ZZV 0 0 0.1554 0.6117 0.89196 0.9 1.0149





ALLxx All events All
BAILA All bailouts All bailouts
BAILF Govt unsuccessfully bails out Household anything starting with BF**
BAILS Govt successfully bails out Household Anything successful
BAILx Govt bails out Household
BAILx.BFHDx Govt bails out Household, Govt attempts and
fails bailout, HH defaults
BAILx.GDEFx Govt bails out Household, Government defaults
BAILx.HDGTx Govt bails out Household, Government refused
bailout debt greater than limit
BAILx.HDLTx Govt bails out Household, Government refused
bailout debt less than limit
BFGDA All events starting with a failed bailout attempt,
government default
All Household and govt
default together
BFHDA All events starting with a failed bailout attempt,
household default
Only some failed with a
Household default
BFHDx Govt Attempts and fails bailout, HH defaults
BFHDx.BFGDx Govt Attempts and fails bailout, HH defaults, HH
causes Govt to default after failed bailout
BFHDx.GDEFx Govt Attempts and fails bailout, HH defaults,
Government defaults
Table B.1: Event Sequence Classification (1)
B.1 Scenario Event Counts
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Classification Description Summarising
GDEFA All events starting with a government default All government initiated
sequences
GDEFx Government defaults
GDEFx.BAILx Government defaults, Govt bails out Household
GDEFx.BFHDx Government defaults, Govt Attempts and fails
bailout, HH defaults
GDEFx.GDHDx Government defaults, Govt default causes HH
default
GDEFx.HDGTx Government defaults, Government refused
bailout debt greater than limit
GDEFx.HDLTx Government defaults, Government refused
bailout debt less than limit
GDEFx.HDNBx Government defaults, Government does not
bailout
HDGDA All events starting with a household defaulting
followed by government defaulting in same
period
HDGTA Government refused bailout debt greater than
limit
All failed bailouts where
public debt was above the
limit
HDGTx Government refused bailout debt greater than
limit
HDGTx.BAILx Government refused bailout debt greater than
limit, Govt bails out Household
HDGTx.GDEFx Government refused bailout debt greater than
limit, Government defaults
HDGTx.HD~GD Government refused bailout debt greater than
limit, Government forced to default, because HH
defaulted first as government limited bailout
Table B.2: Event Sequence Classification
210
Classification Description Summarising
HDLTA Government refused bailout debt less than limit All failed bailouts where
public debt was below the
limit
HDLTx Government refused bailout debt less than limit
HDLTx.BAILx Government refused bailout debt less than limit,
Govt bails out Household
HDLTx.BFHDx Government refused bailout debt less than limit,
Govt attempts and fails bailout, HH defaults
HDLTx.GDEFx Government refused bailout debt less than limit,
Government defaults
HDNBA All events starting with a No bailout Where government has a
policy of not bailing out
HDNBx Government does not bailout
HDNBx.GDEFx Government does not bailout, Government
defaults
HDNBx.HD~GD Government does not bailout, Government forced
to default, because HH defaulted first as
government limited bailout


















































































ALLxx 28034 37491 30704 36815 37108 30489 37171 30421 30261 62781 37750 54074 37175 54094 25202 27860
BAILA 21034 23794 22573 0 4782 4044 19114 23355 7076 0 21899 4943 0 0 0 0
BAILF 1111 1737 1242 0 1494 1084 394 1747 1444 0 3459 802 0 0 0 0
BAILx 19923 22057 21331 0 3288 2960 18720 21608 5632 0 18440 4141 0 0 0 0
BAILx.BFHDx 34 58 42 0 49 38 0 53 37 0 155 46 0 0 0 0
BAILx.GDEFx 1077 1679 1200 0 1442 1041 78 1694 1403 0 3304 756 0 0 0 0
BAILx.HDGTx 0 0 0 0 0 0 316 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BAILx.HDLTx 0 0 0 0 3 5 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BFHDA 123 249 144 0 258 155 0 147 134 0 399 631 0 0 0 0
BFHDx 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 0 0 0 0
BFHDx.BFGDx 96 204 117 0 212 121 0 112 103 0 338 608 0 0 0 0
BFHDx.GDEFx 27 45 27 0 46 34 0 35 31 0 59 20 0 0 0 0
GDEFA 6877 13448 7987 12939 13217 7882 13148 6919 6917 40483 15452 48500 15005 48549 999 3826
GDEFx 6329 12819 5788 12311 12594 5709 12514 6187 6183 36810 10952 224 10619 215 977 3602
GDEFx.BAILx 75 404 70 0 4 70 401 132 132 0 280 111 0 0 0 0
GDEFx.BFHDx 353 0 563 0 0 544 0 416 422 0 369 131 0 0 0 0
GDEFx.GDHDx 120 225 1566 230 228 1559 230 184 180 2534 3851 48034 3766 48089 7 18
GDEFx.HDGTx 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
GDEFx.HDLTx 0 0 0 0 391 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
GDEFx.HDNBx 0 0 0 398 0 0 0 0 0 1139 0 0 620 245 15 206


















































































HDGTA 0 0 0 0 0 0 4909 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
HDGTx 0 0 0 0 0 0 3154 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
HDGTx.BAILx 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
HDGTx.GDEFx 0 0 0 0 0 0 1545 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
HDGTx.HD~GD 0 0 0 0 0 0 207 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
HDLTA 0 0 0 0 18851 18408 0 0 16134 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
HDLTx 0 0 0 0 18615 18232 0 0 15809 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
HDLTx.BAILx 0 0 0 0 133 127 0 0 207 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
HDLTx.BFHDx 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
HDLTx.GDEFx 0 0 0 0 103 49 0 0 113 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
HDNBA 0 0 0 23876 0 0 0 0 0 22298 0 0 22170 5545 24203 24034
HDNBx 0 0 0 21949 0 0 0 0 0 17191 0 0 18350 4129 24114 23414
HDNBx.GDEFx 0 0 0 1714 0 0 0 0 0 4438 0 0 3441 800 81 570
HDNBx.HD~GD 0 0 0 213 0 0 0 0 0 669 0 0 379 616 8 50


















































































ALLxx 23879 24484 23753 24290 24715 30704 30489 30421 30261 124,940 224,600 194,680 349,990 193,090 123,340 27734
BAILA 23592 24188 0 0 0 22573 4044 23355 7076 18817 13660 13496 5795 0 0 0
BAILF 27 28 0 0 0 1242 1084 1747 1444 8964 10449 8749 5795 0 0 0
BAILx 23565 24160 0 0 0 21331 2960 21608 5632 9853 3211 4747 0 0 0 0
BAILx.BFHDx 1 1 0 0 0 42 38 53 37 373 351 308 278 0 0 0
BAILx.GDEFx 26 27 0 0 0 1200 1041 1694 1403 8591 10098 8441 5517 0 0 0
BAILx.HDGTx 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BAILx.HDLTx 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BFHDA 2 2 0 0 0 144 155 147 134 2053 2980 2266 3197 0 0 0
BFHDx 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BFHDx.BFGDx 2 2 0 0 0 117 121 112 103 1825 2829 2032 3007 0 0 0
BFHDx.GDEFx 0 0 0 0 0 27 34 35 31 228 151 234 190 0 0 0


















































































HDGTA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
HDGTx 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
HDGTx.BAILx 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
HDGTx.GDEFx 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
HDGTx.HD~GD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
HDLTA 0 0 0 0 0 0 18408 0 16134 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
HDLTx 0 0 0 0 0 0 18232 0 15809 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
HDLTx.BAILx 0 0 0 0 0 0 127 0 207 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
HDLTx.BFHDx 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
HDLTx.GDEFx 0 0 0 0 0 0 49 0 113 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
HDNBA 0 0 23489 24017 24360 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15585 20711 21096
HDNBx 0 0 23468 23996 24327 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3808 9082 19882
HDNBx.GDEFx 0 0 20 20 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9748 9755 1115
HDNBx.HD~GD 0 0 1 1 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2029 1874 99
Table B.7: Frequency of Events (2b)
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Figure B.3: contd., Summary sequence events by scenario
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